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A L F R E D A K N O P F

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Recently, after years of ill health and several acute periods of organic trouble, there retired from the Department of Agriculture a fine public servant. I knew him well, but he was not widely known in Washington, and certainly known but little to the nation. On retiring he wrote: "I have been only a small part of the Department of Agriculture, but the Department of Agriculture has been a great part of me." Throughout the country there are scores of thousands of able civil servants performing their duties with high devotion to the interest of a public almost unaware of them. The government is a great part of them. I am sure they would like this inscription shared in just this way:

TO
JOHN CITIZEN
AND
BILL BUREAUCRAT

Through twelve years in government my respect and affection for both of them have grown steadily.



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FIRST EDITION

IN TWELVE YEARS of governmental service there have come to me thousands of letters. One that I remember most vividly was written in pencil, on rough tablet paper, and badly spelled. It began: "Dear Mr. Germint." As I read it, I kept glancing back at the salutation, wondering why that letter had come to my desk, wondering who Mr. Germint was. When I had finished the letter—the outpouring of a tale of woe from a simple, colored Southern tenant farmer—and had glanced back once more at the salutation, I looked at the envelope in which it had come. It was addressed:

*U. S. Germint,
Washington, D. C.*

That humble farmer was simply looking to the U. S. government as a friendly source of assistance and a proper place to present his troubles for consideration. Personifying the government was the only way he knew of asking for help from the big democracy we have become.

I could not at the time I received that letter, and I cannot now, pose as "Mr. Germint." Yet I have had an extraordinary opportunity to see government operate.

During the next decade few things will be more important than the way in which our people and our officials approach the job of reconciling the necessities of big government with the values of democracy in an industrial civilization. The issue inheres in the war itself: it is a struggle of big governments that are pitiless in their disregard of humanity against big governments that are dedicated above all to the welfare of persons and peoples.

So it is that I have responded to the urgings of some of my friends to try to put on paper something of what I have learned as a result of my experience. It will not have the widespread interest that might attach to a more factual, more historical, or more anecdotal recital. The book consists much less in what I have seen and experienced than in what I have come to think as a result. Nor does it present in full and rounded view the problem of government as I

now see it. What I have rather tried to do is to emphasize certain considerations regarding contemporary democracy which other writers have either minimized or missed altogether. In so doing I lay myself open to those who will wish to charge me with being the world's most bureaucratic bureaucrat. Yet I have no more vested interest in the government than any other citizen.

Even among the best-informed citizens there is little understanding of modern government. Perhaps no one would assert that he understands America except in the sense of knowing certain aspects of the nation's life. One may know one's community, one's state, one may read much and travel widely through the country, and still feel humble about one's grasp of what makes this nation what it is. The organized government comprehends in some way, it impinges upon and is affected by, practically everything that exists or moves in our society. It involves policies and actions of immense complexity. Its fullest possible understanding requires the wisdom of the anthropologist, the historian, the economist, the sociologist, the political scientist, the farmer, the laborer, the merchant, the industrialist, the banker, the politician, the philosopher, and many more.

What we normally get in discussions of government is much less. We get a repetition of shibboleths. We get debates. The newspapers give us daily snapshots of government, not panoramas. Nor do the snapshots run together present a panorama. They are chosen for dramatic or spot interest, not for completeness and perspective. Correspondents at the Dumbarton Oaks conference told State Department officials: "We are not interested when you agree; we want to know when you disagree." That approach and its limitations are implicit in newspaper conventions. Press competition for advance news leads to such a high percentage of speculative news that at times I suspect the people of knowing more about what their government did not do than they know about what it did.

Similarly, the more serious and scholarly discussions of governmental administration usually concern procedures, mechanics, and operational detail; they reflect the method of microscopic examination and analysis. Or they turn the microscope from one small organizational unit to another and present us with an analysis of many trees without providing any views of the governmental forest.

The only value of public discussions of the procedural-analysis variety is in creating a greater willingness on the part of citizens and Congress to appropriate funds for the employment of adequate staffs having to do with that kind of management. In every organization opportunity always exists to develop and use more efficient procedures. But there is even now within government more wisdom about such things, in the governmental setting, than there is outside of government. The public has and needs no more basis for judging such matters than it has need of a basis for judging the mechanics and procedures of General Motors or General Foods. The broader aspect of this problem—organization—also is chiefly a problem for specialists. A popular or pressure-group demand for the consolidation of two departments would have no more validity than would a popular demand to consolidate the Bethlehem Steel and Firestone Rubber companies.

Efficiency specialists have an important place in government, but no efficiency engineer will ever solve the principal problems of government. Other specialists can make important contributions to the general improvement of government, but those specialists will be social scientists and administrators rather than efficiency engineers.

The problems of greatest magnitude and difficulty are extremely broad problems, their character is such that they cannot be solved by breaking them into small parts and then analyzing, measuring, and improving each part. The nature of the problem must first be seen and understood. Many of the problems have to do with the whole being of the Congress and the Executive—indeed, of the nation itself. Some of the principal problems exist in tradition and in popular and official attitudes. Surely the problem of how a President may better manage the executive branch is not by half a problem of administrative management in the usual, rather narrow sense of that phrase. The same is true of the problem of managing a Cabinet department. If the ablest administrative management specialists in the country should be substituted for the President and his Cabinet, popular satisfaction with the government would diminish greatly. The reason is simple: over-all, true efficiency would decline. Specialists in administrative management fully realize this

truth. Yet of course there should be many more administrative management specialists in high posts than there are today.

Persons who are not outstanding musicians may make valuable and intensive studies of piano construction, of tone quality, or of harmonic combinations. It would still remain for musicians to make use of the information. And it would be absurd to advise a young person to learn to play all of the orchestral instruments as a certain and simple way of qualifying for the post of conductor.

The principal problems of government are to be solved, relatively and progressively, by the combined efforts of scholars, specialists, administrators, politicians, and the public. It is the whole contribution of the executive branch I have in mind when I think of "public administration." This book is intended to have something to do with public administration. It aims to do three things: to present one general impression of government, of the situation within which it functions, and of some of the general ways by which it functions; to comment on various proposals illustrative of possible improvements; and to give some suggestion of relative values in the public consideration of modern government.


Laws are practical and dynamic expressions of what Justice Holmes called "the felt necessities of the time." Government is the active effort to satisfy, for the people, those felt necessities. All discussions of government in our big democracy should be based on a recognition that that is its central role. Let us hope that they will run less and less in terms of "the government" as something separate and more and more in terms of "our government"—the greatest single resource of the American people.

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Government Is Different

IT IS EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT clearly to identify the factors which make government different from every other activity in society. Yet this difference is a fact and I believe it to be so big a difference that the dissimilarity between government and all other forms of social action is greater than any dissimilarity among those other forms themselves. Without a willingness to recognize this fact, no one can even begin to discuss public affairs to any good profit or serious purpose.

Analysis of Differences

Some of the less important of these differences are generally acknowledged and accepted. For example, the public recognizes without much thought or question that a good lawyer will not necessarily make a good judge. Dimly, except by those who have paid special attention to the matter, it is seen that the function of a judge, even though it has to do with law, is very different from the function of a lawyer. Attorneys treat specific situations in terms of the interests of their clients except only for the making of necessary adjustments to legal, ethical, and public-relations considerations. To have a society made up entirely of persons thinking like lawyers and clients, no matter how well intentioned, would be plainly impractical if not impossible. We must also have persons thinking and acting like judges. Yet many of us fail to recognize the need of having persons thinking and acting like government officials. To elevate an excellent lawyer to the bench will not guarantee society even a tolerably good judge. It should be equally patent that men with excellent records in private business will not necessarily make competent government officials.

In both cases, particularly in the lower brackets, there is through self-selection a certain automatic correction that limits the number of major errors in appointments. Many lawyers are not attracted to

the bench. Their disinterest usually reflects some missing qualification. Should an opportunity for appointment to a very high court be offered, there would be some tendency for the thought of honor and prestige to outweigh other considerations. But, in general, individual tastes and interests furnish material evidence of qualification and play a positive role in the process of selection. So in the choosing of government personnel. In ordinary periods many persons have little inclination to enter government, while others are strongly attracted to it. These inclinations and disinclinations are significant, and sometimes controlling, factors in the determination of the general result. In extraordinary times, however, new factors such as patriotism, desire for adventure, or other considerations may come into play and cause proportionately a far greater number of people to aspire to positions in the public service. Many of these persons will, by reason of temperament, outlook, and experience, be utterly unqualified for government work. Others will be qualified only to advise; in government they are technicians—experts in specific non-governmental enterprises. By and large, those who do not normally and consistently feel a great interest in government will not be good prospects. In general, the more they have succeeded in non-governmental fields, the more they have developed interests and habits of thought that will unfit them for government. Obviously the more delicate and difficult distinctions have to do with upper-bracket positions. There, surely, patriotism, zeal, and intelligence could never be enough—any more than they could be accepted as adequate criteria in selecting candidates for the bench from the ranks of the bar, or in selecting army generals from non-military ranks.

Admittedly there are many positions in government in which persons may function very much as they would outside of government. This is true chiefly in such lower-bracket jobs as those of charwomen, elevator operators, messengers, clerks, and typists. Yet even with respect to these there are countless instances where the employee works for the government because he definitely prefers public employment and where that preference has served the public interest. The public would be gratified and moved if it could know of them. Some day it will. For, sooner or later, regard for self-interest, coupled with a sense of justice, will cause the public to be concerned far beyond

what it is today over contemptuous attitudes toward lowly government "clerks" and bureaucrats.

Government is not different, however, simply in respect of personnel. The temperament and attitude of a judge do not furnish a complete basis for understanding the character and functioning of our judicial system. Courts are not simply assemblages of judges. Neither are they simply a succession of judicial procedures. Both of these and something over are required to make a judicial *system*. Hence the importance of popular attitudes regarding what is expected in and from a judge. All these things together, expressed in individually well-selected judges, are essential to an effective judiciary. So it is with government in general. It, too, is a *system*, and the system cannot be understood except in terms of the public employees themselves, their conceptions of their positions, and the attitudes of the public about what is required in and from our civil servants. These elements together are what make government a system, for in combination they comprise what we call a bureaucracy.

The qualifications for judges differ from those for other governmental people because their functions differ. Yet these qualifications may be used to illustrate a fundamental distinction between governmental and non-governmental tasks. In common speech reference is made to the "judicial temperament." One might similarly refer to the governmental temperament. But temperament seems to me to be less satisfactory as a common denominator than attitude. Consequently I shall speak of the "governmental attitude."

Significance of Attitudes

In my judgment no one can serve the public as it should be served by a governmental official unless he has a public-interest attitude with certain special characteristics. The carrying on of government involves action. No matter how many studies may be required, government in the final analysis is action—organized action. Persons in high positions must have a sense of action. They must have a feeling of the need for decisions to get things done. They must be able to organize resources whether of personnel, material, or information so that contemplation of objectives will be translated into accomplishment.

What has been said with reference to action is familiar to the field of business no less than government. I have, one might say, portrayed the executive, particularly the big business executive. But what I have said up to this point is, of itself, no more adequate to make a governmental administrator than knowledge of the law alone is adequate qualification for a judge. Even possessed of patriotism and zeal, the most capable business executive in the country might be a most dismal failure in government. Indeed, in actual fact many such persons do fail in government. The press, however, ordinarily treats them with such special favor, and their prestige generally is so great, that the public rarely learns of their failure. Strangely enough, their actual induction into government is often political rather than the opposite, as is commonly supposed. Frequently they are appointed to official positions as a means for securing additional support for governmental action. Or they are sought for their prestige, which, since government has the job of maintaining and developing political unity, is always a factor for legitimate consideration.

This feeling for action and this ability to organize resources for action do, of course, resemble corresponding talents that are essential for non-governmental executives. There are business executives who can serve government well, and vice versa. But just as there are successful business executives who could not do well in government, so it is true that some governmental executives who are able to administer public affairs with distinction would probably fail if transferred to private enterprise.

It is instructive to observe that big businessmen who have inherited large business interests seem, on the average, to be better bets for government service than those of the self-made variety. This is probably the result of the development of a special attitude of public responsibility inculcated by parents who were especially conscientious or concerned about what inherited wealth might do to their children. It may derive, too, from some special stimulation to self-questioning and reflection forced by their station of privilege on especially responsible young people. Or it may be the result of their being able or, for that matter, obliged to deal with their affairs more *generally*—that is, with less concentration on the ordinary objective of managing things with an eye to monthly earnings and profits.

Many businessmen, especially those of the self-made variety, have the disadvantage for government service of being *prima donnas*, with strong personalities too little adjustable to situations other than the ones they have come to dominate. This is true also, to be sure, of some types of vivid politicians who are effective as spokesmen but unable to function as administrators. It seems to be true both of businessmen and politicians that the spread of their activity—their participation in more than one field, and preferably in many more than one—has something to do with their ability to *manage* governmental organizations. Politicians inevitably rub up against more considerations; they tend to be more broadly stimulated. Thus any man of political inclinations who has had organizational and executive experience would be a superior prospect for success as a public official for the reason that he would, almost inevitably, have developed breadth of view and a public-interest attitude.

How Business Looks at Government

It may be unfortunate, but it is nevertheless a fact that, because of factors beyond its control, no industry can realize its own social aspirations. It is also true that no industry can regard public interest equally with industrial interest. That cannot be its function; it must have a different and narrower one. Governments exist precisely for the reason that there is a need to have special persons in society charged with the function of promoting and protecting the public interest.

People tend to develop a sense of responsibility with respect to the functions for which officially they are responsible. Ordinary people brought into government tend to develop some special degree of public responsibility. Yet there are wide ranges of differences in this respect, as everyone knows. Long concentration on other functions unfits a great many people for governmental service. I have seen scores of businessmen in government who were not able to sense the differences between government and business. Without being venal, some thought their positions in government simply a fortunate special privilege, like being the cousin of a purchasing agent. Others again had the fixed idea that the best possible way of promoting the public welfare would be to help private business and assumed

accordingly that doing favors for private business was their simple governmental duty.

Business itself, however, does not feel that way in its general attitude toward government. In all things other than those that make for its own profit, a business concern expects government to be guided by a public-interest point of view. The brevity of cabled news sometimes makes such things clearer than does the lengthier reporting of news at home. Consider, for example, this dispatch in the Paris edition of the *New York Herald-Tribune* for the year 1934:

U. S. INVESTMENT BANKERS ENDORSE
ROOSEVELT POLICY

White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., Oct. 31—The Convention of the Investment Bankers Association, meeting here, offered today its full assistance to President Roosevelt in his recovery program.

A resolution was passed in which it was stated that the members of the association would stand behind the President *in all measures which were not calculated to infringe on their own interests*. The bankers offered Roosevelt their *whole-hearted support in particular in all his efforts on their behalf*.

The italics are mine.

Since most governmental actions affect other persons more than they do us as individuals, we all wish governmental action to be what it needs to be with respect to others, while yet, of course, being considerate of us. The truly governmental official in a democracy comes in the course of time to appreciate this. Under the impact of popular demands and lamentations he comes to realize that he must try to operate in a governmental way; that is, through action which is as fair as possible, and as uniform as possible, and which can be taken publicly and publicly explained.

Essential Character of Government

In broad terms the governmental function and attitude have at least three complementary aspects that go to differentiate government from all other institutions and activities: breadth of scope, impact, and consideration; public accountability; political character. No non-governmental institution has the breadth of government.

Nothing the national government does in New England can be separated from what it does in New Mexico. Other enterprises may ignore factors remotely related to their central purposes but not the government of the United States; it is supported, tolerated, or evicted on the basis of a balance involving the sum total of everything in the nation. No other institution is so publicly accountable. No action taken or contemplated by the government of a democracy is immune to public debate, scrutiny, or investigation. No other enterprise has such equal appeal or concern for everyone, is so equally dependent on everyone, or deals so vitally with those psychological intangibles which reflect popular economic needs and social aspirations. Other institutions, admittedly, are not free from politics, but government *is* politics.

Government administration differs from all other administrative work to a degree not even faintly realized outside, by virtue of its public nature, the way in which it is subject to public scrutiny and public outcry. An administrator coming into government is struck at once, and continually thereafter, by the press and public interest in every detail of his life, personality, and conduct. This interest often runs to details of administrative action that in private business would never be of concern other than inside the organization. Each employee hired, each one demoted, transferred, or discharged, every efficiency rating, every assignment of responsibility, each change in administrative structure, each conversation, each letter, has to be thought about in terms of possible public agitation, investigation, or judgment. Everything has to be considered in terms of what any employee anywhere may make of it, for any employee may be building a file of things that could be made publicly embarrassing. Any employee who later may be discharged is a potentially powerful enemy, for he can reach the press and Congress with whatever charges his knothole perspective may have invited. Charges of wrongdoing on the part of a government official are always news, no matter who makes the charge, for every former employee is regarded as a source of authoritative and inside information.

In private business the same employee would be discredited by the very fact of having been discharged. Government employees

number far less than non-government employees, but the cases of discharged government workers getting into the public prints with denunciations of their former chiefs must be at least a thousand times more frequent. A person discharged is always offended. But whereas a person discharged from a private job is of little interest to the press, the dismissal of a person from a public job is regarded as public business.

This is not to say that I would have it otherwise. I am simply calling attention to it as a fact that greatly differentiates government from business. But the public would do well in judging such reports to consider them in perspective with similar, unaired situations in non-governmental fields.

Because of these circumstances, every governmental executive lives and moves and has his being in the presence of public dynamite. Every action he may take is influenced by this condition—whether before or after an explosion.

Millions of dollars are spent every year in government because of this situation—millions that would not have to be spent in private organizations. In a narrow sense government tends therefore to be less efficient because of its public nature. But since government operates more in the public interest because of such special attention and scrutiny, the net effect is to make it more efficient in terms of its central purpose.

As an illustration of the way in which disgruntled or dismissed employees cause expenditures of millions of dollars a year, let me cite the case of a man whom I have never seen, but whose activities I had occasion to follow for a full decade. During this entire period (and also for ten years preceding it) he carried on a continuous series of campaigns against a half-dozen of the ablest executives in the government. He talked *ad hominem* and *ad infinitum* to writers of gossip columns. He wrote to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to other administrative officials, and to members of the Congress. He made hundreds of charges of misconduct, not one of which was warranted. Each one, however, had to be carefully investigated and duly reported. His superiors were reluctant to discharge him for communicating with members of Congress because to do so would perhaps have convinced hostile Congressmen of the

truth of the charges. He cost the government hundreds of times more than his salary, and he stayed on the job until he reached retirement age.

The public nature of the government's business thus makes for a great difference in organizational discipline. Government employees often discuss their work with others in a way that would cause immediate discharge were they on the payroll of a private organization. Press and public both expect and induce that kind of talk. Business executives coming into government with no experience to prepare them for such a situation often find it extremely hard to adjust themselves to it. Yet some adjustment is an absolute necessity.

Generally the bigger a corporation, the more complex it is. An outsider can easily get lost in any of its fields of operations—raw materials, marketing, production, labor relations, finance, and management. Yet in relation to the United States government even the very largest corporation is small and simple. And the more big corporations we have, the more complex must the government become. Government, dealing in one way or another with almost everything, requires in its highest officials a special competence in handling relationships among all the varied and powerful forces, activities, and elements in the country. At the top the job is that of managing relationships between the complex parts of the entire nation, of giving both form and leadership to the life of the whole people. At that level it is an art—the art of politics. Only a politician can be President. The President needs economic understanding, but he should not function as an economist; he needs legal understanding, but he should not function as a lawyer; he needs business understanding, but he should not function as a businessman; he needs social understanding, but he should not function as a sociologist; he needs understanding of research, but he should not function as a scientist; he needs understanding of agriculture, labor, finance, but he should not function as a farmer, laborer, or banker. He needs to understand these *broadly* in order to understand politics: his success or failure as President depends on how he functions as a politician. At its best, politics is statesmanship.

Statecraft—government—is different from all other professions because it is broader than anything else in the field of action. Purely

speculative thought and emotion may range a wider field, yet even this may be doubted, for government must be concerned with intellectual and emotional outreachings too. Government is different because it must take account of all the desires, needs, actions, thoughts, and sentiments of 140,000,000 people. Government is different because government is politics.

Size

PUBLIC OFFICIALS usually work into governmental administration bit by bit, starting with a single function and moving on to others. When one arrives at a center of complexity by that method, one may gain a sense of perspective so gradually as not to be conscious of having acquired it—or one may be enabled to do one's work without very much real perspective. For the most part, students of government have to approach administration in the same way. After a general consideration of history and political theory, they have to examine the actual administrative process bit by bit. Only rarely and after long reflection do they get to the point where they can see it in the large, with all the bits related to each other. It is possible, however, for a person to develop some sense of perspective and proportion rather quickly if he is suddenly plunged into the center of the complexity of modern public administration and makes a genuine effort to look at it from that vantage point.

Perhaps there is no way so well designed to get away from the usual analysis by segments as to go directly to the fact of size. Public administrators and politicians do not like to admit the fact of size. In self-protection they minimize the size of the agencies they direct and control by finding ways to make them appear smaller than they really are. Journalists, for different reasons, participate in this evasion; in order to make their news stories more easily manageable they personalize administrative action. By common practice they report developments that are the product of a functioning and intricate organization simply as the action of Secretary Blank.

My own introduction to public administration was something like the one I propose to offer here. Brought into government unexpectedly in March 1933, into a position of responsibility over a huge and complex Department, my first necessity was to try to understand that Department as a whole. I looked about for individuals who could lend me a day-to-day, Department-wide operating perspective,

even if from single vantage points. As I remember, I found only eight persons who commanded an overview of the entire Department. I never actually counted them. There may have been one or two more, but there probably were less. Today I can remember three. The great majority of the important executives had only segmented responsibilities, running up and down a single hierarchy, but seldom embracing two or three. Limited in function and experience, they were similarly limited in perspective—necessarily so. Moreover, since by training and inclination most of them were specialists, it is not likely that, even had they been charged with broader functions, they would have had the perspective I sought. The Secretary of Agriculture, whose administrative assistant I was, had department-wide and governmental responsibilities. Even with the extraordinary breadth and background he had, however, he could not manage the Department successfully without the aid of a number of strong and able persons who could help him visualize the Department as an entity and as a whole.

USDA as of March 1933

For those who can sense problems of interrelationships, a general picture of that Department as it existed in March 1933 will illustrate the nature of the problem we want to examine.

It was the largest research organization in the world. It had the most extensive organization for disseminating to farmers and to the public the fruits of that research. The issuance of crop reports, crop estimates, statistical analyses, and research findings through thousands of press releases and thousands of formal bulletins, and the distribution of this information through agricultural colleges and county agents, tied in with related work done at state experiment stations—these things alone made a great and complex administrative task.

It was a great regulatory agency, if one may use the word "regulation" to cover, among other matters, the whole field of inspection, the fixing of standards, and the enforcement of them. The Department then administered more than sixty statutes of this general nature. Even a smaller list, made some years later after several bureaus had been transferred away from the Department, will convey

some idea of this second great field of administrative authority and responsibility:

1. Act of May 29, 1884, 23 Stat. 32, secs. 5 and 6 (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. 113, 115: to prevent exportation and interstate transportation of livestock and poultry known to be diseased or from an area found by the Secretary to be "infected."

2. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 833; May 28, 1928, 45 Stat. 789 (1929), 45 U. S. C. A. 75: to provide for safe and proper transportation and humane treatment of cattle, horses, mules, asses, sheep, goats, or swine which are exported from the ports of the United States; to authorize the Secretary to examine all vessels which are to carry such animals and to prescribe rules and regulations regarding accommodations which said vessels shall provide for such animals.

3. Act of May 9, 1902, 32 Stat. 196 (1935), 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 995 (Renovated Butter Act): to provide for the supervision of the labeling of processed or renovated butter and the sanitary inspection of establishments where renovated butter is made.

4. Act of February 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 791, secs. 1 and 2, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 111 et seq.: to regulate the exportation, importation and interstate shipment of livestock and poultry from any locality where the Secretary has reason to believe that infectious animal diseases exist.

5. Act of February 1, 1905, 33 Stat. 628 (1927), 16 U. S. C. A., sec. 551 (Transfer Act and Related Statutes): to regulate the occupancy and use of national forests and to preserve them from destruction.

6. Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1264 and 1269 (1927), 21 U. S. C. A., sec. 123 (Animal Quarantine Act): to prevent the interstate transportation of livestock and poultry from areas which the Secretary has quarantined after he has determined that there are livestock or poultry therein "affected with contagious, infectious, or communicable" diseases.

7. Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 607 (1927), 16 U. S. C. A., sec. 684 (Twenty-eight-Hour Law): to prohibit the confinement by common carriers of animals in the course of interstate transportation for a longer period than twenty-eight consecutive hours without unloading the same in a humane manner into properly equipped pens for

rest, water, and feeding for a period of at least five consecutive hours.

8. Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1260 (1927), U. S. C. A., sec. 71 (Meat Inspection Act): to prevent the interstate or foreign shipment of meat and meat food products which are unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, or otherwise unfit for human food by requiring such shipments to bear marks of Federal inspection and approval.

9. Act of May 23, 1908, 35 Stat. 254 (1927), 21 U. S. C. A., sec. 132 (Dairy Products for Export Act): to prevent the exportation of dairy products unless the same shall have been inspected and certified as to quality, purity, and grade.

10. Act of April 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 331 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., secs. 125, 126 (Insecticide Act): to prevent the manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated or misbranded insecticides and fungicides.

11. Act of August 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 315 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., sec. 154 (Plant Quarantine Act): to regulate or prevent the importation and interstate shipment of plants and plant products capable of bearing plant diseases and pests.

12. Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 833 (1927), 21 U. S. C. A., sec. 155 (Virus-Serum-Toxin Control Act): to license and supervise the production and to regulate the importation of, and interstate commerce in, viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous products for use in the treatment of domestic animals.

13. Act of August 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 482 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., sec. 71 (United States Grain Standards Act): to establish standards of quality and condition for wheat, corn, and other grains, and, after standards have been established, to prohibit the interstate or foreign transportation of grains not officially inspected and graded by licensed inspectors.

14. Act of August 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 486; July 24, 1919, 41 Stat. 266; February 23, 1923, 42 Stat. 1283; March 2, 1931, 46 Stat. 1463; (1939) 7 U. S. C. A., secs. 242 et seq. (United States Warehouse Act): to provide for the licensing by the Secretary of warehouses in which agricultural commodities are stored for shipment in interstate commerce.

15. Act of August 31, 1916, 39 Stat. 673 (1939), 15 U. S. C. A., secs. 251, 252 (Standard Container Act): to establish standards for climax baskets, berry boxes, and similar containers for small fruits and

vegetables moving in interstate commerce; to authorize the Secretary to prescribe tolerances and variations and make examinations and tests for the purpose of determining whether such containers meet the requirements of the act; and to prohibit the manufacture, shipment, or sale of containers not conforming to such standards.

16. Act of August 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 476 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A., secs. 1090 et seq. (Cotton Futures Act): to regulate trading in cotton futures by levying a tax on each pound of cotton involved in any contract of sale of cotton for future delivery upon any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business, unless prescribed types of contract are used.

17. Act of July 24, 1919, 41 Stat. 241, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 96 (Horse-meat Act): to prohibit transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of horse-meat and horse-meat products unless such meats be plainly and conspicuously labeled, marked, branded, or tagged "horse-meat" or "horse-meat product," as the case may be.

18. Act of August 15, 1921, 42 Stat. 159 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., secs. 181 et seq. (Packers and Stockyards Act); August 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 648 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., secs. 217 et seq. (Live Poultry Amendment): to regulate the business conduct of packers and stockyards in so far as their transactions are in the current of interstate commerce, and to prescribe the rates to be charged by the owners of stockyards and by the commission men who operate at such yards.

19. Act of August 31, 1922, 42 Stat. 833 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., sec. 281: to prohibit the importation of adult honey bees, except from countries in which the Secretary shall determine that no diseases dangerous to honey bees exist and then under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Agriculture.

20. Act of February 18, 1922, 42 Stat. 388 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., sec. 291 (Capper-Volstead Act): to promote associations of producers of agricultural products for collective processing and marketing in interstate commerce of such products and to direct the Secretary, in event any such association monopolizes trade so as unduly to increase the price thereof, to order such association to cease and desist from such monopolization.

21. Act of March 3, 1923, 42 Stat. 1435 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., sec.

91 (Naval Stores Act): to establish standards for rosin and turpentine and to prohibit the sale of such products inferior to the official standards.

22. Act of March 4, 1923, 42 Stat. 1517 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., sec. 51 (United States Cotton Standards Act): to establish standards of quality for cotton and, once standards have been established, to prohibit the interstate and foreign transportation of cotton not inspected and sampled by licensed samplers.

23. Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1355 (1939), 7 U. S. C. A., sec. 491 (Produce Agency Act): to prevent the destruction or dumping, without good and sufficient cause therefore, of farm produce received in interstate commerce by commission merchants and others, and to require them truly and correctly to account for all farm produce received by them.

24. Act of May 21, 1928, 45 Stat. 685 (1939), 15 U. S. C. A., sec. 257 (Standard Container Act): to establish standards for hampers, round stave baskets, and split baskets for fruits and vegetables moving in interstate or foreign commerce; to authorize the Secretary to prescribe tolerances and variations and make examinations and tests for the purpose of determining whether such containers meet the requirements of the act; and to prohibit the manufacture, shipment, or sale of containers not conforming to such standards.

25. Act of June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 689, sec. 306 (1937), U. S. C. A., sec. 1306 (Imported Meat Act): to prevent the importation of cattle or meats from any foreign country in which the Secretary shall determine that rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease exists; and to prohibit the importation of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb, pork, bacon, and ham and prepared or preserved meats of all kinds unless they are "healthful, wholesome and fit for human food," and contain "no dye, chemical, preservative or ingredient which renders the same unhealthy, unwholesome or unfit for human food."

26. Act of June 10, 1930, 46 Stat. 531 (Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930): April 13, 1934, 48 Stat. 584; June 19, 1936, 49 Stat. 1533, August 20, 1937, 50 Stat. 725; (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 499a: to require the licensing of commission merchants, dealers, and brokers handling fresh fruits and vegetables in the current of interstate commerce.

The Department was also a great custodial agency, administering national forests and wildlife refuge lands worth more than a billion dollars. It also operated two great public service agencies not included in the categories mentioned: the Bureau of Public Roads, and the Weather Bureau.

A tabular review of the Department from the standpoint of its bureaus and offices and their expenditures would have revealed the facts given in the table on page 18.

Formally reported personnel in 1933 numbered 26,544. This figure did not, however, include temporary workers employed under field authority, of whom fire-fighters employed during the forest-fire season may be mentioned as examples. Nor did it include persons on state and county Extension Service staffs, nor persons in state experiment stations, working on co-operative research projects. Such personnel were and are paid in part with money appropriated to the Department, but they are not normally hired directly by the Department and are not subject to discharge by the Department.

The most widely experienced veteran in the Department in those days consistently affirmed that after twenty-five years he did not by any means "know the Department." He did know it broadly and had a fine understanding of its general management, but he did not by any means know its intrinsic detail.

Even in 1933, then, it was not possible for members of Congress, who had responsibility over the whole field of government, to "know" or to "understand" the Department of Agriculture in the sense that the public would expect. And certainly the same was true for them with respect to other departments and the government as a whole. Even the subcommittees of the two Houses handling appropriations for the Department could not really know it thoroughly or well, although they and a few veteran members of the Committees on Agriculture knew it best. For all of these members had a great deal to do besides learning about this one Department.

They had to be concerned, because of the interests of their constituents, with all departments and agencies. They had to acquaint themselves with Congressional organization and procedures—the whole vast field of legislative bureaucracy. They had to take time for dealing with each other, the general public and their own con-

BUREAUS AND OFFICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE AND THEIR EXPENDITURES
IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1933

Office of the Secretary	\$ 970,336.55
Office of Information	1,126,934.25
Library, Department of Agriculture	102,887.13
Total, Office of Experiment Stations	4,582,913.50
Payments to States, Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, for agricultural experiment stations .	4,358,915.17
Salaries and expenses	223,998.33
Total, Extension Service	10,141,151.90
Payments to States, Hawaii, and Alaska for agricultural extension work	8,607,325.94
Salaries and expenses	1,533,825.96
Weather Bureau	3,695,617.37
Bureau of Animal Industry	13,062,780.33
Bureau of Dairy Industry	626,584.27
Bureau of Plant Industry	4,636,867.89
Forest Service	20,859,885.01
Bureau of Chemistry and Soils	1,602,627.52
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine	4,596,271.22
Bureau of Biological Survey	1,784,158.54
Bureau of Public Roads	168,214,964.65
Bureau of Agricultural Engineering	496,176.17
Bureau of Agricultural Economics	5,899,740.94
Bureau of Home Economics	214,312.94
Enforcement of the Grain Futures Act	174,056.60
Food and Drug Administration	1,582,712.66
Miscellaneous (including forest roads and trails, collec- tion of feed and seed-grain loans, soil erosion investi- gations, special construction, etc.)	11,103,547.39
TOTAL	\$255,474,526.83

stituents. They had to worry about primary campaigns and general elections. Thirty-two of the 96 Senators had come to the Senate since 1928 (hardly a dozen are still there); 151 members of the House were just beginning their first term in Congress and 62 more were just beginning their second term.

Addition of New Responsibilities

On top of the 1933 departmental situation of complexity and size, the next few years brought an enormous new load of responsibility and diversified activity. There were transferred away from the Department (though, let me point out, not from the still more complex field of governmental management) the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Bureau of Biological Survey, and the Food and Drug administration. But there were established or brought within the Department action agencies of great scope. These included:

The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, with programs of crop adjustment and fertility conservation, having direct contractual relationship with 6,500,000 farmers.

The Farm Credit Administration, sponsoring some 8,000 semi-governmental corporations and farmer co-operatives making loans of various kinds to well over a million farmers.

The Commodity Credit Corporation, making loans to producers on various commodities as a support to prices and as a means of maintaining the ever-normal granary. Its borrowing power is \$2,650,000,000. Its transactions number millions annually.

The Soil Conservation Service, carrying on first demonstration projects and then co-operatively helping organized farm districts in programs of physical conservation. There are 785 such districts, comprising 2,153,548 farms and about 460,000,000 acres.

The Farm Security Administration, responsible for special aid to low-income farmers, having direct contractual relations with some 700,000 farmers.

The Surplus Marketing Administration, with responsibility for the disposal of surpluses to consumers.

The Rural Electrification Administration, making power available to 1,002,177 farm and non-farm establishments in rural areas, of which approximately 800,000 are farms.

The Crop Insurance Corporation, handling a new type of insurance on over 600,000 farms producing wheat and cotton.

Various other governmental programs also have been administered in part through this Department. The work projects of from a maximum of 2,000 CCC camps to a minimum of 1,000 (personnel involved, including enrollees, ranging from 408,897 down to 206,319) were carried on at their peak through six bureaus. Civil works and WPA projects administered by the Department employed at a maximum over 100,000, and for a considerable period numbers ranging downward from 60,000 to 30,000. Food purchases under the Lend-Lease Act have been handled by the Surplus Marketing Administration (now incorporated in the Food Distribution Administration), and these purchases in the first year amounted to \$706,328,313.

About two years ago I had occasion to make a list of the principal programs of the Department. It included the following:

USDA Program before Pearl Harbor

Office of Experiment Stations

Grants for state and territorial experiment stations (grant-in-aid)

Operation of Puerto Rico Experiment Station

Nine co-operative regional research laboratories (with states)

Extension Service

Grants to states for extension work (grant-in-aid)

Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations

Collection of information on foreign agriculture and trade

(statistical)

(descriptive)

Agricultural Adjustment Administration

Agricultural conservation program

Range and naval stores conservation program

Conservation materials program

Parity payment program

Sugar Act program

Emergency cotton program

Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and Engineering

General research program (research)

Four regional laboratories—new uses for agricultural products (research)

Bureau of Agricultural Economics

- Co-operative land use planning program
- Economic research and investigations (research and statistical)
- Regional and national program development

Agricultural Marketing Service

- Statistical and research programs
 - Crop and livestock estimates
 - Market-price news service and statistics
 - Marketing and distribution research
- Program for inspection, grading, and classing of farm products (compulsory and voluntary under various special acts)
 - Fruits and vegetables
 - Processed fruits and vegetables
 - Dairy and poultry products
 - Rice, hay, beans, etc.
 - Livestock and meat
 - Cottonseed
 - Tobacco
 - Cotton
 - Grain
 - Seeds
 - Naval stores
 - Insecticides
 - Cotton classification for the Commodity Credit Corporation
- Programs for the regulation of markets, handlers, processors, and manufacturers (under various special acts)
 - Handlers of perishable agricultural commodities
 - Warehouses
 - Packers and stockyards
 - Container manufacturers (standard sizes)

Bureau of Animal Industry

- Disease control and eradication programs
 - Tuberculosis and Bang's disease eradication
 - Cattle-tick eradication (co-operative with states)
 - Hog-cholera control (eradication and demonstration)
 - Inspection and quarantine (inspection and control)
 - Eradication of foot-and-mouth disease (inactive: appropriated funds are available for emergency need)

Research programs

Animal husbandry

Disease of animals

Meat inspection (regulatory)

Administration of hog-cholera virus and serum marketing agreement

Commodity Credit Corporation

Loan and ever-normal granary program

Commodity Exchange Administration

Commodity exchange regulation program (regulatory)

*Bureau of Dairy Industry**Research programs*

Milk and butterfat production investigations

Market milk investigations

Manufactured milk products investigations

Enforcement of Renovated Butter Act (regulatory)

Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine

Insect and insecticide research programs (research)

Insect control programs (with varying amounts of state co-operation)

Japanese beetle

Sweet-potato weevil

Mexican fruit fly

Gypsy and browntail moth

European corn borer

Pink bollworm and thurberia weevil

Disease control and eradication programs (with varying amounts of state co-operation)

Citrus canker

Dutch elm disease

Phony peach and peach mosaic

Blister rust

Barberry

Program of foreign and domestic plant quarantine and certification of exports

Farm Credit Administration

Land-bank loan program

Commissioner loan program (Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation)

Production credit loan program

Intermediate credit program (Federal intermediate credit banks)

Loans to co-operatives program (banks for co-operatives)

Emergency crop and feed loan program

Credit union program

Programs in liquidation

Regional agricultural credit corporations

Agricultural credit stock purchase loans

Agricultural Marketing Act revolving fund

Joint-stock land banks

Research programs (operating research)

Economics and credit research

Co-operative research and service

Farm Security Administration

Tenant purchase program

Rehabilitation program (loans and grants)

Farm debt adjustment program

Migratory labor camp program

Wheeler-Case program—joint irrigation programs with the Department of the Interior

Resettlement programs

Management of suburban projects

Management of co-operative farm projects

Special Lakes States program to enlarge farms

Program in co-operation with WFA

Defense housing program

Federal Crop Insurance Corporation

Wheat crop insurance program

Research on crop insurance for other commodities (research)

Forest Service

National Forest program

Research programs

Private forestry co-operation (research and education)

Forest and forest-products research

Forest-fire co-operation (grant-in-aid)

Forest highways, roads, and trails

New England timber-salvage program

Shelterbelt program

CCC Program

- On national forest lands

- On state, municipal, and private lands

- TVA camps

- Co-operative work with states in tree distribution and fire protection

Bureau of Home Economics

- Research program

Bureau of Plant Industry

- Research and investigation programs

- Plants

- Plant exploration and introduction

- Soils and fertilizers

- Soil survey

- South American rubber-development program

- National Arboretum

Rural Electrification Administration

- Loan program

- For line construction or reloan to members of co-operatives for wiring, plumbing, appliances

Soil Conservation Service

- Districts erosion control program

- Demonstration erosion control program

- Submarginal land purchase program

- Isolated settler removal program (Wisconsin)

- Flood-control program

- CCC program

- Erosion-control demonstration camps

- Drainage camps

- Nursery program

- Emergency Everglades erosion-control program

- Water-facilities program

- Research program (research)

- Physical land surveys

- Co-operative farm forestry program

Surplus Marketing Administration

- Food-stamp plan

- Cotton-stamp plan

- Relief-distribution program
- School-lunch program
- Mattress program
- Export-subsidy program
- Diversion program
- Marketing-agreement program
- Refugee-relief program (purchases for Red Cross)
- Marketing quota compliance for AAA
- Freight-rate adjustment program
- Lend-Lease program

Certain illustrative details may make this picture of size and complexity even more impressive. The figures cited were accurate at the time of calculation, but are not necessarily correct or even approximately correct as of the present.

In the AAA program 97,000 community and county committeemen are engaged on a per diem basis in local administration. Employees in county offices in addition number about 21,000. Beyond these are a good many other thousands who work about three months each year checking the conformance of each farmer to his agreed program.

Regular employees of the Department number 89,000, but persons paid wholly or in part with money appropriated to the Department—such as extension workers, local AAA personnel, and persons employed by the various Farm Credit Corporations and REA co-operatives—for all of whom the public holds the Department responsible even in ways in which it is not—bring the total number participating in the work of the Department to some 300,000.

Merely in Washington, where present employees number little over three per cent of the 300,000, the Department occupies space in eighteen buildings in addition to most of the two great buildings that are its central headquarters. In Washington alone the Department *receives* 13,000,000 pieces of mail a year, handles (at the largest peacetime single-establishment switchboard in the world) 13,000,000 telephone calls a year, has the largest duplicating plant in the world, and the largest aerial photographic laboratory. Field offices of various sizes and functions, for which the public regards the Department as responsible, number some 14,000.

In such a Department any single operation—purchases or travel,

for example—is a subject of such proportions as to require organized attention. In such a Department, administrative change is a continual process. When the Byrd Committee on Administrative Management called on the Department a few years ago for all “memoranda, orders, reports, etc.,” on structural and managerial changes that had been issued in the preceding eight years, the Department had something of a problem even to keep the volume of assembled material down to two truckloads—still far more than any Congressional committee could actually use.

Probability of Continued Growth

This picture has been made life-size in full realization that the tendency on the part of anybody who sees it will be to throw up his hands in futility and despair. Yet society cannot throw in the sponge. Solemn declaration that co-ordinated management of so many functions is impossible will not solve the problems that have called forth these activities. Dividing the whole into an even greater number of parts—it already is divided into many parts—will not make the whole more manageable. The managing responsibility of the President is vastly greater than that of the head of one of his departments, and while the President knows the need of and consistently has tried to organize for better over-all management, there is no solution per se in requiring him to work through more department heads. That would increase the Presidential job.

Nor is life going to be made any simpler by refusing to face complexity or refusing to take responsibility for achieving a necessary degree of unity. Civilization has been achieved by a process of specialization, and that process ultimately calls, in a geometric ratio, for a process of synthesis or generalization. Must we admit that man has now reached his upper limit in dealing with size and complexity or can he make further progress by directing to the business of managing complexity some of the attention that has hitherto gone to increasing specialization?

It ought to be a reassuring fact that without any special help, without popular or even limited public understanding of the present size of the task, the bureaucrats have done a job of the most impressive sort. Their mistakes have been klieg-lighted for all the world to note.

But although here and there persons or groups have contended that the job was too big and that there has been perilous and wasteful "overlapping and duplication" of effort, the public has shown no particular alarm. Some of the programs of the Department have provoked heated argument—they seem gradually to win acceptance, however, and to become less and less controversial—but there has been no evidence of a popular feeling of hopeless confusion or irritation. There has been no cry of serious corruption—and no sign of it. The country over, it is generally felt that the Department of Agriculture has been more than ordinarily well administered. Students of government, best informed of citizens with respect to this particular problem, even though they have not been in a position to see the immense reality, have generally agreed that the biggest government departments are at least as well run as the smaller ones. Originally expecting to recommend breaking the Department into smaller units, the President's Committee on Administrative Management, on the basis of its own research, gave up any such thought.

To sum up: it seems plain that both within government and outside of government, and probably for the same reasons, the trend is toward bigness. Responsible citizens, including those who like bigness least, have therefore the duty of helping to give it form and content. It is not sufficient even for those who hate bigness to resist and cry out against it. It is for us all to consider and examine the big organizations we have and the bigger ones that are being built, and to try to make sure that they will provide in the future the same quality of service provided by the most efficient of our smaller institutions.

Inevitably we shall strive to deal with these demons of size and complexity by exercising our powers of simplification. For simplification enables us to organize our affairs and reduce them to manageable proportions. But simplification on what basis? We have big government and clearly we are going to have bigger government. But with what spirit will it be motivated? On what terms and by what technique can we develop the unity our complexity demands and do it in a way that will harmonize with our history of freedom and our ideals of individual worth? Our hopes for genuine progress lie largely in the answers to these questions.

Working with People

THE SIZE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL JOB as described in the preceding chapter is a reflection of the size and kind of society that is America. Our purpose in this chapter is to examine the number and kind of relationships with people which a governmental agency must maintain if it is to perform its functions.

Of necessity, many of these relationships are with organizations. Particularly is this true in Washington, and in regional and state offices. Even in counties, the county government, farm associations, chambers of commerce, luncheon clubs, and other organizations present important problems for administration and have a significant influence upon it. To Washington come for the most part those who are in varying degrees and in varying ways representative of organized groups with national memberships or national interests.

No such representative is ever an infallible guide to the sentiments of his group. Groups rarely are unanimous about anything. Even when they favor some policy unanimously, the depth of the sentiment may be little or much and may vary widely with individuals. Professional leaders of these groups tend, of course, to express their individual opinions; the positions of their organizations tend accordingly to become those positions of the leaders to which members do not sufficiently object. Just how meaningful may be the expression of a particular organization spokesman on any particular subject becomes therefore a matter of nice judgment, devolving considerably on a knowledge of both leadership and membership.

But the fact of the existence of these organizations, and of their special importance, and of the demands their functions and dignity make on the time and energy of public administrators, has enormous bearing on public administration. Individuals of prominence and distinction likewise demand attention from governmental officials and have an influence upon their work.

A Cabinet Member's Appointment List

In the Federal government itself all Cabinet and little Cabinet

officers, all heads of independent establishments, and many who have staff or secondary positions around those named feel that they have an unquestioned right of quick and easy access, in person or by telephone, to the head of a department. All 531 members of Congress have that expectation. So do 48 Governors, 96 members of the National Committee of the party in power, 48 state chairmen of that party, a considerable sprinkling of committeemen and chairmen of the opposition party, and many of those who used to hold these posts, especially former members of Congress. So do many newspaper editors, publishers, and correspondents. Then there are some among the hosts of persons the secretary has met socially or who knew him before he entered the Cabinet—not to mention those who know these people and come with letters of introduction to the secretary.

In each particular department, from this point on, the list grows according to the function of the department. In Agriculture, the presidents, deans, and directors of research and extension of the land-grant colleges come high on the list. There are four general farm organizations of national scope, and many special ones, such as the Horticulturists, the Wool Growers, the Livestock Growers, the Sugar Beet Growers, and the Wheat Co-operatives, many of which have state organizations. Next come the state farm associations. Any officer or representative of any of these organizations expects ready communication with the secretary.

The list goes on to include all organizations or concerns having to do with the marketing or processing of farm produce—the boards of trade, livestock commission men in the livestock markets, the packers, the millers, the bakers, the chain-store people, the independents, the farm-paper editors and publishers, the food-trade papers, the millers' journals, the conservation associations, the Academy of Science, the lumbermen, patriotic organizations, magazine writers and artists, the farm-implement people, the fertilizer people, the seed and nursery people, the agricultural agents of the various railways, heads of the County Agents Association, utility people who are nervous about REA, brokers and warehousemen, and insurance company presidents and vice-presidents who are interested in farm mortgages.

When extended to cover all commodities and areas and to include heads of single concerns of size, the list of persons who legitimately

feel that they are important to agriculture or to the secretary or to the government reaches far up into the thousands. While they are learning more and more to transact their business with other people, most of them feel that at least occasionally they should have a chat with the secretary. And when the matters they are prosecuting get what they feel to be unsatisfactory treatment, they invariably wish to appeal to him.

In many cases it is a question simply of personal or organizational dignity. If they cannot report to their associates that they have had long visits with the secretary, their own tenures may eventually be endangered. In some cases, as among farm organizations, this matter of prestige tends to develop at times into an issue of actual dominance of the government department. Veiled hints may be made: "We're telling you what you'd better do if you know what is good for you." Curiously enough, this attitude is often justified on the ground that such is democracy: "We represent the farmers; it is your duty to do as we say."

Requests for Special Favors

The way in which demands are submitted frequently reflects a belief that government agencies act only in response to pressure. It is generally thought that the way to get something done is by using "influential people." Persons who attempt to use influence other than their own are usually seeking special favors. They do not always recognize that what they ask is a special advantage over others. But when they do, they tend to feel that their demand is legitimate in the same way that it is legitimate for a wrongdoer to have an attorney plead his innocence in court. Back of their attitude lies the assumption that "the other fellow" is trying to get by with the same thing and that this constitutes democracy—and if not justice, then at least free competition, which is also virtuous.

I do not mean to imply that these persons are not good citizens. What I have said is by no means the whole truth. But enough of it is true to have some importance in considering public administration. It is true that some people aim at getting more than their deserts and try to get action by reaching or using persons of influence. It is true

that to quite a degree people come to government seeking special favors. And it is true that government dispensing special favors and operating on a basis of influential introductions is opening the door not merely to injustice but to corruption. I do not mean corruption in terms of bribes or presents. I cannot now recall definite knowledge of a single instance of that in all my years in Washington, and I have had circumstantial evidence in only two or three small cases. I mean corruption of good government, its perversion to bad government.

The people who come to Washington on business with the government are in overwhelming majority sincere and honest citizens. What I am trying to say is that they do not look at government business with governmental understanding. Business people are fond of saying that government people do not understand business. It may be so. But my observation has been that business is more a matter of common experience and knowledge than government, and that people generally, whether businessmen or others, do not sufficiently understand government. All these elements in government-citizen relationships should be more explored. I have heard private groups insist in all seriousness, when prosecuting requests to be permitted to run their businesses as they see fit, that they are just as mindful of the public interest as the government is. This I do not believe, not because I hold people in government to be superior, but because their function is more exclusively and more clearly the public interest. It is not equally the business of businessmen to consider the public interest. It is possible for a bureaucrat to be as much concerned for his interest as a bureaucrat as a businessman is concerned for his profit, but it is not likely. For the benefit to the individual bureaucrat is much less direct, much less discernible, much less certain. And the bureaucrat is so situated that his own tenure and success are more dependent on doing what is publicly satisfactory and generally fair than on advancing the welfare of his associate bureaucrats.

The Bureaucrat's Position

The bureaucrat thinks of each demand in terms of other demands that have been made or are likely to be made upon him. He knows that what he does for one applicant he must be able to do for others

and must be able to explain to citizens of opposite or different interests. What he does is not completely satisfactory to any of those affected, but it tends to be in the direction of the public interest.

Any man coming to Washington to "get action" favoring the interests of some special group should remember that the government official he is addressing is the recipient of similar attentions from his competitors, his customers, and persons in wholly different businesses all over the country. And then he should be mindful, too, that with all the facilities for investigating the poor bureaucrat and making him miserable, no one has ever got enough on him as a collective entity to warrant one per cent of the hue and cry that has been raised.

There is one type of appeal the bureaucrat likes to respond to quickly. It comes from the citizen who has been caught by a law or a regulation in some way which makes him a victim of discrimination. Adjustment in administration to take care of such instances is frequently not easy, but to do a favor when it makes for equity is the line of least emotional resistance. The difficulty is that government must act according to principle and rule as a guarantee of equity. When the rigidity of the rule defeats equity, every instinct supports adjustment. This is a "favor" that can be explained; it will be supported by good citizens when it is explained, and the recipient of the favor will be happy. The bureaucrat invariably wishes to adjust situations of this kind. He will hesitate only to weigh the probable effects of the adjustment on the program as a whole as against the degree of inequity borne by the citizen.

It is not intended to suggest here that the bureaucrat is perfect—or even a superior being. It is intended to make somewhat clearer the situation in which he functions. The bureaucrat's worst sin is to live in fear of "burning his fingers," and, consequently, to play safe. Often he can properly be charged with losing initiative and daring. But, by that very token, what he does is well considered in the sense that it will stand detailed public scrutiny and comparison with what he does in similar cases.

It is in the nature of the bureaucrat's situation that he readily detects an effort to get special favor. As a result he frequently exhibits a feeling which many suppliants mistake for hostility. In reality his reaction is quite different: fear of being forced to do something un-

workmanlike, something ungovernmental, something that would not stand up in a Congressional investigation. Consequently when any citizen makes an appeal supported by "influence," the bureaucrat regards it with more, rather than less, suspicion than normal.

A frequent complaint of businessmen who come to Washington is that they "can't get an answer either way," or that "he said no, but he didn't tell me why." The complaint is often justified; but there are extenuating circumstances. The bureaucrat grows timid under constant fire—and the fire is not only constant, but heavy. In a particular case he may hate to offend by saying no, but he may not be able to say yes—and when the answer is neither yes nor no, the answer is no. Negative answers not explained are partially a result of timidity, partially a way of avoiding renewed argument on issues previously discussed, and partially a reflection of sheer physical inability to tell all the applicants all of the reasons for a decision. In private business such decisions are accepted as real, no matter what the reasons. An executive who decides not to do something would be amazed if he were required—it would of course be impossible—to give all the reasons growing out of a multitude of experiences. It may be granted at once that there will be some governmental decisions that cannot—and should not—be accepted simply as a complex judgment of a particular official. But it should also be recognized that in most instances time will not possibly permit the telling of all the stories of similar cases and of all of the history that enters into a particular decision. As it is, citizens who criticize "waste" and "overhead" in government often expect governmental officials to be able to give unlimited time to explaining what they do—or what they would do if they could stop talking and get a little work done.

In considerable degree the difficulty here is that citizens have insufficient respect for the government man. Frequently they think of him as a "clerk," though he may be a world-renowned specialist or may have thousands of employees working efficiently under his direction. Many other citizens distrust government people and the government on general principles. All of these things make for bad government.

It is a common circumstance for visitors in Washington to assume the necessity of telling government officials things they have heard thousands of times before. The explanation is, patently, that the visitor

believes that the official "doesn't know conditions in our county." Ordinarily, however, the official does know those conditions. For he gets the benefit of a constant flow of information—from the 13,000,000 pieces of mail a year, the 13,000,000 phone calls, and the administrative grapevine from 300,000 people, from conversations with other visitors, and from his own trips to the field. The real difficulty lies in the fact that visitors "don't know conditions in Washington."

All employers have their difficult points. The biggest difficulty about the employer of the bureaucrat is that he has 135,000,000 different aspects and interests. The employers who are most honored in Washington are those who never come to the national capital. Over the common people the government official is inclined to hover as employees hover around the office of the head of the company when some tragedy gives them a sense that the boss is also a sentimental human being. After all, most of the people who come to Washington can take care of themselves pretty well. The real test of the government is what it does out in the field in daily work with the millions. There, in my judgment, good government is going forward. And if there is increasing understanding on the part of the public, it will go forward faster.

There is genuine value in extended conversations between government officials and citizens. It is both administratively helpful and socially desirable for the executives of a department to discuss important actions with leaders of affected citizen groups. Yet there are times when situations develop in Congress, in the government, or in the country that demand immediate action if things are to be kept manageable. There are other actions that because of their nature cannot satisfactorily be discussed in advance at all. There are others in which representations can be heard, but intentions cannot fairly be revealed. For example, because of speculative advantages it would confer, any discussion indicating in advance the level of a proposed corn loan would be wholly out of order. Finally, it should be recognized that it is never possible to discuss an action with everyone who feels entitled to participate, or with any one person for as long a time as he might wish to be consulted.

There have been occasions when the heads of certain private organizations have asserted an exclusive claim to prior consultation

with governmental officials and to the right to express the sentiment of their special group. Formalized advisory bodies have been established at various times in response to such proposals or in an effort to simplify public contacts. But the result of giving a fixed, lasting and rather exclusive consulting relationship—as contrasted with a temporary, special, and non-exclusive advisory relationship—is to confer a governmental standing and function on non-governmental people, on people not similarly charged with responsibility. Actually, no one can represent the citizenry in nearly as comprehensive and effective a way as can the government itself, if it keeps numerous channels of communications open and cultivates numerous associations with the people.

Recently, in an evening discussion, a friend exclaimed in alarm over the power exercised by a great number of public officials. He cited as an example the head of the Visa Division in the State Department, who could, he said, arbitrarily grant or deny the right of citizens of other countries to enter the United States and remain here. Of course, he went on, an occasional appeal would be heard by a higher official, but in most instances the decision of the Division head would obviously govern. My friend used this set of circumstances to argue the fundamental importance of the courts as protectors of the people against the bureaucrats.

The point is not well made. In the first place, the assumption that a higher official, hearing an appeal, would make a better decision is thin and irrelevant; for he would be exercising the same powers, using the same organizational resources. In both cases the decision would be institutional, not individual. Secondly, no matter how many appeals might be made to how many higher officials, including judges, someone ultimately would make an arbitrary, final decision. Third, this very process already has gone on below the head of the Visa Division; recommendations by lower officials are always effective unless and until appealed. Fourth, the availability of the courts for appeals on visa rulings is so slight as hardly to be real. Fifth, in the administration of George Washington—long before the age of big democracy—there existed essentially the same administrative situation with respect to the visa; some bureaucrat always had the power, in the final analysis, arbitrarily to approve or disapprove.

It happens that I personally am inclined to be critical of certain policies related to the issuance of visas. But I cannot see that the "faults" of which I would complain are inherent in bureaucracy. The fact that I am critical may not indicate faults, but merely disagreement. For the policies to which I object are in line with widespread prejudices. Bureaucracy is constantly exposed to this temptation. Good administration, however, can and does rise above it.

The decisive thing in the issuance of visas is the general setting within which that power is exercised. The right to appeal to a higher level is one factor in the situation. The existence of the courts is another—although in this case of small importance. The procedural system within the Division is another. The realization that a consciously bad decision really requires the participation in a conspiracy by so many persons that someone is bound to talk is yet another. The danger that an aggrieved applicant will appeal to the press and to members of Congress is still another factor. There is no new issue involved in the authority of the head of the Visa Division. Indeed, there is no issue in it at all, whether old or new. To discover such authority is simply to discover organization, to discover government. To improve our governmental organization is important. But improved government is not going to have less authority; it is not even going to have less authority vested in single officials.

The present visa problem is really a problem of good administration. It does, however, have certain rather new aspects. Visa control has become a means of political censorship, a purpose for which it was never used in the early days of the Republic. At any rate the issue has certain policy aspects of new importance. The issuance of visas is said to be somewhat out of line with general Administration policy. It may be so. But better administration would still be bureaucratic administration. The real need is always for good policy and good administration. Authority must be exercised in an organized way, through many people.

Essentials of Democracy

In the midst of increasing size and complexity, it is important to see clearly what things are essential in democratic government. I put two considerations above all others: free speech with all that it im-

plies, and free franchise in elections which cannot be adjourned. Auxiliary to these is the Congressional function of inquiry and investigation. Likewise the action of the people in writing thousands of letters to the departments and to Congressmen, expressing complaints and questions of constituents; these are a great check against the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of authority and a valuable means of giving department heads a sample view of their department's activities. Letters of this kind are much more important than members of Congress realize. Add the far-flung and daily contact with affected citizens in the flow of business in a society in which there is free speech and free franchise, and bureaucracy becomes a word that does not properly carry adverse connotations. In combination these essentials have produced in the United States a nation of free men and women and a government considerate of and responsive to their needs.

Actually it is a government in which there appears to be not the least danger that its officials will become isolated or separated from the people. The pounding of public criticism is so intense that, more and more, government officials break under it. Some employees by bearing tales to gossip columnists manage to carry on vendettas against superiors who have given them low efficiency ratings or withheld promotions. Others may tip off members of Congress to things which in partial view seem out of line. Hundreds of thousands of dollars a year have to be spent refuting and reporting on these matters. General public criticism and most of the charges of Washington visitors grow out of such tales and rumors and distortions. There is much less criticism from persons actually affected by governmental action than there is from persons who have heard about something that they resent in theory, something they think has happened or fear may happen. The something may never have been contemplated. If only the people outside of government respected the people in government and assumed that they would do their jobs with reasonable fairness and intelligence, an enormous saving in energy would result. Although a great deal of the shouting at the government has constructive value, the volume of it is really much too great. It is excessive by whatever amount reflects either basic fear or contempt of the people in government.

It goes without saying that it is to the interest of the public that the powers exercised by government officials be superior within their fields to those of all other parties. For all others would be less representative and less responsible. The country was properly shocked when, after the 1936 election, it was reported that John L. Lewis demanded of the President certain specific action in return for campaign contributions. When any single group asserts or tries to assert a direct control over government, governmental officials and citizens alike know that a demonstration of the superiority of governmental power is the first necessity. I know of one equal instance on another governmental front. And there are many minor instances in which others have tried to get the kind of power Mr. Lewis is reported to have sought. All of them underscore the desirability of the government's sustaining a variety of relationships with a wide range of organized groups rather than limiting its relationships to a few dominant groups.

Government must be big enough and powerful enough to be definitely superior to any and all special-interest groups. By the same token, governmental power should be exercised only by government-minded persons, by persons sensitive to the public interest and to public opinion and publicly responsible for their official acts. It is so exercised in the United States government today. The danger that our liberties are being lost because Federal executives possess too much power and because they can use it arbitrarily exists almost entirely in the imagination of persons without perspective. It is my observation that no one in Washington, not even the President, is impressed with his own power. Rather the contrary: the average "high official" is so conscious of the restraints and limitations under which he is obliged to function that his strongest impression is likely to be that of a very restricted power. Indeed, this sense of a lack of power is what drives people out of Washington. To have to "think of everything in terms of everything else" causes many men to think that they are so hedged about by restrictions that they "can't do anything," with the result that, after a while, they simply give up with a feeling that they might as well go back home. The orders and statutes in our big democracy do not invest persons with power; they invest organizations with responsibility.

Administrative Leadership

AN IDEAL CABINET MEMBER would be one combining great abilities as a popular leader with great administrative abilities. Great ability as a popular leader is not often found. By definition great ability is exceptional. Great administrative ability similarly is exceptional. The man who combines exceptional abilities in both fields is a most extraordinary person.

Such a combination of qualities is not a logical one. Leadership of the public goes with marked individuality. Something of the same kind of personal leadership contributes to success in administrative management and may be used in some cases as a substitute for administrative ability; but it is not the same thing. It can, for example, serve as a substitute in a business based on a novel idea when the idea gives it a special advantage over its competitors and makes less necessary an efficiency arrived at purely through management. It can serve as a temporary substitute at the beginning of an undertaking when special zeal may be able to take the place of organized management. It can sometimes serve as a substitute in a small organization. But administrative efficiency can be developed and sustained in a large organization only by systematic methods. Marked individuality in the head of an organization can contribute to administration if that man appreciates the necessity for intricate teamwork. Usually, however, the contribution he makes is not to the process of administration but to the dynamics of it. If it were otherwise, it would probably damage administration rather than help it.

The completely public nature of government poses a special problem in the balance needed in executive personnel between capacity for popular leadership and capacity for organized management. Ordinarily the best way of securing a proper balance is by seeking for complementary qualities in executives on first and second levels of

the administrative hierarchy and by developing in them a vivid appreciation of the importance of both kinds of ability and of the distinctive contribution each can make.

Managing Complexity

Paradoxically, citizens who profess to be alarmed at the size of government often clamor loudly for the extension of government into new areas where their particular interests would thereby gain an advantage. Members of Congress who oppose on principle an enlargement of the sphere of government control nevertheless share with their constituents dissatisfaction regarding specific situations and, in consequence, vote for measures requiring the government to undertake new or additional functions.

Whether it comes from the cumulative logic of events or from some extraordinary single incident such as the attack at Pearl Harbor, this is the current course of history for all who run to read. One does not have to believe in extending the range of government per se in order to have a reason for being concerned about how extended government can be made to function effectively.

It is plain that there is no clear and basic principle marking the limits within which government must confine its actions. Government has to do what it has to do. One basic sentiment of our people is strongly opposed to the extension of governmental activity, but we have even stronger sentiments that move us to call for such extensions whenever they promise better solutions to public problems than private action. Our national structure reflects a reluctance to accept positive government. This reluctance is embodied, for example, in our system of checks and balances, which by making agreement hard to get makes it difficult to get vigorous governmental action. It is a fair and fundamental question whether our basic structure is well adapted to the functions our government must presently perform. True conservatism quite properly begs that question by attempting, short of thoroughgoing structural change, to find ways by which government may better carry the load it has assumed and the greater load it seems likely to assume.

There is encouragement, then, in the thought that existing complexity may not be at all so unmanageable as it may appear to those

newly aware of it or to those who see it only from a great distance. Patently, the prewar situation was tolerable for the overwhelming majority of our people. Even our mild reactionaries do not deny that democracy could still live if only the government would stop where it was on December 6, 1941. It is fear of the further growth of government beyond the limits it has reached today that is really serious. But this was as true twenty years ago as it is now. While we all may be inclined to feel that there are bounds beyond which we hope government will not go, and while the study of satisfactory ways of "other than governmental" handling of our emerging problems is much to be desired, surely it is the part of wisdom to explore ways by which government may satisfactorily carry its prewar load and, say, ten per cent more.

It is, after all, mainly a job in organization and management, a big one, yet not nearly so large as the war job—and we are proving that we can manage that. Better understanding of governmental administration would, moreover, be an important aid to better conduct of the war.

All of us have known persons who, though functioning well in small affairs, cannot orient themselves effectively in a larger frame of reference. The number of people who can deal readily with bigness is severely limited. This fact is not, however, one that should cause deep concern, since fewer people are required to deal with big measures than with little ones. Most people in big organizations function much like people doing similar work in smaller organizations. It is by no means fully realized, but it is a fact that there *are* persons who can handle six digits as readily as most mortals can handle two. Moreover, there are persons who can deal effectively with big issues even though they get bogged down with the little things of life. It is generally believed that men should go up the administrative ladder step by step but the belief is not altogether well founded. There are men who would be poor as ordinary section heads in a bureau who would be able and effective as Secretary of the Department.

It is not necessary for the head of a small business to be a book-keeper in order to understand his balance sheet and to be able to call for figures that will tell him what he needs to know. Neither is it necessary for the heads of great governmental organizations to be

masters of the various functions performed by their staffs in order to be masters of their own executive functions.

Even in a relatively small enterprise the elements of bigger organization are present. The president of a company does not write its advertisements. Final copy is invariably a composite of production, sales, and management points of view, molded and modified by advertising technicians. It may not be completely satisfactory to any department, but it is an organization product. So it is in government—except for one further complication. The process of getting an organization product calls for a reconciliation not only of the viewpoints of those responsible for the several different functions of the agency, but likewise of a host of public-impact considerations.

The nature of the job of organization may be illustrated by the game called "twenty questions." Beginning on the fringe of creation it is possible, by organization processes, swiftly to identify the sink in a particular kitchen: All creation; the planet Earth; the Western Hemisphere; the United States of America; the state of Nebraska; the city of Lincoln; the house at 4343 Bureau Street; the kitchen; the sink.

Here is an illustration from life. Some years ago a man in the Department of Agriculture reported with a chuckle finding on his desk eight identical letters from a citizen who had addressed them to the President, the Secretary of Agriculture, the head of the AAA, the head of the Southern Division of the AAA, two Senators, one Congressman, and the man on whose desk the letters accumulated. All of the letters had promptly reached the desk of the man who was handling the particular matter involved. All of the replies, when they went out, had adequately to take account of the vantage points and the functions of each of the officials originally addressed. In drafting them, therefore, the man had to allow appropriately for the separate special considerations regarded as important in each of the other seven offices, and on their part, members of the staffs of the other seven offices became similarly educated to a composite, representative point of view on the particular matter.

Qualifications of Top Executives

This kind of process goes on continually. Direction of the process is a function of a department's top-level executives. It is *not* an un-

manageable function. But it does require the special utilization of persons who have a somewhat unusual assortment of qualities—and the development of more such persons. The qualities include, perhaps first, an ability something like that required for higher mathematics. Trigonometry is no less practical and precise than arithmetic. It comprehends arithmetic, but is a way of relating and simplifying the handling of relationships between various arithmetical calculations. What is needed is the ability to handle relationships in their larger and broader terms—the quality of philosophy. This means a capacity to see public policy in tens of thousands of different actions and to relate these actions to each other in terms of public and governmental interest. Efficient “operators” we have in great numbers. They are capable of serving well on the higher levels of governmental management only if they have this quality of philosophy.

The kind of philosophy is of course important. A philosophy of absolutes and cold logic, a philosophy technical and rigid, would be ruinous. A sound political philosophy must comprehend people’s spirits and emotions as well as their reasoned opinions; it must embody the logic of events and sentiments, and not merely the logic of statistics.

The second quality needed by the top executive is “governmental sense,” the ingrained disposition to put the public interest first and thus to recognize the great, essential, and pervasive difference that distinguishes public administration from the management of private enterprise.

Related to governmental sense is a third quality of public-relations or political sense. This involves, on the one hand, an appreciation of the necessity for government officials and governmental action to be exposed to the citizens and the public affected by them and, on the other, an ability to anticipate probable popular reaction and make allowance for it. It also includes the capacity to act swiftly in introducing minor administrative adjustments when such action will relieve public irritation and the ability to sense major political shifts in the early stages of their development and gradually to modify the program of the agency accordingly. No matter how elevated they may be, however, administrators can never have the fullness of wisdom. Fortunately, they need not have it. Events and national senti-

ments will make the bigger and the ultimate decisions. Executives and administrative experts, working together, simply give form to specific programs and mechanisms within the framework of larger national movements. The capacity to sense the coming of these movements is political sense at its highest level.

Ability to be governmental enough to discern the national interest and to insist on programs and procedures so sound that they will be as unyielding rock on which the waves of special interest may break their force in vain; ability to be political enough to seek those concessions which are the needed refinements of the process of making governmental action equitable and smooth; ability to be political enough to read and respond to the messages of public currents; and ability to use administrators who can organize and relate agencies so that they produce organized, integrated action—this is the combination of abilities required for the relatively few top people in the great agencies of government.

A Secretary's Job: Top-Side View

To organize for or to stimulate and support organized efforts for getting integrated action that will be acceptable to the public is the job of administration on its highest level.

How to organize at this top level depends of course upon the nature of an agency's program and upon attendant conditions. If its function is a new one and especially complicated, as was the case with that of the War Production Board in 1942, the initial problem will be how to free the responsible head for essential consideration of general policy. Later on, as agency policies become settled, the top job becomes mainly a matter of adjusting policies and of overseeing the processes by which they are expressed. If general policy is understood to include these adjustments, then the top job is completely a policy job. While it involves administration in the sense of getting policy into performance, it is administration in very broad terms. It means organizing to do the whole job by making general determinations that affect the entire program.

Among the things that are essential for good administration on or near the Cabinet level are several elements that in my judgment are of special importance. They may be listed and described briefly

here as they apply in the administration of a huge and complex department. In later chapters I shall discuss some of them in greater detail.

First in importance comes a steady insistence on "operating on one's proper level." Any Cabinet member who attempts regularly to make specific and detailed decisions is a poor administrator. Inevitably he does great damage to his organization and fails effectively to implement his own policies. He simply cannot perform his own real function and do it well if he allows himself to become involved in specifics. As the bridge to the governmental level the secretarial level is the top departmental level. No secretary should ever operate below that level. No one on the governmental level should attempt to operate on the departmental level. No bureau chief should attempt to operate on the division level. The drag of inadequacy is always downward. The need in administration is always for the reverse: for a secretary to project his thinking to the governmental level, for a bureau chief to try to see the problems of the department, for the division chief to comprehend the work of the entire bureau.

The next essential is continuous and determined effort to establish within the department working relationships that will guarantee an organized product, one, that is to say, which embodies the contribution or points of view of all appropriate parts of the agency. This means habitual horizontal clearance and co-ordination as contrasted with the rigid flow of material in straight hierarchal channels. The impulse some persons feel to be facetious about co-ordination is mistaken. There is no way of dividing functions so that they are really self-contained. The more complex matters are, the more co-ordination there must be.

The third essential, somewhat related to the second, is to unify the structure so as to facilitate decision and action. This involves a special appreciation of the importance of building into the structure of the agency a central core of authority reaching from the head of the department to every individual engaged in carrying on work for which the department is responsible. This authority, turning on the right to hire and fire, is essential to the responsibility of a secretary. His power will be limited in any case by the necessity to delegate, the necessity to minimize controversy, and the necessity of getting or-

ganizational and public acceptance. To delegate authority regularly and definitely to non-Federal officials or to persons responsible to other organizations—as too many agency heads seem willing to do—is to renounce responsibility and to abandon the effort to get teamwork and unity.

The fourth element complements the second and third and amplifies the delegation implicit in the first requirement. It is an informed capacity for decentralization. This follows the third point rather than precedes it for a very definite reason: there can be no sound decentralization until there has first been centralization. One cannot well dispense what one does not actually have. Good management of every complex and far-flung business requires decentralization, but it must be a centralization organically unified and stemming from a core of basic authority.

The fifth most essential qualification for top administration in a Department is the ability to provide that which otherwise tends to be pushed out by the process of getting an organized product—dynamics. If an agency is to succeed significantly, it must organize against the tendency of all organizations to petrify. No amount of effort on the part of other officials can compensate for the failure of the Secretary of the Department properly to concern himself on this score.

A sixth element has to do with democratic spirit and techniques. It can be expressed in many ways: enlistment of all the energies and abilities of the persons in an organization; getting their full and zealous participation rather than simply their compliance; understanding the importance of individual placement; arranging for and encouraging the flow of ideas and suggestions from the bottom up and not merely from the top down; demonstrating an interest in everything in good and imaginative personnel administration; providing for intra-departmental education in total program objectives and content; and stimulation of personnel to develop better spirit and improved techniques in dealing with the public. Each is important for effective administration.

We shall examine some of these elements in more detail in succeeding chapters. Before elaborating on them, however, I should like to try to shake a few prejudices about “governmental inefficiency,” “red

tape," and "bureaucracy." For it can, I think, be readily demonstrated that as a nation we need and profit by the very thing so often criticized: government by bureaucrats; government by government-minded officials; government by bureaucrats subject to and accustomed to political control.

The Relativity of Efficiency

ONE OF THE RIGHTS of American citizenship most frequently exercised is that of criticizing the inefficiency of government, but it is difficult to find many references to the lack of governmental efficiency that reflect genuine thoughtfulness. Almost no one, however, indulges in similar glib generalizations about the efficiency of other institutions or organizations. Few persons attempt to judge, for example, the general efficiency of Bethlehem Steel or of General Motors. Most of us need to develop a corresponding restraint in evaluating the efficiency of government. It is dangerous to be dogmatic about efficiency of administration in any field, public or private, big or little. Who would venture to assert that the printing plant producing the *New York Times* every day is more or less efficient than the plant producing the *Saturday Evening Post* every week? Presumably the *Times* plant is the most efficient plant known for producing the *New York Times*. Presumably the *Post* plant is the most efficient one known for producing the *Saturday Evening Post*. The question is: what objectives is the organization trying to accomplish? What means are available to obtain the desired end? In short, what are the criteria?

Evaluation of Efficiency

Fashion merchandise does not lend itself to assembly-line production. Small shops can spring into action and serve a market for such goods before a big one can even get organized. Clearly an item chiefly dependent on some rare manual craftsmanship can be most efficiently produced in a small shop. Nor are these the only advantages that go with smallness in size. The owner of a printing plant doing a million-dollar business once told me that any printing job amounting to less than a hundred dollars costs him money because it costs that much merely to get a job going in his establishment. Yet certainly

there are hundreds of small plants which can earn a profit even from five-dollar jobs.

Some years ago an industrialist described to me the difference in efficiency in two plants he operated, both manufacturing similar products. One had been in production only three years. It employed three hundred persons. The other had been in operation for thirty years and employed thousands. Yet similarity in their functions offered a basis for computing comparative efficiency. What he had found was that the new plant was not nearly so efficient as the old one; it was, as he said, too new to be highly efficient. It is my observation that this factor of age is equally important in government. From the standpoint of operations per se, a new governmental agency simply cannot be expected to be as efficient as an old one. New organizations, whether in or out of government, are likely to be more efficient in terms of "drive," imagination, and bold policies, but they are almost necessarily less efficient than older ones in effectuating their purposes. Obviously any big and complex new unit with a big and complex new function will be less efficient in its operations than a new unit with a small and simple function. But it is also a safe assumption that small new agencies will ordinarily be less efficient than big ones that are older.

These considerations illustrate the futility of most references to governmental inefficiency as contrasted with the efficiency of private industry. Patently the government is more efficient as a political agency than is private industry. Even with all its modern interest in public relations and its growing appreciation of personnel administration, industry does not have to be nearly so political as government. And surely government is more efficient at providing minimum educational advantages, organizing road systems, and many other things including coining, issuing, and regulating the value of money. Some of these functions are of the essence of government and are so completely accepted as such that there is today no argument whatsoever as to the propriety of these things being handled by government. Yet it was not always so and the fact that it was not should help us appreciate that the real question with regard to new uses of government is simply this: has the function involved come to have a sufficient public-interest character to be in the field of what must be

handled governmentally? There is no clear limiting principle for governmental action in a democracy. The range of public power and activity will and should differ at different times in history.

Efficiency Is Relative

There is no absolute, universal, and intrinsic difference in efficiency as between public and private management or between big and little business that may serve as a safe guide in determining, on that basis, whether or not any particular function should be entrusted to government. But there are other objectives and considerations according to which governmental management of that particular function will be adjudged by the people to be more or less *desirable* than continued private management. These other objectives and considerations change from time to time and they are certain to change in the future as they have in the past. These things are the vitally important factors; they count for more in the scales of democracy than the relative efficiency of government—though this too is important—in the performance of a function that could conceivably have been left in private hands.

Even if one should believe that government is more efficient than other forms of enterprise, there are other values than the values of efficiency about which one should be concerned. Our descendants may espouse socialism in some form or other; whatever they do, it can be set down with certainty that they will insist that their society shall foster and protect in new and special ways values more important than mere efficiency. Man never will live by bread alone. The argument, however, should be made on the points of our real concern. Are there new and better ways of maintaining old values we know to be good? If so, let them be developed, considered, and adopted. This is the hope of gradualism, as contrasted with revolution.

Against this background, however, there are many things that could be said about specific aspects of the relative efficiency of government and business. Is there, for instance, more or less nepotism in business than in government? Are appointments in the one field more a reflection of pull and privilege than in the other? No one knows. My *guess* is that in these respects government is superior. Yet it may be otherwise; the subject is certainly debatable. Is purchasing as done

by government more or less a matter of favoring friends as compared with purchasing as done by corporations? No one knows. Again my guess is that government has the better record. Do the personal, irrelevant interests of executives determine their decisions more often in business or in government? No one knows. But here too my guess is that because of the public-interest atmosphere surrounding it government normally gets a more completely disinterested judgment from its executives than does a commercial corporation.

Countless similar questions could be posed. The answers to them would doubtless underscore anew the fact that people are capable of reacting to different stimuli in many different ways. The profit motive is not the beginning and end even of self-interest. Enlightened self-interest often becomes astonishingly altruistic. It is by no means uncommon for businessmen to work every bit as hard at things involving no material self-interest as at their businesses. The selfish desire to be well regarded often flowers in truly social attitudes. Persons in government are characteristically among those who seek other than monetary returns and rewards. Perhaps scientists carrying on research in government laboratories furnish the clearest examples; they carry on significant and zealous work without being moved by anything like the profit motive.

The Dynamic of Competition

But the principal advantage commonly attributed to private enterprise is that of dynamics. "Individual initiative" and "free competition" are popular slogans because we have believed that they have been the principal secret of our rapid progress. Even with respect to these factors, however, we have more sentiment than cold analysis and measurement. Take, for example, the rather common charge that we have an "economy of waste"; that waste has been blandly defended, or discounted, as good economics, as being on the whole profitable. But no one seems to have attempted to compute a balance sheet, a careful, factual estimate of the total cost of our wastes and total dynamic return from them.

Probably we shall never make a determination on any such basis, but it is worth while to ponder the question a bit. Before the war a friend who is in the oil business told me that if a motorist started from

Richmond to drive to Los Angeles and bought a pint of gasoline at each filling station he passed, he would, on arriving at Los Angeles, have not only a full tank of gas but enough in addition to fill two tank trailers. This is just one aspect of a situation treated popularly some years ago in a series of articles in *Collier's Weekly*, "Too Many Retailers." It is a familiar story to anyone who visits his old home town and observes the effects of mortality among business houses. The once familiar Main Street has become a strange place—and this despite the fact that he cannot know of other changes between his visits which have left no trace at all.

Notwithstanding all we hear about "duplication" in government, it is my observation that this is no more a major problem in public administration than it is in any other field. Bureaucracy is its own check against duplication—and for much the same reason that businessmen would, if they could, end competition. Duplication exists in almost all non-governmental fields, and though it is generally believed to be a blessing, it is not so regarded by businessmen as they come directly up against it. On the contrary they do their best to get away from the "free competition" they loudly espouse during political campaigns.

One of our national business journals called two or three years ago for suspension by the Department of Justice of its enforcement of the anti-trust laws. The writer did not attack Congress and demand repeal of the laws. Instead he attacked Thurman Arnold for trying to enforce them! He did it by questioning the national belief in free competition and by insisting on the inevitability of bigger and bigger business. Here are three of his paragraphs:

"The old theory of competition was that it lowered prices down to a point just far enough above the cost of production to assure a small margin of net profit and continuance of the business. Actually, as we have learned over and over again from experience, unrestricted competition forces prices down to a level which is less than the actual cost of production.

"In any competitive price war, which so many politicians seem to think should be encouraged, the lowest price level is from 10% to 20% under the real cost of production. This means that a corporation with the greatest resources is bound to win at the end of any competitive struggle. It also means that in a price war, competitors would fight on, gradually exhausting their strength until, like roosters in a cock fight, one or both dies. Unlike

roosters, however, industrialists have intelligence and judgment. So they do their best to bow to the law; at the same time they get together somehow to prevent suicides. . . .

"With every good intention, they attempted by legal enactment to resurrect and revitalize it. They sought to upset an economic trend and to break up combinations by law. Of course, they did not succeed. Natural law made cynical jokes of our man-made anti-trust laws. Within the past 50 years, and since the passage of the Sherman law, there has been a veritable slaughter of small units. Corporations and combinations of them have grown by leaps and bounds, until the so-called independent is today the exception. Officially we have not yet recognized the immutability of the natural law. The fight against it is kept up at great and wasteful legal expense."

After this defense of big and bigger business, the writer opposed big government. Consider his argument:

"Ideas and progress come from individual minds, not from the mass. The crowd can feel, hate, consume and destroy, but it cannot build."

Here he seems to be on Thurman Arnold's side! He applies this latter thought to government. It could as well be applied to business.

The problem of dynamics in big business is not inherently different from the problem of dynamics in government. Socially we have relied less on progress brought about by a single big company than on progress made by a variety of companies, both big and little. Yet big business is capable of making many important contributions to society. So, too, is government, which is one entity and yet many. But both of them can perfect their organization to ensure greater dynamism—and both need to do so. Increasing giantism in our major corporations will simply mean that this will become more and more of a common problem for business and for government.

It has been said that Congress causes government to be inefficient by ordering the doing of things that are not required. According to whose judgment? By what criteria? Who is to say that Congress is "wrong" in interpreting popular sentiment as indicating a need for a certain action? Wherein does such a Congressional determination differ essentially from that of the board of directors of a commercial corporation? The board has the criterion of corporate profit; Con-

gress, the criterion of national need and sentiment. Is the criterion of corporate profit a superior and more efficient criterion? Are all executive and board decisions in business good decisions?

Anatomy of Efficiency

The most persistent and most thoughtful argument respecting the relative efficiency of government and business is that competition, presumably present in business and lacking in government, guarantees efficiency in business and that therefore private enterprise is naturally more efficient than public enterprise. But it may be questioned whether competition is absent from governmental administration. Each of thousands of budget estimates competes strenuously with all others for appropriations. Each bureau, each program, each project, has to fight for life and funds. A section head is under tremendous pressure in preparing estimates to justify his askings; he has to play down, skimp, or reduce estimates for projects that he cannot hope to justify effectively in contrast with other items from other sections. Throughout the year that follows he must continuously watch and review so that he can adjust any part of his work that would make his section competitively vulnerable. The division chief goes through the same process, coming up at the end of the year with a budget request he knows he can fight for against askings of other divisions in the bureau. The bureau chief functions similarly in handling requests from all his divisions, accepting those he feels able to justify in the departmental competition with other bureaus. So with the department. It presents to the Bureau of the Budget only what it feels able to justify in competition with other departments. The Budget Bureau goes through the same process in preparing submissions to the President and to the Congress. Finally Congress itself holds lengthy hearings, criticizing and scrutinizing the budget in detail in terms of the probable reactions of constituents back home. Invariably these hearings result in definite cuts; yet these reductions may not represent the end of the gantlet. Even when the chambers are unable to decide on specific ways to make reductions, they may order horizontal cuts, leaving it to agencies to find ways of making particular reductions.

This process resembles very much what happens in business. There

the drive behind the process may come from competition in the sense of the urge for profit, whereas in government the drive behind the process comes from desire for public acceptance and approval. But the process is essentially the same. Can anyone be sure that these different urges working through similar administrative processes will produce essentially different results?

It is to be questioned, too, whether competition is by any means so constant a force in private business, or so clearly a force in the direction of efficiency, as many assume.

A perfect monopoly would obviously be free from the immediate and most drastic pressures of competition. But there are many degrees and kinds of monopoly, so that competition is minimized in countless ways and in varying degrees. It is in the nature of business to want to eliminate competition. It is in the nature of business also to try to set its own competitive stage by focusing attention on points other than those calculated to encourage objective comparison between its products and those of its competitors. What is to be said of the intrinsic efficiency of investing huge capital and a great volume of manpower in the manufacture and sale of such products as chewing gum, nail polish, lipstick, Dr. Kwack's Gout Router, and other similar trivia? Even with government restraining the inefficiency of free enterprise through a Food and Drug Administration empowered to exclude many deleterious goods from the channels of trade, there is in the market a terrific amount of what-of-it merchandise. Wasteful and unimportant features become the basis of competition in many instances. Department-store overhead has tended to go up steadily for years because of a competitive race to provide costly services and features. Two nationally known inventor-industrialists asserted in my hearing several years ago that the way to make money is to invent a doodad rather than to expend effort on more fundamental research. These are some of the aspects of competition that disqualify it as a force making for efficiency.

What is an "economic good" after all? Is it not anything that satisfies a human desire or a desire people can be made to have? Wherein actually does it differ from a "political good" which is the basis for Congressional action and governmental administration? What is more efficient than what? Who says so? What is efficiency anyway? These

questions, it seems to me, all fall before another, greater question: What do the people want to do? That is a political question. Politics determines the basis on which economics lives and moves. There is therefore no easy way to compare efficiency in government with efficiency in business. The president of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, Mr. Chester Barnard, in *The Functions of the Executive* declares that there is no objective test for broad efficiency except survival. There is no real point to glib assertions concerning relative efficiency of government and business. There is much point to efforts directed toward making both government and business better able to survive, more adjustable, more satisfactory in their functioning.

Red Tape

NOT LONG AGO certain magazines gave wide circulation to a listing of nineteen steps by which cases of price gouging and fraud on military contracts are investigated and prosecuted by the War and Justice Departments. Their whole point was evidently to demonstrate that government is in the hands of morons and wasters. One of the magazines used for its main title, "Washington Wonderland," with a subtitle, "Bureaucracy Defined," and offered what it regarded as appropriate editorial comments in the form of critical quotations from members of Congress.

Caricature of Bureaucracy

One need not know the War and Justice Departments, but only large organizations whether governmental or otherwise, to know that in actual practice, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, three of the nineteen steps listed are never taken at all, in perhaps ninety-eight cases out of a hundred two or more of the nineteen steps are never taken, and that in practically all cases seven more of the nineteen steps never require separate action. They are together a single process of reference and of transmittal just as going from Washington to New York is a single process even though one necessarily stops in and goes through Baltimore, Wilmington, Philadelphia, and several other places. If one wishes to be analytical about such a trip and break it down into all its steps, one sees the fireman stoking the engine; the engineer releasing the brakes, opening the throttle, ringing the bell, blowing the whistle; the conductor signaling, taking tickets, answering questions, settling difficulties; the Pullman conductor going through his duties, giving the diagram to the porter; the porter shining shoes, making berths, and putting out clean towels. And in division and general offices a lot of people are working at a lot of different things, auditing tickets, keeping trains from colliding, buying coal, paint, oil, tickets, funny lanterns, red flags, timetables, spikes,

and what have you. A railroad man would put in a thousand "steps" I have left out. It almost makes that last step up to the ticket window too much. Do I really need to go to New York?

Yet the railway companies somehow manage to run trains every once in a while. And most people are content to let the railway bureaucracies refer things back and forth from maintenance to operations to general superintendent to general freight agent without wondering very much about how the section crew at Chatterton got approval for that little job of special repair they had been recommending since last April.

It is not that people *think* more about processes of operation and organization in the case of government; they just *exclaim* more. And one might argue that the processes of government are probably more efficient than those of nongovernmental agencies for that very reason.

The magazines mentioned above somehow saw bureaucracy "defined" in the listing of nineteen steps—mostly hypothetical—in a governmental process. Should we try to find in a similar listing of the steps in a commercial process a definition of "merchandising"? Let us assume that I am going to buy a couple of neckties. I approach a big store, determined to cut red tape and insistent on not "going through proper channels":

1. *I enter store.*
2. *I search first floor for tie counter.*
3. *Ditto second floor.*
4. *Ditto third floor.*
5. *I find there is no fourth floor.*
6. *I return to first floor and discover stairway to basement.*
7. *I descend stairs and find tie counter.*
8. *I get attention of salesman and explain my need.*
9. *I look for the \$1.50 ties, inspect \$2.50 ties, and ask for \$2.00 ties.*
10. *I find three that suit me, ask salesman to charge them, and sign the charge slip, telling salesman to deliver ties to my residence, together with goods my wife bought yesterday.*
11. *Salesman sends charge slip to business office.*
12. *Clerical assistant refers it to cashier.*
13. *Cashier refers it to credit manager.*

14. *Credit manager refers it to an assistant.*
15. *Assistant digs up my record, finds I have not paid my bill for forty-five days.*
16. *Assistant reports to credit manager, who studies the account and instructs assistant to call City Credit Bureau.*
17. *Assistant calls and gets report that my other accounts seem to be in good condition.*
18. *Assistant reports to credit manager, who tells clerical assistant to O.K. the charge and notify salesman.*
19. *Salesman sends ties to delivery department, which assigns package to "C" truck for afternoon handling.*
20. *"C" delivery crew load for afternoon delivery and in due course arrive at my residence. Since it is Thursday afternoon, the maid is not at home and my wife is at a Red Cross meeting.*
21. *Deliveryman takes ties back to store, places them with parcels awaiting tomorrow's delivery.*
22. *Ties loaded again and delivered safely.*
23. *I wear them, find that one does not look in daylight as I had assumed it would, but the thought of all those steps discourages my making attempt to exchange it.*

Exaggerated? Well, a little. Yet, to the extent that the steps enumerated really are separate steps, most of them are essential. As for the above investigations by the War and Justice Departments, the procedure indicated actually saves time and effort as compared with having individual investigators and attorneys and army officers hunt for one another and wonder what and when and to whom to report.

Red Tape in Business

But the fact remains that all large organizations have bureaucracies and red tape, that they have to have them, and that these are the means to the efficient transaction of business. It is every bit as easy to find instances of inefficiency in commerce as in government, although newspaper reporters and Congressmen do not similarly busy themselves trying to find them. My wife's experience in trying to buy an ironing board may serve to illustrate a series I have at hand. The following is a faithful recital:

"I telephoned a big department store one day, asked for the house-furnishings department, and announced that I wanted an ironing board. A very pleasant voice said: 'Would you like the services of a shopper?' and when I replied: 'Not particularly,' she said she would be very glad to get me a shopper. When the shopper, who was to expedite matters for me, answered, I explained that I wanted an ironing board, a good, firm one. After a little discussion of the different kinds of ironing boards they had, I decided on their best one and asked if it already had a pad and a cover. I was assured that it did, and that it would be sent out the next day.

"Many days later I saw the maid doing the family ironing in the laundry room and said to her: 'Well, how is the new ironing board?' She had been struggling for many weeks with one that had been cracked in moving and I thought she would be pleased because I had finally remembered to get her a new one. In a very weary voice she said she had not yet got a new ironing board. I stepped to the phone at once, went through the business of telling the clerk on what day I had ordered the board, what style board I had ordered, and with which shopper I had talked. I was assured that the board would be sent out immediately.

"The next day it came, just as I was leaving the house, so on my return I said cheerily: 'Well, now how is the new ironing board?' Once again I was met with an utter lack of enthusiasm—the ironing board had no pad or cover. I called the store on the phone again, asked for house furnishings, was referred to the 'shopper' who would supposedly smooth my way, and explained to her that the ironing board did not have a pad and cover as she had assured me it would have, and asked if she could have sent out, on the first possible delivery, one pad and two covers. She was very apologetic, carefully retook my name and address, and said the pad and covers would be out the next day. The next day the maid said to me as I came in the door: 'I didn't know why you ordered two more ironing boards. I was sure it must be a mistake, so I sent one back and kept one, but it hasn't any pad or cover either.'

"In desperation I went once more to the phone, went through the entire business of recalling the transaction to the person who answered, and said that I still needed one pad and two covers for my

ironing board, and that I wanted the extra board picked up and returned to the store. The next day the pick-up truck came for the extra board, leaving us, however, neither pad nor cover. Then a few days later, from my upstairs window, I saw the delivery truck outside and hurried down to open the door and get the pad and cover for the ironing board, as on that particular day we were once more badly in need of them. When I opened the door, there stood the delivery boy—with an ironing board! I told him to take it right back to the store, and, completely exasperated, called the store and told them that if they sent me any more ironing boards I would not return them but would give them to my friends, and would they *please* send me *one* pad and *two* covers. The clerk apologized profusely and asked me to hold the phone just a minute. When she returned she said very sweetly: "We have no pads or covers. Would you like to have me order one?" I told her I would not, that I would pick them up in the neighborhood, and, having done that, dismissed the whole matter from my mind.

"Four or five days later a delivery boy from the same department store came to the door with two packages under his arm. I told him that I had ordered nothing from the store and that he must have come to the wrong number. However, my name and address was on each of the packages, so I asked him to wait while I opened them. Each package contained one pad and two covers, all of which I returned.

"The final chapter in this tale of the efficiency of private enterprise came when I received the monthly statements of my bill. Four ironing boards were charged and all four listed as returned, but I was charged with two pads and four covers. I hadn't the courage to call the store again, so I paid for all the pads and covers, and for no ironing board. The store was the loser by fifty-six cents."

Bureaucratic Organization: A Technical Subject

The organization of a bureaucracy is a technical subject about which most intelligent citizens know nothing. Except for the aspect of public accountability, bureaucratic organization and administration in large business concerns is quite similar to that in government. Those who discover and exclaim over bureaucratic procedure are either complete illiterates with respect to organization or so hostile

to government as by passion to be blinded to their own experience. The procedures of bureaus, which are simply the major divisions of an organization, constitute a field for technical study. One reason for this is that diligent attention to detail can invariably discover minor ways of improving procedures. There is a more important reason, however: bureaus change to meet changing conditions, and procedures have rather constantly to be changed to meet new work loads and new situations. Any company having a twenty per cent increase in a certain field of its business inevitably has to rearrange its bureaucracy and its procedures. Men even write books on problems of business bureaucracy. To cite but one example, Holden, Fish and Smith have recently published a volume entitled *Top Management Organization and Controlled Research Study of the Management Policies and Practices of Thirty-one Leading Industrial Corporations*.

To exclaim wildly over bureaucracy and bureaucratic procedure is to betray one's ignorance. That is, of course, one's privilege. Unfortunately, however, it directs public attention to a technical subject to the understanding of which few among the general public can make any contribution, and it diverts public attention from concentration on broader questions that the public alone can resolve. There is an incidental result, too, which is profoundly harmful: it fosters a basic public distrust of the government and damages the morale of men and women in public service.

Emerson refused to eat a small berry between meals because it would set in motion the whole intricate process of digestion. No one, however, would wish to become so conscious of the complexities of metabolism as to become unwilling to eat the meals themselves. Altogether too many of our citizens bring single, between-meals berries of public business to heads of departments. The country would profit greatly from their development of a greater sense of discretion about taking such fodder "straight to the horse's mouth." The business of organized society must and will go on. It will be carried on by bureaus of one kind or another.

The intricacies of the linotype machine remain impressive even after long acquaintance. One wonders how anyone could have invented it. The big rotary presses that grind out tens of thousands of

newspapers an hour are another amazing achievement. One can spend an interesting life working at and with linotypes or presses—though the man who does either will usually not be a publisher. A publisher need not know a great deal about either linotypes or presses. His job is the management of an even more intricate mechanism: the bureaucracy embracing composing room, stereotyping and press rooms, mailing room and circulation departments, advertising department, news room, editorial, engraving, and business departments. The linotype operator is a complete specialist; the head of the composing room is a specialist executive; the mechanical superintendent less a specialist and more an executive; the business manager still more an executive; and the publisher almost wholly an executive. Yet among businessmen he is a specialist—a newspaper man. All this is familiar enough and accepted. The public marvels, but not too much. Only in the case of government is there a tendency for people to fix their eyes on the linotype machine and say: "It won't work!"

Yet if government cannot become more complex as the rest of life becomes more complex, society cannot grow. Inevitably it would become decadent and chaotic. If John Centipede Citizen becomes too much concerned about the processes by which he moves, he will be unable to move. Those questions are for the technicians. John C. Citizen has rather to decide in what direction he wishes to go.

The Uses of Red Tape

One can gain a slight view of red tape in small establishments in their cash registers with separate drawers for different sales clerks. In larger establishments the tape takes the form of a special cashier whose accounts must check with sales slips. The train conductor who is accompanied by an aide as he takes tickets affords another mild example of red tape, recalling the days when it was generally believed that many conductors carried on something of a personal business in transportation. What we see here at work is the old principle of "check and double check"; it has of necessity been highly developed in big organizations. Integrity in transactions is demanded much more completely in government than elsewhere. This accounts for much red tape.

The importance of red tape as a safeguard against fraud was illus-

trated by a case that attracted much attention in 1937. It involved what was popularly described as a "fake CCC camp." A lengthy analysis printed, after thorough investigation, in the *Congressional Record* for January 19, 1938, culminated in the simple explanation that the CCC had not insisted on quite enough red tape.

As someone has well said, "Red tape is that part of my business you don't know anything about." Certainly it is not something peculiar to government. It is not something that government people like in some special way and spin because they like it. Practically everyone within a given organization rebels more vigorously at its red tape than the average outsider does. The explanation should be obvious: most people like to simplify their jobs. They like to feel confidence about that for which they are responsible. This latter desire may inspire some red tape, but it also inspires simplification of procedure. When better red tape is made—and it is being made continually—the bureaucrats, not the commentators, make it. They make it to meet their own necessities, not the demands of the commentators. There is no absolute simplification of what is inherently complex. There is only relative simplification. Red tape means exactly that—relative simplification. We shall have it with us always. And the more complex our civilization becomes, the more red tape we shall need.

Operating on One's Proper Level

MUCH OF THE GENERAL FEAR about big government arises from reflection on the limited capacity of the human mind. Mr. Justice Brandeis and many others endowed like him with superior minds have found in this limitation the basis of a social philosophy that would frankly limit the scope of organized effort. They are convinced that giant organizations can never be adequately comprehended and efficiently managed, especially that they cannot be so managed as to protect and advance the delicate values of hundreds of thousands of diverse personalities.

It is no reflection on the thinking of the gifted men and women who adopt this view to suggest that it is the position which ordinary citizens of less reflective capacity will also tend to take and that emphasis on other aspects of the problem of public management may contribute to a better adjustment to modern trends and necessities. It is neither possible nor necessary to refute the arguments of those who insist on emphasizing the finite character of the human mind. But to say this is not to admit that the limits in administrative management have now been reached. Until we have studied carefully the high capacity of the human mind to devise finer and ever finer ways of organizing and apportioning administrative functions and responsibilities, no one can know how close we are to those outer limits.

There are distinctly reactionary implications in mere insistence on human incapacity, just as there are reactionary implications in a simple insistence that privilege inevitably begets decay. These two propositions are usually asserted at the right and left ends of the social spectrum and directed at each other rather than toward any central truth. Both argue that civilization is impossible. Yet it is not hard to believe that privileges often really are advantages. And it is not hard to believe that the mind can comprehend more than it now comprehends. Taking any point in history, who can say that humanity could not have sustained one added measure of complexity or that a par-

ticular group of people would have been forced on the decline by the grant of one new privilege?

Even if the trend toward larger organization be not progressive, we do face the necessity for adjustment to it. That requires consideration of how to enable and to help limited minds to make the best possible success of the job of management which is presented to them.

Philosophers in Administration

There are many old misconceptions needing clarification and many new conceptions calling for elucidation. One of the things most needing to be understood now is the increased practical value of the so-called abstract mind. Up to now we have advanced by a process of division of labor that is called specialization. There are today thousands of markedly different kinds of jobs in which men can employ their talents. But as we have specialized, the practical need for generalization and synthesis has grown in geometric ratio. Thus our elaborate division of labor puts a new value on persons with capacity of a sort that approaches philosophy. Handlers of artifacts we have in abundance, but we have a desperate and growing need in our day for men and women who can deal in relationships.

The process of administration—especially large-scale administration—is the process of moving matters up and down, to and from successive levels of abstraction. There is no more difficult problem than that of getting at the highest level persons sufficiently broad in their perceptions and with enough capacity for the abstract to deal effectively with the issues that require to be settled at that level. If we prize that kind of ability in our highest administrative posts and cultivate it sufficiently, we can entrust public management with far greater tasks than we safely could otherwise.

But the inclination still runs strongly the other way. Experience is thought to be the great qualification. To be sure it has its values, but popularly we misunderstand and overrate them. The result is that, figuratively speaking, we put a man in the post of supervising architect because he has had twenty years of experience as a bricklayer. Persons who perform well at the top rarely if ever do so because they have had more experience than anyone else in all the divisions of their organization. Nor do they succeed because they

have had more experience in some one particular division of the organization. Louis Brownlow once said that if you need to select an executive and choose a county agent for the position, if you make a good selection, he will invariably be a good executive with respect to everything except things having to do with county agents.

Men who go far in governmental administration usually have to get there by large leaps. If they function well on a high level to which they jump, their success cannot be due to greater experience in everything in the field below that level. They succeed because they have special qualities. How to discover in advance whether a person has the qualities needed: there is the rub. Yet, though it is impossible regarding either a frog or a man to tell by looking at him how far he can jump, we should be able, by taking thought, steadily to enhance our ability to appraise the jumping ability of individuals.

Using county agents again for illustrative purposes, there may be a few who after a year or two of service will have a vivid understanding of the functions of county agents in the United States, but some of them would almost have to serve in all 3,000 counties before developing such an understanding. These latter might be fairly good agents, understandingly zealous with regard to the problems of their own localities, but they should never be brought to Washington. Those of the first category are, on their level, of the general order from which Washington should recruit its staff.

Higher Levels Distinguished

There are, of course, many more levels than are recognized by the writers of personnel classification acts. It is obvious, however, that many times more persons are experienced in and able to discuss administrative matters relating to the so-called lower levels than are able to discuss them on the higher levels. It will therefore be most useful for us here to focus attention on the bureau, departmental, secretarial, interdepartmental, governmental, and Presidential levels. These are the levels hardest to understand and most difficult to staff. The chief problems about government that disturb thoughtful citizens are problems having to do with the responsibilities of administration on those levels. All of them are governmental in that they are in and of the government. It is moreover essential that administra-

tors be public-minded in their attitudes on every level. But the requirements in perspective and method of procedure are definitely different on these various levels.

Every bureau head is, in a way, a specialist. Even if he may not have been a specialist before his appointment, it is practically inevitable that he will become one—a specialist in the particular field in which his bureau operates. If, however, before his appointment he was a specialist in a single segment of the bureau's work, he becomes steadily less a specialist and more a generalist. In any case, his success depends on his ability to remain or become able to spread himself over the whole of the bureau's field and to be a specialist only in the sense that the broadest reach of the bureau is specialized. His success depends in no small measure, too, on his ability to be a bridge from his bureau to his department and to the government. He needs to be able to fit his bureau into the department and into the government. He needs to have an imaginative perception of the secretary's needs as the secretary manages his own responsibilities—the secretary's need fairly to understand and deal with his other bureaus, the secretary's need intelligently to relate the work of his department to that of other governmental agencies, the secretary's need to be imaginative and sympathetic in relation to the President and his responsibilities.

Any bureau head will bend to departmental and governmental restrictions and requirements. But he may bend only as a tree bends in the wind. What is desirable is that he have the ability to bend in imaginative understanding of his department and of the government. He can thereby enormously enhance his value and his effectiveness. Some bureau chiefs cannot see outside of their own bureaus. Without exception they are inadequate to their jobs. A good chief must be a zealous champion of the functions and the personnel of his bureau, but he must also be a bridge between his more narrowly zealous specialists and his more broadly responsible superiors.

Every bureau chief needs to organize his bureau so that he can carry his special responsibilities effectively and still have time and energy to assist importantly in relating his bureau to the entire government—that is to say, to society as a whole. Most of the commonly expressed fears of bureaucrats amount in reality to a demand on the

part of government executives for broad perception and a widened sense of responsibility. Yet in specific situations the public expects and demands that they act as specialists, keeping within a narrow range of interest, experience, and perception. It is therefore extremely difficult, and to a considerable degree impossible, for anyone who has served long in the position of a bureau chief to change suddenly to departmental administration and function effectively on that level. It is much easier to make the change the other way. It has been my experience to observe this fact time and again: men do not move readily from bureau to departmental or governmental administration, but they can and do move successfully from the departmental or governmental to the bureau level. Bureau officials generally show on the departmental level a limitation somewhat similar to the limitations of most men who have specialized in business. In both instances there has been too much concentration of interest, too narrow a viewpoint, too little of that broad perspective which *is needed so greatly* by those in high administrative positions.

Individuals in departmental offices should perforce be of broader mind than their opposites in bureaus. An \$1,800 junior assistant in the departmental personnel office should be fundamentally broader in outlook and range of interest than his \$1,800 opposite number in a bureau. They may both work on classification of positions; but the one in the bureau needs only the capacity to understand the relationships of positions in that bureau, whereas the one in the departmental office needs to understand relationships between sets of positions in all the bureaus combined.

The same difference should exist between officials on the governmental or interdepartmental and those on the departmental level. Those individuals whose responsibilities relate to the entire government should obviously be broader in outlook than those whose duties are circumscribed by the concerns of a single department.

Suiting One's Action to One's Level

Such actions as are taken on these several different levels should likewise be correspondingly different. For anyone in a departmental position to exercise a bureau judgment, or for a person in a governmental position to exercise a departmental judgment, is sheer

duplication (often the only important duplication to be found in government) and productive of confusion rather than effective management. The higher the level, the more general should be the nature of the judgment exercised.

The only basis on which governmental management can succeed is for officials operating on the governmental level resolutely to refrain from operating on any other than the governmental level. They can best keep to their proper sphere by continually asking themselves questions like these: What are the aspects of this matter that have a different significance when looked at from the standpoint of the government as a whole? What are the things I can contribute because of my special knowledge of the President's policy, of other departments, of other analogous matters which have come up elsewhere in the past? What are the things I need to know about it, out of all there is to know, for me to exercise the kind of judgment I ought to exercise? What are the things I have to watch for on behalf of the President? What are the determinations that, because of my position, I can make better than they would probably be made by equally good departmental officials?

There is more inadequacy in government because of the inability of officials to operate on their proper levels than from any other single cause. But such inadequacy is not inevitable; it is not something that cannot be improved; it is not something predetermined by the limits of the human mind. It stems chiefly from a failure to realize the importance of taking careful note of the qualities of mind, temperament, and personality required for a position on a given level and then searching for those qualities in the person to be appointed. Once there is a realization of the crucial need of abstract, generalizing minds at the top—minds broad and yet incisive, minds interested in ideas, concepts, analogies, and relationships and possessed of a political sense and a leader's "feeling for action"—we can accomplish a great deal in identifying individuals with the needed qualifications. And we shall in time be able to develop more such persons.

Need of Public Understanding

It is almost as important for the public to understand the way in which high public officials should operate as it is for that way to be

understood by the officials themselves. For public and Congressional expectation of the wrong kind of procedure on high administrative levels does much to prevent more efficient administration.

However much the public may be conscious of the size of the great governmental department, few citizens have any real notion of the actuality. When several persons call upon the secretary to discuss some particular matter with him, they never suspect that his department may at that very time be handling thousands of similar actions, of equivalent interest to thousands of groups like the one making the call. They cannot understand that the secretary cannot properly act solely on the basis of their call. Yet he cannot do so because he would then be acting in ignorance of factors governing related cases that he has not heard. He would be handling their case out of focus. The secretary needs to give such matters organizational attention rather than personal attention. He is responsible, and he should be responsible, chiefly for *the way in which such matters are handled* rather than for the handling of specific actions.

Like other intelligent citizens, even the members of the Supreme Court fail sometimes to understand the nature of the responsibility of the secretary of a department. In a recent decision, as in several earlier ones, the Court, by requiring the head of an agency himself to handle a specific matter, actually made it certain that the matter would be handled less efficiently than it had been previously. This was in the case of *Cudahy v. Holland*, a wage and hour decision handed down in 1942. One long paragraph in the majority decision contains a discussion of administration. This is altogether appropriate, because law should not be considered apart from its administration. But the paragraph is based on an assumption that delegated power is more likely to be poorly used than power exercised directly by a commissioner serving as one of the heads of an agency. My own belief is that the contrary is true—as indeed four of the nine members of the Court held. Only those department heads who spend the great bulk of their time directing the *way* in which things are done, instead of doing them themselves, will get superior results.

It happens occasionally that high officials, not fully understanding their own functions and working under pressure from other officials and the public, assume a specific competence they do not have. They

make the error of trying to live up to outsiders' ideas of their official competence and responsibility and interfering consequently in matters on which it is both unwise and inappropriate for them to expend either their time or energy. On the other hand, visitors seeking authoritative action from a department head are frequently confused and disappointed by their inability to get the result they desire. The remedy in both cases is a clear understanding of the necessity for every official to function always on his proper level.

Only those matters should be handled by high officials personally which have developed to the point where the judgment needing to be exercised is general in character. Some specific questions have or acquire an importance to warrant that kind of attention. Where other, less important matters demand attention by top officials, they should treat them as ways of finding out how such things are being handled—that is to say, as samples rather than in terms of their own intrinsic importance. By handling them on this basis officials can readily make sure that they are considered with proper regard for other similar items to which they have not been able to give their attention.

Importance of Delegation

"Delegation" is a term widely used but little understood. What a major executive does not do and will not do is fully as important as what he does do. Every top administrator worthy of his position must make these distinctions clearly in his own mind. If he makes them wisely, he will give those executives below him positions of real importance.

Of a piece with delegation is the minor but essential matter of understanding the organization of office routine. For example, there are many techniques for reducing the number and length of appointments, but they are too little used by many executives no less than by persons having business with them. Those who feel they must needs see a top executive in person can, by taking thought, always find ways of saying what they have to say in fewer words than they first think they need. Invariably they would help themselves by doing so. Yet callers are rarely direct. Often it takes an executive half an hour to find out what it is they want. They "beat around the bush" when the best thing they could do for their own good would

be to give the official the bare minimum of information required to enable him to take action on their problem.

It may be that a few words of advice on this score would be in order. What is said above has been written with reference chiefly to citizens who wish to get attention on their problems—not so much to public administrators in their work with one another, although it applies also to them—and particularly to those citizens who feel that they must “go to the top.” Callers at the office of a high official should, whenever possible, bring with them written statements of what they seek so that, following the conference, the official may refer the matter promptly to his appropriate sub-executive. To expect a top official during a busy day to recapitulate the details of a conference to that executive orally is to expect an impossibility. Usually the best possible result of a conference with a high official is that he will ask an aide to “call John Smith and see what is on his mind.”

But often there will simply be no possibility of arranging for a conference; in that case the citizen will do well to remember that telephone conversations with top executives are often actually better than personal interviews. For then an aide to the official can listen in and, at the end, make the necessary references and make them promptly. Good office management dictates that a high official should almost never make a single note of a telephone call and should almost never have to remember to think about a follow-up. Ordinarily, however, a letter would be still better than a telephone call. It can give a full description of the matter on the citizen's mind and can be routed immediately to the person competent to handle it.

In an earlier paragraph I said that what top executives should not do is as important as what they should do and that erroneous expectations by the public are an important factor in making them give time to things they should delegate to others. Somehow many citizens feel that if only they could “get to the Secretary”—or to the President—things would happen as they wish them to happen. They are grossly mistaken. Nine times out of ten the citizen will get the maximum of favorable action by seeking out and going to the official who is immediately responsible for the particular matter in which the citizen is interested. Why expect it to be otherwise? This is as it should be.

There are exceptions, of course, but nothing can better illustrate

the point than the case of job-seekers and those who are recommending job-seekers. In a department the size of the Department of Agriculture, for months in succession, personnel actions of all kinds may average more than 800 a day. Obviously personnel administration has to be organized. Because of Civil Service laws, classification acts, departmental regulations, and other necessary adjuncts to systematic management, most heads of departments come and go without knowing much about personnel procedures. They do learn—and quickly—that they have, for this general reason, little chance to make arbitrary selections of persons to be hired, demoted, or discharged. Appropriation acts, for example, are written to crush such arbitrary power; no secretary can force a bureau to hire a person for whom there is no salary available. Each bureau is responsible for planning its activities, within the usually quite precise limits of the appropriation act which programs its expenditures. The secretary finds he cannot hold his bureaus responsible if he begins telling them in detail how to organize and run their work. He must be content to give them general directions and through his offices of finance and personnel check their specific actions against such objective standards as he may be able to devise.

The secretary can prescribe general standards and procedures, but can effectively select only his own personal staff and the heads of the various offices and bureaus. So with the heads of bureaus and offices; they can select only their own principal executives, for the latter, in turn, must have equally the right to select, within the limits of general regulations, *their* principal executives. And so on down the whole hierarchal line.

No one is in a worse position in any organization than the person who has been employed as a result of special pressure from a higher executive or from an outside person of influence. His boss will resent the fact that he has to spend his budget money for someone he did not want. He will be afraid that the unwanted employee will not submit to discipline, that he will carry tales about things he does not understand, and that he cannot be fired if found incompetent. The unwanted employee becomes an excuse for everything that goes wrong. All in all, the employee who relies on pull to get a job will be,

on the average, a less desirable employee than the one who sells himself to the man who will be his immediate boss.

Any secretary who tries to select personnel here and there throughout his department is bound to be a poor executive. He will have crosslines of authority, gnawing jealousy, and wasteful friction and confusion. He can be effective as an administrator only by making sure that the men he makes responsible are actually responsible.

Yet, be all this as it may, millions of citizens believe that a Cabinet secretary can be responsible for his department only if he personally selects all its employees. It follows that the job-hunter and the friend who recommends him are "pains in the neck" for all high officials. Obviously the abstract power to hire and fire must vest in the secretary. It is essential to his authority. But it must be used, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, in an organized way. It must be delegated if it is to be exercised wisely and effectively.

Within a department, matters requiring secretarial attention can be and usually are so presented that he can see what he needs to know almost at once. One common technique is to have a series of memoranda covering a single item of business. The first will usually consist of a single page describing the matter, citing the particular issue involved, indicating the recommendation with respect to the issue, and noting which interested bureau and staff officers concur and which ones dissent. Successive memoranda would be progressively more detailed; the docket thereunder would contain all relevant information. The secretary can then go as far into the matter as he may think it necessary.

Eyes on the Woods

But neither these mechanical and organizational techniques nor even the willingness to delegate can make a good administrator out of an executive lacking the capacity to think in terms of woods rather than of trees. Top executives must be able to deal with columns of figures rather than with figures themselves; with large bodies of men, not merely with individual persons; with twelve million bales of cotton, not merely with cotton farming; and with the relationships between the twelve million bales of cotton, two and a half billion

bushels of corn, the bulb-growers in Oregon, the peanut-growers in southside Virginia, the Texas delegation, and the Ottawa Agreement. Knowing how to feed a steer or how to buy a steak is not important for a Secretary of Agriculture. It is important, however, that he be able to look at a report on meat supplies and see the necessity for rationing and the propriety of trying to get equitable distribution of meat by compulsory wartime extension of Federal meat inspection. To insist on having as Secretary of Agriculture a man who "knows his steers" is becoming increasingly irrelevant. But to insist on having a secretary who will know, or will be able to perceive quickly, how farmers will react to a given action is still to be extremely relevant.

Government is concerned with the public-interest aspects of everything people do, whether individually or in groups. Those public-interest aspects change from time to time. But whatever they are, they are brought into focus only in government. If they are national in their significance, they come into focus in the national government. If of another order, they fall within the spheres of state or local government. These levels of government in its most inclusive sense have their counterparts within administrative organization where they are fully of comparable importance. With regard to public administration no less than public policy, the necessity of getting things handled on their proper level is of the essence of good government.

The perfection of arrangements for administrative matters handled on their proper level is a job for generalists—managerial, philosophical, political generalists. In organizing such arrangements the generalist will use the specialist in a multitude of important ways, but he will use him as a specialist or, in other words, as a technician. In so far as a businessman serves government well *because* he is a businessman, he will serve as a technician, advising the government about his field of business or industry. In so far as a farmer or a banker or an economist or a chemist serves government well *because* of his competence as such, he will serve as a technician, functioning in government as a farmer, as an economist, as a chemist, or *advising* government about farming, economics, or chemistry.

Patently there are levels also for technicians. In the Department of Agriculture one of our problems has been to find, among a huge number of botanists, chemists, physicists, zoologists, geneticists,

ecologists, and a host of other specialists, a few scientific generalists. We have found that it is much easier to find a good enzyme chemist than to find a chemistry generalist, and much easier to find a chemistry generalist than to find a science generalist. The analogy holds, we may be sure, throughout the whole vast range of government.

We must be more diligent both in searching for and in educating men and women who will be able to operate effectively on the higher, broader levels of public administration in our big democracy.

Wanted: An Organization Product

"ADMINISTRATION" IS SOMEHOW a respectable word while "co-ordination" seems to be disreputable. Yet administration always proceeds through co-ordination. To co-ordinate is to bring into common action, and this is a reasonably adequate general definition of administration. Administration is thought of popularly in much too simple terms—as management and, increasing the distortion, in the military or authoritarian tradition. Psychologists and administrators alike have come increasingly to realize that management consists much less in giving orders than in inducing or in organizing to secure agreement. When the process is thus understood, orders are seen as the formulation of what has been or will be agreed to. Where the factors are complex, the process unavoidably becomes complex. It is the desire to evade the difficulties inhering in such complexity that leads to the snubbing of co-ordination. The tendency among the uninitiated is to feel that if someone would only issue the proper orders or if only someone were clothed with sufficient authority, there would be no need of co-ordination and everything would become a matter of "simple administration." Yet the fact is that the process of formulating and getting acceptance for the proper orders still would be in considerable part a process of co-ordination.

In its simplest terms, co-ordination begins with consideration of the different interests of two neighboring farmers or two merchants or two industrialists. It goes on to consider differences in interest as between grain farmers and feeders; between cotton farmers and corn farmers; between the butter-making creamery, the cheese plant, the condensory, and the fluid-milk consumers; between the need to cultivate and the need to conserve the soil; between the need of farm people to make money and the need of city people to eat; between the need of bankers to make money and the need of farmers for cheap credit; between the desire of citizens to get help from the

government and the desire of taxpayers to reduce public expenditures; between the desire of some producers to export and the desire of other producers to keep out imports.

These different interests are co-ordinated in a way and to a degree by legislative action. But they remain to be co-ordinated more delicately and more precisely in administration. The practical job of co-ordination begins when Congress provides for a number of bureaus to carry out programs designed to take care of popular needs. The administrative job of co-ordination has its internal, organizational aspects; in other aspects it is a reflection of the necessity of co-ordinating diverse public interests. Administration and co-ordination, whether they are regarded as different things or as very much the same thing are, in a democracy, part of the democratic process. The problems of public administration are by no means wholly self-contained within the organizations of government, although they have strictly internal aspects. The various organizations reflect various popular interests, various popular responses. Co-ordination of the interests, judgments, and attitudes of related governmental organizations is necessary to efficiency, bringing to bear upon the specialized segments of government the organizational interests and technical competences of the whole government. But it is also the democratic process working through administration. It is one of the ways by which the essence of popular attitudes and interests is brought to bear upon and made controlling over the specialized segments of government.

Nature of Co-ordination

Co-ordination has different aspects and elements on each level of policy and of administration. Starting on any single farm, production and management are inevitably influenced by the judgment of Farm Credit Administration field workers just as they are influenced by the judgment of the local banker. A farmer's management and production decisions similarly are influenced by the AAA, by the Soil Conservation Service, and perhaps by the Farm Security Administration. Each of these agencies makes a specialized effort to help farmers do things they cannot do unaided. Each generally supplements and supports the others, though there occasionally are

exceptions to this rule. It is clear, however, that their activities cannot be co-ordinated on John Q. Smith's farm unless their programs, their policies, and their organizations are first co-ordinated in Washington. Each new docket, each new proposal for making a particular program more useful, must be checked by those responsible for all the others. Otherwise when the new program comes into operation it may cause more harm than good, more confusion than improvement.

Friction and confusion may stem, however, from considerations utterly outside the ken of John Q. Smith, farmer. The Federal government is not and should not be carrying on these programs merely to help John Q. Smith. It must act out of a regard for the welfare of the whole nation. Its only justification for helping John Q. Smith would be that there are so many John Smiths in distress as to alarm the country, or that there are such serious unbalances between our rural and urban economies as to threaten a national breakdown, or that because they have felt themselves neglected by their government all the John Smiths have as a group begun to take action which is in danger of upsetting a lot of distant applecarts, even breeding international ill will.

No government can ever be just a general effort to do whatever John Q. Smith or some other farmer wants done. Whatever is done has to be justifiable as public—that is, governmental—action. Moreover it must be done in a way which can be defended before Congress, in line with the particular legislation Congress enacted dealing with the issue. Congress provides for a systematic though narrow review of all administrative action by the Comptroller General; every farm program must be able to pass that review. Funds must be got in competition with all other programs comprising the national budget; hence every farm program must be able to meet the scrutiny of the Budget Bureau. And if a farm program will have an effect on international trade or foreign relations generally, it must be reasonably acceptable to the State Department as well.

These facts are, of course, only illustrative. What is important is that these tests, all of which have been devised to protect the public interest, have an enormously complex derivation and influence. They are tolerable only because they establish an intricate process of ref-

erence, consultation, and clearance which actually promotes the general welfare. In its formal aspect this is the process of co-ordination. It has to be organized with the greatest of insight and care.

The Organization of Co-ordination

To organize the process, responsibility for each type of checking and clearance has to be precisely fixed. Thousands of individual employees acting on their own motion cannot profitably go running to the Comptroller General, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, or the Secretary of State, each to get a ruling on his own particular proposals. They simply must proceed in an organized way.

In the Department of Agriculture, the Office of Land Use Co-ordination, and, though to a lesser degree, the Office of the Solicitor serve, by clearing dockets, to accomplish one important type of co-ordination throughout the Department. Other offices play a similar part. The Office of Budget and Finance handles relationships with the Bureau of the Budget and with the Comptroller General. The Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations handles the departmental relationships with the State Department. With their general background these offices are able to clear many dockets without outside consultation. When outside consultation is necessary, however, they know where to go and how to handle the case. Thus when a docket comes to the secretary with the initials of the Director of Finance, the Director of Foreign Agricultural Relations, the Director of the Office of Land Use Co-ordination, the Solicitor, and the Chief of the initiating Bureau, he knows that he needs to consider it only in terms of his own judgment. The process invariably works regularly and smoothly unless the secretary's office grows lax about requiring these references. When that happens, someone's fingers get burnt rather quickly, and the process is re-established and, mayhap, reinforced.

Co-ordination includes as one of its aspects consultation and communication with the public. For it is not complete without proper reference to public attitudes and expectations. It requires an effort to make each segment of the public realize the interests of all the others. Thus all the concerns of politics are brought to bear on every administrative program.

No great department—that is to say, no bureaucracy—can long be

"isolated" or "removed from the people." Let John Citizen think he has a grievance against the Soil Conservation Service or the Farm Security Administration; let him mention it to an AAA committeeman, and it will travel far and fast within the department, and it will get a great deal of attention. With thousands of field offices, with Washington executives frequently going to the field and being everywhere exposed to people, with great authority delegated to the field, where it is subjected to local pressures, with millions of letters pouring in on the department annually, with millions of telephone calls, with newspapers looking about critically all the time for things to complain of, with Congressmen getting millions of letters from their constituents, with millions of personal contacts between administrative officials and affected citizens—no big department suffers in the slightest from too little knowledge of how the people feel. Where a contrary impression exists, it is superinduced by critics who resent the fact that the superior knowledge of the bureaucrats keeps their own views from weighing more heavily. Government workers are exceedingly sensitive to popular feeling. Public administrators probably get too many reactions from the people rather than too few, considering the number of reactions that are irrelevant or misconceived because of the remoteness of the reactors from what they are reporting. This is not to say, however, that this overdose entails any serious danger—and it does have whatever merit is represented by the blowing off of steam.

But discussion of administrative issues with the public may slow down the process of consultation and reference, and this is a serious problem. If government officials should attempt to discuss a proposed action with all the groups and individuals in the country who believe they are entitled to be consulted and for as long as they think they should be consulted, government would invariably do too little and always do it too late. Fixing reasonable limits to the process of reference and consultation is necessary because the final purpose is agreement on *action*. Agreement must be sufficient, but for 140,000,000 people it inevitably will be the kind of agreement that is involved in the conception of majority government. It is agreement on a course completely satisfactory to no one but sufficiently acceptable to a majority. Fixing reasonable limits to reference and con-

sultation before action is the more tolerable, also, because the decisions are popularly controllable, subject to change and reversal.

The part played by criticism after a decision has been reached, a program launched, is not sufficiently understood or appreciated. On the whole I am inclined to believe that popular discussion and criticism *after* the fact has greater value than it has before the fact. It is important both before and after, but the earlier debate would profit from greater realization of the importance of the later process. The later criticism, too, would be more valuable if there were less assumption that its occasion reflects governmental stupidity and error. Any decision, any governmental action, will profit from experience, from criticism of a program in action. Most programs can be undertaken at all only because of the possibility of correction in practice. The citizen who writes a letter of complaint and the commentator who appraises the working and results of a program are contributing to a process just as important as the franchise itself and closely related to the franchise. The pushing around that government workers in the field suffer at the hands of citizens with whom they work is a part of the process. The process influences the President and workers at every level. Its ultimate impact and effect on and through Congress and through elections are only the ultimate aspects of a pervading process.

What results from this process of organizational and popular co-ordination—and it is one way of defining the essence of good administration—is not an arbitrary product but an organized product, an institutional product, a representative product, a political product. It will be a product to which no very great number will much object, one for which no better alternative was clearly available, one that is subject to change and will be changed in the light of experience, in response to popular criticisms. Such should be the products of democratic government.

An Organization Product— National Action

ORGANIZED BUSINESS is essentially organized agreement. There must first be agreement on a method of choosing leaders and of defining the powers that they may exercise. Then there must be agreement on the processes by which the leaders arrive at their decisions. In net effect these are agreements on what action shall and shall not be taken. The public laws governing corporations together with the particular articles of incorporation of the given company form the basis of an agreement under which investors put their money into the enterprise. Rates of pay and working conditions form the basis for an agreement under which workers submit to direction and discipline by the corporation. All these may change. Under all conditions, however, it is generally agreed that there must be organized arrangements and organized authority.

This fact is never questioned with respect to private management. There is a tendency, however, always to question, analyze, scrutinize, and restrain public authority. To a degree the two types of authority are competitive. Heads of corporations prefer to have authority in their own hands. That is the point of private bureaucracy. There are instances on record in which private business executives have favored the extension of governmental authority in their own fields, but they are relatively few. Governmental executives have a similar tendency to seek authority and for quite the same reason—to make their jobs manageable. Persons in government, however, are subject to the play of political sentiment from the inside and to the pressure of political forces from without. As a result they reach out for authority somewhat more reluctantly than do executives in private business. In many instances they actually resist extensions of their own authority. The two opposing tendencies

are very real. For individuals, their relative positions in government and business are largely a choice of alternate disciplines. In many respects it is a matter of indifference to an employee whether the controlling authority with regard to his work be head of a company or a government executive. Some employees will prefer to work for a private company. Others will have quite as strong a preference for government employment.

Democracy and Administration

Looking at these facts from the general standpoint of administration, one can see in the accumulation of changes a need to look freshly at the whole procedure of establishing disciplines and of making administrative decisions. We have been inclined to believe that for decisions on broad issues we have a safe and simple guide in the principle of majority rule. Yet the formation of a majority invariably depends on prior agreements to limit the number of alternatives open for choice. A majority of citizens rarely favor a particular man for President until the choice has been reduced to a field of two. Thus the fact is that majority rule almost never yields a decision originally desired by a majority. In broad matters the decisions are perforce attractive as well as acceptable to the majority. In specific matters, however, it will frequently happen that the best thing that can be said about such a decision is that it is one to which a sufficient minority does not sufficiently object.

Constitutions, elections, and legislation are all instruments and processes for reaching agreement. Administration under law is also a system for reaching agreement—for deciding on courses of action and getting them accepted. In private business the admitted interest in administration of those other than executives has increased enormously in amount and scope. Industrial management has become less and less the arbitrary giving of orders to docile employees and more and more a joint endeavor in which labor has come to have an important role. Governmental administration has always included some provision for such participation, but the growth in volume and scope of its activities makes this sharing of responsibility more important today than it ever was in earlier days.

Inside government and out, executives are exercising arbitrary

authority less and less. Administrative decisions tend more and more to be a product of organized consideration in which every relevant factor is brought to bear. The aim is to make them truly representative. Delay and confusion, however, are frequently entailed. These new checks and balances of discussion, consultation, and procedure are more valuable than some of the older checks and balances in our governmental structure. But they require time all the same—and more of it than they need to because the processes of discussion in connection with public administration have never been properly analyzed and organized. They ought to be made to contribute to action. We need to expedite the making of decisions to which a sufficient minority does not sufficiently object. We must develop ways and means of ensuring that discussion will lead to decision. Talking should not be allowed to be interminable, for protracted, fruitless discussion itself becomes an impediment to adequate consideration of the succeeding question. Free speech does not have to be endless in order to be free. An administrative filibuster is no more defensible than a legislative filibuster, particularly in view of the fact that announcement of a decision need not be a bar to its reconsideration later. Decisions arrived at through such organized processes, bound to get critical public attention and subject to change as a result of that attention, are not much to be feared. Normally the problem is how to obtain prompt action. Obviously the cry against red tape is principally a cry for more expeditious action.

Essentials of Administrative Authority

What are the essentials of modern governmental administrative authority? The right to hire and fire remains fundamental. It is essential alike to authority and to responsibility. The right has been, and should be, restricted both in government and outside of government. In the national government, Civil Service procedure—limiting the field of original selection, governing classification, and providing for efficiency ratings and for appeals—is generally applicable. Humanitarian considerations, union activity, public scrutiny, and Congressional opinion further guard against arbitrary action. Yet the ability, even within limits, to select new employees and to

promote, demote, or transfer personnel—that ability is the principal source of administrative control.

The fact that below the level of the bureau chief control of personnel must for the most part be delegated tempers this authority but does not vitiate it. There are in any agency enough instances of final determination being made at the top to make all employees aware that the power is really there. And the bureau chief's own dependence on secretarial approval causes the secretary's authority to be reflected all down the line. The daily review of personnel actions carried on by his Office of Personnel constitutes another reminder of secretarial authority.

The point is elementary. Yet it is often ignored. State Departments of Agriculture and state Extension Services often seek to have delegated to them powers of the secretary in action programs. Their efforts frequently are supported by pressure groups whose members are dissatisfied with what they feel to be a lack of responsiveness on the part of the Federal Department and who believe they could exert a greater influence on state agencies. No Secretary of Agriculture will ever use, willingly and continuously in direct administration, organizations and personnel not really responsible to him. And Congresses and Presidents may come and go, but in their case, too, none will be really satisfied with an arrangement that would deprive a secretary of essential authority in fields over which they hold him responsible.

Exercising authority through delegation down the lines of a basically unified hierarchy should not and need not displace the process of discussion and reference and consultation. It should merely provide a channel making the process run to the center of effective responsibility. A state bureaucracy is no less a governmental bureaucracy than a Federal bureaucracy. If a program is Federal and if the responsibility is Federal, the authority should be Federal and the administering bureaucracy should almost always be Federal. Only thus can national purposes be served; only thus can there be popular control; administrative mechanisms not controllable by a Presidentially appointed top executive are not manageable by the people. The ends hoped for through delegation to the states can be

and should be sufficiently attained through decentralization that is wholly Federal. To assume that decentralization and delegation to states are one and inseparable is to assume too much.

When our national government was first set up it was a federation, and national action was limited by that fact. National action developed slowly and, in the first instance, partly through devices for influencing state action. Constitutional considerations and historical precedents still cause such methods to be followed long after the federation has become a nation. The result often is an undesirable confusion and fuzziness of administration. Many have assumed that there was virtue in the original necessity and have not critically regarded the resulting situation. It is my own view that we generally can attain to the same virtue by other means which are less destructive of responsibility and unity.

Achieving Administrative Unity

In the period ahead world affairs are going to have to be managed in ways roughly analogous to the ways in which we handled Federal problems in the early years of our constitutional history. But confusion inherent in diffused responsibilities must not be allowed to run too far. Some of our intranational administrative confusion will have to be cleared up if there is to be any hope of making our international job fairly manageable.

The first principle in achieving administrative unity—where there is already an established governmental unity—is not to farm out essential functions to unintegrated agencies, but to organize all responsibilities in unified but decentralized hierarchies.

The second principle is to widen the channel for the flow of ideas and information to and from the top or central authority and to support that central authority by stimulation and constructive criticism generated outside of and roughly parallel to the line of hierarchal authority. No secretary can administer a department solely by means of his own dealings with his bureau chiefs. No one can do it by adding a personal staff to supplement his dealings with those chiefs. In some instances bureau chiefs may not see their secretary for intervals of two or three months. It may well happen that a bureau chief will have no interview with any of the assistants to the secretary for six

or eight weeks or longer. Even if there were a regular daily conference it would be inadequate. Constant operating contacts between bureau personnel and officials whose functions are exclusively secretarial—that is, of the department rather than of the bureau—are an absolute necessity. The Offices of Budget, Personnel, and Information, for example, must continually impress upon the bureaus departmental considerations and standards. Because it is their business to represent the secretary in dealing with other governmental agencies, the staffs of these offices can and will impress the bureaus of the Department with governmental considerations and standards. The bureaus tend naturally to separate themselves from the Department and to seek autonomy. Moreover, they are enormously powerful, representing as they do the dignities and aspirations of their personnel, the power of the money they disburse, and the influence they have with citizens aided by their programs. They can be made subject to an over-all popular control only by being integrated with a department which by a similar process is integrated with the government.

A third principle is that there should be structural balance in the organization. For non-technical discussion the importance of balance may be suggested by describing two aspects. In one aspect, it is balance of power and has to do with controllability. In power, executives reporting to an administrator collectively are roughly equal to him, and individually they should be as nearly as possible equal to each other. In the War and Navy Departments there is a constant tendency for military personnel to organize affairs in each Department under a single military man. In the Navy Department Admiral King is Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; as such he has authority over almost the whole Department. In the War Department General Marshall as Chief of Staff has authority over almost the whole Department. In such circumstances there is little administrative justification for the existence of a Secretary. Because secretaries exist in such a structure, the military heads do not have or expect to have adequate departmental administrative facilities, and because single military heads exist the secretaries do not have or expect to have adequate departmental administrative facilities. Only the personal force of the secretaries and the considera-

tion and quality of the military commanders make such an arrangement work at all. Under war conditions it may be a necessary arrangement. From an administrative standpoint, and from a standpoint of effective civilian control of the military establishments, as a continuing thing it is thoroughly undesirable. It results in too much bureau autonomy and too little integrated administration, as well as in great difficulty in maintaining fundamental civilian control. The situation illustrates one kind of structural imbalance. Another kind is found in a department where there is one major bureau associated with several small ones.

In its second aspect, structural balance has to do with posing issues at the level where decision should be made. Bad structure can smother issues, instead of getting them decided; or it can throw too many issues upward for decision, hampering operations while confusing and overloading high officials. One example of this type of balance in structure may be cited in the Department of Agriculture. There a function of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency is to increase farm income. Commodity loans are one means available. If the Agency had the lending facilities, the tendency to make loans at ever higher levels would be strong and structurally unrestrained. The Commodity Credit Corporation as a separate entity has the special responsibility of making its loans with small losses; it has the banking function. Conflict of interest of the two agencies results in a performance more in line with public policy than would be accomplished if either agency were subordinated to the other. The issues are resolved by the secretary, who has both responsibilities. If the Commodity Credit Corporation were located in another department, a still different result—less agricultural-interest emphasis—would be had. In that case the level of decision would be the White House. The structure would be balanced in each case in terms of a different public policy, and the level of decision would be correspondingly different. What level an issue should be decided on depends upon policy.

One more illustration should make the importance of such structural considerations clear. Before the present war some military men had developed a plan of mobilization that would have put manpower, materials controls, and rationing completely within the military establishment. The theoretical result would have been better service

of the military needs, less concern for all other needs and considerations. Actually, the administrative difficulties would have operated against realization of the theoretical objective. But the objective would have been a warranted one only in the direst extremity. A structure posing issues between strictly military and other considerations was overwhelmingly in the national interest, and practically made for better administration. The very conflicts of which the public was aware were reflections of a fundamentally desirable governmental structure.

A fourth principle is that persons on equivalent levels in the various bureaus and offices should be located in physical proximity. Bureau chiefs who associate with each other, encountering one another in daily comings and goings, will work together better than bureau chiefs who are physically separated. As an illustration of this principle close to home, take the case of the representatives of the Department of Agriculture in a single county; they work together to their mutual advantage if housed in convenient proximity, and the farmers are better and more easily served. Naturally the same rule holds true at regional and state levels. Physical location also has a great deal to do with the reality of structural balance.

A fifth principle is that co-ordination is essential where matters are complex, and that many special mechanisms will ordinarily have to be used to achieve it. Arrangements for canalizing the flow of work so as to recognize the various principles of unity set forth above and so as to bring into correct relationship the prerogatives and capacities of the various parts of the agency—such arrangements are basic. Some devices should be used regularly and as a matter of course. Others may be extremely temporary, as in the case of a special committee to study and report on a particular situation. In some cases special co-ordinating mechanisms may be required for an indefinite time, pending developments that permit of making a direct administrative assignment. Systematic co-ordination develops attitudes and processes wearing the appearance of the automatic and spontaneous. Normally the best system of co-ordination will be one that has grown up over a long period of years. Every system needs, however, to be supported, policed, enforced.

A sixth principle is that, being a means rather than an end in itself,

co-ordination must always be pointed toward action. The question here is how to point toward action.

Achieving Policy Unification

Getting agreement on action has its beginning in structure. Concerted action becomes possible only by organizing for action. In an utterly unorganized group, agreement may come by default—as a simple response to need by a spontaneous following of informal leadership. But for large groups and complex affairs arrangements for fixing responsibility and getting agreement are fundamental necessities. Our Constitution has to do with basic structure. Since its adoption a vast mass of complex procedures has been devised on that base. There is a tendency for us to concentrate our attention on persons and procedures and to forget structure. Yet, in spite of the tremendous importance of the placement and procedure of persons in the structure, structure comes first and remains basic. One of the common failings of men brought into government from non-governmental careers is that they neglect to utilize the resources of their agencies *per se* because they fail to act as leaders and directors of their *organizations*. They miss the importance of structure and act as individuals rather than as administrators. So acting, they fail to clear up confusion, disagreement, and disunity as they should, and indeed often make matters worse. They fail consequently to generate or obtain the measure of agreement required for good administration.

It is a natural consequence of this anomaly that these men have a dual function involving attributes rarely well combined in a single person. Public men need to be rather colorful individuals, personifying policy and action in their particular fields, but at the same time they must be able to function as efficient operating heads of great and complex organizations using tremendous resources. Capacity for public leadership and ability to formulate, explain, and adapt policy in changing situations—this is of the essence of successful public administration. But so is the ability to organize and get effective action. Structural unification and administrative discipline can be practically vitiated by a secretary who does not know how to use his tools. Obviously no extreme of sheer administrative policing could possibly guarantee effective *policy* unification, though it might be

able to produce a kind of administrative unification. Policy and administrative unity are both essential to good administration, but the personnel, budget, legal, and other staff offices in a department cannot adequately enough cover policy. The secretary of every department will have some need for administrative assistance that can maintain a bridge between administration per se and policy.

In a small and functionally simple department the secretary himself may be able to ensure unity on policy. Normally, however, and this is always true in the case of big and complex departments, it must be done by a team of complementary officials. Theoretically the team is made up of an under secretary and one or more assistant secretaries. But often this is not the case. Sometimes the failure thus to get a team stems from the fact that these sub-secretaries were selected for national political reasons rather than for the purposes of providing such a team, and by the President rather than by the secretary. Or if the secretary makes the selections—and he usually can make them if he insists—he may not realize his own need for such assistance. And in such Departments as Justice and the Post Office, where the men of assistant-secretary rank actually are bureau chiefs, a departmental team, in the over-all sense, must be otherwise constituted if it is to exist at all.

To separate administration from policy-making and to concentrate responsibility for administration in a career under secretary or assistant secretary is possible to some degree and is attempted in several departments. Such an arrangement, however, requires certain traditions and popular attitudes, as well as able and responsive personnel. Administration and policy cannot be separated excepting arbitrarily. Questions of policy cannot be confined solely to the top level; they are present, positively and negatively, on every level. Nor can a secretary actually renounce responsibility for administration. He could to some extent if our traditions and popular expectations were different; but they are what they are. In Britain that kind of situation does exist; a minister is responsible for administration, before Parliament and in the public mind, but not so directly and precisely and universally as an American secretary. There the Civil Service has a distinct and special degree of responsibility for administration. Here the need is to move somewhat in that direc-

tion, so that secretaries might function more as policy heads and public leaders and less as administrators narrowly defined. Even so our secretaries would continue to need some kind of special staff to ensure a departmental policing of policy. Otherwise a secretary would unify and give leadership only to those particular things he happened to take hold of, or, at the other extreme, he would try to determine much more than any one man fairly can and would inevitably retard his department.

The preceding chapter emphasized the institutional nature of decisions and action taken by government. The question we have been considering in this chapter has to do with converting institutional consideration into institutional decision and action. This implies institutional unification. It means that proposals and issues must move upward from one level to another, the scope of which is commensurate with the given proposals or issues. It means that the movement upward must be to progressively narrowed responsibility proportional to a progressively broadened scope.

Whereas ten thousand specialists and executives may have been concerned originally, the action must come to a point where remaining decisions rest with one person. In one instance the place of decision may be a section head, in another a division head, in another a bureau head, in another a department head, in another the President. The decision of the section head, thought adequate at the time, may later be reviewed or reversed by the division head—and so on up the line. The President's decision may be reversed after the popular reaction is clear. But responsibility for even provisional decision must be narrowed and fixed. And the process of final controllability must be assured. The process of getting decision and the fixing of responsibility are one process. This is the reason why there must be a basic unity of structure. Who makes a particular decision is a question that should be of relatively little public concern. Whether that person's responsibility is to the whole people, whether he is subject to the proper ultimate controls, should be of great public concern.

For administrative reasons and for the sake of effective popular control, then, basic, institutional unification is important. This is why the present discussion has been carried on in terms of a department headed by a single secretary, responsible to the President.

Pressure groups and the administratively weak or inexperienced frequently advocate establishment of top authorities in boards, sometimes with long tenure. The pressure group seeks, it says, to avoid the influence of politics. This reflects a desire to avoid ultimate controllability by the whole people, to seek an autonomous capacity to serve one special interest and to maintain unaltered one special point of view. The weak administrator sees in such devices a way of escaping responsibility similar to the device of delegating functions to powerful entities not forming an integral part of his own controllable institution. Besides being less responsible, less popularly controllable, boards consistently find it more difficult to act. Except where the administrative function has a judicial character, little case can be made for an administrative board.

In part for this reason, in part for another, the tendency in recent years to establish governmental corporations should be examined. A private corporation is a device for bringing many persons and resources into a single organized undertaking. Government itself is such a device. It has just as much need of the corporation device as a train has need of a bicycle. A government corporation is another government bureau—another division of government. Some bureaus are so named, some are called divisions, some are called offices, some are called services, some are called administrations, some are called corporations. The inclination to establish a corporation reflects recognition of the fact that many restrictions provided in law to standardize and limit operations in bureaus should not apply to a particular operation because they do not fit, do not give enough flexibility to the management of the particular program. Yet Congress makes many exceptions to these requirements. To create a corporation is to make an additional exception, for which the corporate form and name are not required. The consequences are to confuse understanding, to put responsibilities in boards that should be in administrators, to conceal the fact that for the usual legal restrictions on bureaus there need to be substituted in special cases similar principles and checks designed to fit the particular function. For governmental corporations, like all governmental organisms, need to have governmental character, to be operated according to governmental principles and be subject to governmental and popular con-

trols. The need for action is never greater than these needs. The central point is that establishment of a government corporation reflects a need to expedite action. To put responsibility in a board instead of an administrator retards action. The question of procedural flexibility is one requiring separate consideration.

Decentralization

IN TWELVE CROWDED YEARS I have never seen in Washington anyone who had a driving desire for the government to take over complete and detailed direction and management of business. There have been a few who have favored governmental ownership of particular industries, but, even all told, they were concerned with only four types of business. These sentiments are the sentiments of isolated individuals; there is no general sentiment for the governmentalization of business and no significant movement in that direction. Only two or three times have I ever heard either from so-called New Dealers or from other bureaucrats any speculation directly on the subject of what kinds of businesses government ought to own and operate, and even on these occasions only a few academic sentences.

Similarly I have found no cultivated advocacy of widespread governmental regulation of business. Most of our regulatory acts developed over a long period of years as governmental responses to popular recognition of particular evils rather than as the result of an effort to apply any fundamental theory. In my observation, government regulates business in much the same way that a parent spanks a small child: even as the spanking is administered, the parent has a sense that there should be something better to do, but does not know what it should be.

Contrary to a prevalent impression, people in government do not yearn for the responsibility of extensive and intensive control over economic activity. When any impingement on old ways of doing business is effected, it seems to me always to be a by-product of another, simpler purpose: to meet a national need for better housing, to extend electricity to rural districts, or to deal with some other similar substantive problem.

What most governmental officials would prefer is that government act in such a way as to exert a general influence and create a set of conditions under which citizens would find it advantageous to do

things in the social interest. As a practical matter they recognize, however, that it is often more fruitful for government to pursue the middle course of performing certain specific services which the public needs, particularly when neither individuals nor private groups seem able to provide those services.

Centripetal Force in Bureaucracy

Whatever the activities finally undertaken, it is the desire to make them manageable that dictates the expansion of delegation we call decentralization. As more policy decisions are made in Washington, more and more administrative determinations should be made in the field, where administrators are pulled and pushed by the affected citizenry. Effectuating those arrangements is not an easy matter. While it may be argued whether or not there is a centrifugal force in bureaucracy, the presence and power of a centripetal force is undeniable; decentralization is necessary and ultimately inevitable.

Field organization and structure will need, of course, to be determined by the work load. At the point of ultimate incidence there must naturally be some local organization. Whether or not there needs to be a state headquarters will depend upon many factors. Any program of size requires a regional organization, chiefly for two reasons: first, because a Washington bureau cannot deal effectively with forty-eight state offices; second, because regional reconciliation of various local and state interests forms an essential step in reconciling those interests with the whole public interest, which is, broadly stated, the responsibility of Washington. The problem is treated here from the standpoint of national administration because field considerations are for the most part so familiar to everybody as to be commonplace. Let me observe, however, that in another decade those states of the Union which have been inclined to be hostile to Federal regional offices will probably be their champions. The explanation is very simple: the states will be able to get quicker and easier consideration at regional headquarters than they can in Washington. Sound administrative decentralization consists in moving a part of Washington that is essential to them nearer to them, where it will be easier for them to get at it.

In the Department of Agriculture regional organization began

spontaneously long ago in the Forest Service. For some years it "just grew," without much departmental management or consideration. But as action programs grew in number, the experience and the problem were analyzed, and the Department's regional administrative map came to conform roughly to a map of the country's major agricultural regions. A program was developed looking toward the establishment of common regional headquarters for all of the Department's action agencies, and ultimately common regional boundaries. This was viewed as a part of the process of co-ordination. Achievement of the program has been retarded, however, by political considerations. It is extremely difficult to move a Federal office, particularly across state boundary lines.

What powers to delegate to a region, what to a state or area office, and what to local administrators, how to review and check field action, how to keep field people up to date on policy as developed on the national level—these are technical problems with which the Department and establishments in Washington have had much and varied experience. They are problems familiar to all executives in large organizations. It is vastly easier in government, however, to provide for the flow of stimulation from the field to national headquarters than to get an equally adequate flow from headquarters to the field.

Some of our leading scholars in the field of government make the mistake of selecting some single minor aspect of decentralization and giving it an emphasis that in my view is undeserved. Thus, for example, some stress the point that different bureaus and programs can stand at different degrees of control and proximity to departmental administration. This seems to me an elementary, commonplace detail, a self-evident necessity. Its undue emphasis, on the other hand, results in minimizing the necessity for central controllability. Even though it is true that an older bureau, carrying on a program that has become routinized, may be permitted for long periods to operate with relatively little attention from the Secretary, the ability to make that program respond fairly quickly to new national needs must not be lost to the Department. Decentralization as a general phenomenon has fundamental significance, but degrees and forms of decentralization are for the most part technical details.

Decentralization of administration must be carried on in such a way and with such a structure as to make for centralized policy control. The actual processes of decentralization must be fluid and reviewable. The usual tendency is for bureaus to become too autonomous.

Two Principal Aspects

Two points regarding decentralization are, I believe, especially important. The first is that decentralization is a physical necessity, therefore something that the public does not need to be much concerned to push, and a technical job of management that the public need not debate. The second is that Federal action programs can serve the *national* interest only if they are finally responsive to national political determination; because this is so, national decentralization should take place through a unified if dispersed organization, around a central core of direct national authority.

I have said that decentralized structure is a technical matter that cannot much profit from public debate. Chambers of commerce send delegations to Washington to ask that more field offices be placed in their respective cities. It is a silly business. If government agencies should locate units because of any such representations, it would be a confession of tragic administrative inadequacy. Administrative needs frequently involve intricate considerations, but they generally dictate location quite clearly; only rarely are there even two logical possibilities. In one region there is now an unpopulated place which, if it should suddenly become a city, would immediately be made a Department of Agriculture regional headquarters and would have a thousand Department employees. The city would not have to have a chamber of commerce at all in order for this to happen. Such a headquarters city does have to exist; it does have to possess certain facilities. Given these, location is almost automatic, except as political pressures prevent.

Related to the effort to get field offices to move to specific cities is the effort to get a whole department, or a whole bureau, moved from Washington to some other city. Since the war began, there have been some instances in which whole bureaus have been moved away from Washington. These moves were made in desperation, in order to make room in Washington for war agencies. But leaving out war

considerations, which properly were determining, each move of a complete bureau was definitely a bad move administratively and definitely contrary to long-time public interest. This is true because it was a move in the direction of irresponsible administration—administration less responsive to the total national will.

It is of tremendous importance that the President have his most important executives quickly available—and that they be in a position to obtain a quick response from their bureaus. This is important in order that responsibility may be made to center in practice in the person the public and the Congress hold responsible, the President. It is important that governmental agencies have quick access to department heads in the same way, else *governmental* administration and controls will become a fiction. It is important in order that public sentiments about operations of the bureaus may be brought into focus with other public sentiments, and the result used to modify and redirect policies.

Department heads similarly need to have *their* chief executives quickly available and quickly responsible. These chief executives in turn usually need their principal aides about them. While a decentralized structure is both possible and desirable, it very much needs to be developed carefully so that responsibilities are not impaired. The degree of close communication required may vary a great deal, but the maintenance in Washington of the four top levels is almost uniformly essential to good government: Presidential, department head, bureau head, division head. Occasionally an entire division can safely be moved to another city, but it is a rare case.

Decentralization is frequently confused with delegation of authority to persons or entities not responsible to the person who makes the delegation. That is, the two are thought to be identical; decentralization is felt not to be true or proper decentralization, for example, unless the functions are assigned to state agencies. While decentralization may include that kind of delegation, it certainly is not limited to it. Where the function, the responsibility, and the appropriation are national, that kind of delegation must be seriously questioned; for it makes for even more irresponsible administration than moving whole bureaus out of Washington. This is not necessarily because the United States government has a better structural arrange-

ment but simply because under the Constitution the state governments are not a part of the national government. They are parallel authorities on a different level. Where specific national purposes and interests are concerned, to farm out responsibility to forty-eight authorities not responsible to the national government is to abdicate responsibility and to ensure national and administrative confusion.

Factors Governing Devolution upon States

On the other hand, there obviously are matters which can be very fully delegated to the states or assigned to them. Some of the considerations that enter into the differentiation are these:

1. Whether or not the activity has a substantially controversial aspect. (The national government cannot be responsible, for example, for a national program that would allow or encourage each state to make modifications fully according to its attitudes on the racial question.)

2. The degree to which state sentiments and interests would conflict with the national interest and national opinion. (Any one wheat state, for example, would try to get the largest possible wheat quota in a Three-A program, whereas the national necessity would be to reduce it in adjustment to the reduced quotas of other states. With respect to conservation in general, the Federal interest can take a longer view than local interest can; the local interest tends more toward immediate exploitation.)

3. The extent to which a particular program requires or would profit from integration and co-ordination with other national programs.

4. The character of the activity in terms of the probability of continuing Congressional concern. (If Congress appropriates for and authorizes by law a particular program and if its members may be expected subsequently to hear often from constituents with respect to it, the program must be directly controllable by a national department.)

5. The degree to which organization and activities may be more efficient and duplication may be avoided, if the program is nationally administered.

These points all apply to matters with respect to which Congress

has legislated and appropriated—matters that thereby are actually national activities.

In cases where considerations of this kind dictate national administration, the role of interested state agencies should be consultative or, in some instances, co-operative. What state agencies do in such instances is to *influence* the program in the direction of adjustment to state and local concerns, but they do not *determine* the program nor do they administer it.

Where the relationship is consultative, as I have indicated elsewhere, it cannot be an exclusive relationship. Planning by non-Federal agencies is a desirable and important procedure; these agencies should stand in a consultative relationship to the corresponding national agency. But they should not do more.

Where the relationship is co-operative, it will inevitably be uneven, and, for the national administrator, undependable to a considerable degree, depending upon the type of program, because the co-operating agencies will be responsible to forty-eight different state authorities, none of which is in turn responsible to any national authority. The degree of success attained and the amount of friction generated will depend a great deal on the type of program in which the co-operative relationship exists.

There are, however, some activities that definitely can be delegated to state entities. In these the amount of influence nationally retained and exercised in deference to the national source of funds will vary according to the degree of difference between national interest and state interest. A great deal of research—and probably more than is now so delegated—falls readily into the category where the difference in interest is small. There is not a little research, however, that must be done in close association with action agencies, and this type of research cannot be delegated. Field education of a promotional character similarly has its administrative and general aspects. Sometimes the function of handling the general phase can safely be delegated, but not the other.

Decentralization and Centralization

Decentralization cannot be discussed adequately without saying something about centralization. Leaving out rather complete delega-

tion to agencies not a part of the national structure, no proper decentralization can take place except around a core of central authority. Nothing can be decentralized properly which has not first been centralized. The basic essential is national controllability.

Perhaps the chief fear citizens have in mind when they talk of the evils of bureaucracy is that bureaus often seek to acquire enlarged powers and functions and that they will be permitted to do so without restraint. In my opinion this danger is not nearly so great as many citizens believe it to be. Bureaucrats want their jobs to be manageable. They have much of the feeling of those who dislike big government in general because, like all finite human beings, they like simplicity. They have no violent thirst for complexity, but rather a positive urge to simplify. Although there are selfish urges, where bureaus seek more money and more authority, they do it generally because they see ways in which to do a better job and to handle uncertain responsibilities. These urges are reflections of the urge to simplify. Yet they do have something of the result feared, the building of bigger bureaus. Related to this is the natural tendency of bureaus to resist "interference" and to seek autonomy. This is the real danger; for control of this second tendency will, as a by-product, furnish adequate control of the first. It is therefore of fundamental national importance that bureaus be actually controllable and controlled by departments, and that departments be controllable and controlled by the President and the Congress. In that control, considerations of budgetary requests, competitive interest, and general national sentiment all have their proper influence. The red tape involved in these relationships is the means by which the administrative and political controls that should be determining have their effect.

The Dynamic Factor

MANY THOUGHTFUL PERSONS have observed that organization tends after a while to confuse itself with the purposes it was created to further, that it emphasizes means rather than ends, and that these tendencies may in time become so strong as ultimately to defeat the prime purpose of the enterprise. Thus the forms of religion and the prerogatives of a hierarchy tend to get more and more emphasis and the content of faith less and less. Thus a political party set up in passionate devotion to some cause tends to get steadily more concerned about winning elections and gradually less concerned about the cause that gave it birth.

So, too, older government bureaus tend to run down, to become obsolete in method and in product and unimaginative in spirit. They may become more and more efficient in their routines, but in terms of policy they begin to petrify. In contrast, new bureaus will have a lot of "policy drive" but, on the whole, less efficient administration. One of the most important functions and responsibilities of a top executive is to help new bureaus develop administrative efficiency and to help old bureaus rejuvenate themselves.

Even though organization tends ultimately to defeat its own purposes, great ends can be achieved only through organization. Life today entails more and more complexity, and, by that token, more and more organization. How may we organize for progress? What are the dynamic factors through which we may avoid organizational petrification?

Something Less than Revolution

Jefferson had questions like these in mind in his anticipation of periodic revolutions in our society. Obviously we do have periodic minor revolutions. Each election has a little of that nature, and occasional elections have something more than a trace of revolutionary content. The change in department heads resulting from a change

in the Presidency will effect at least a minor administrative revolution. We have, in addition, various non-periodic changes in places of responsibility in the government as a whole or within single departments; they are the means by which administrators make adjustments to changing situations and necessities. Some executives almost seem to administer by a process of irregular explosions. Yet for that matter, however foreminded and imaginative a leader may be, there will be times when he or the public will develop sudden realizations of new things needing to be done and he will make adjustments accordingly.

These changes provide a sort of correction-line on the map of government. Yet the frequency of change in department and bureau heads thus resulting does not yield a clear profit. Cabinet members new to government or even new to the Cabinet level of government sometimes do greater damage to the administrative process than they offset by new contributions in the field of policy. To deprive them of the power to do great harm to administration and yet to open the way for them to make necessary policy injections is a continuing problem for which as yet no one has found a sound solution. Administration should therefore endeavor to provide itself with dynamism within its own organization. By so doing it could avoid altogether the threat of drastic revolution, could minimize the fluctuations of the political pendulum, and could make the march of government more continually progressive.

Rarely does a new Cabinet member arrive at his post by being washed there by a tide of support for a ready-made program. Even if he should so arrive, he would be ill-equipped to put it quickly into effect. Characteristically a new secretary simply exerts by the slant of his judgment a mild and moderate influence on a course or program already largely set. A good many of his "slants" are reflections of his own personality rather than the result of any overt social trend or a response to clear social need. But any secretary in the course of his comings and goings becomes aware of governmental movements, sentiments, and situations. These exposures are something different from and in some respects superior to the sum total of the exposures of the rest of his department. Out of these impacts come certain reactions which he passes on to his department as policy stimuli.

They may be defensive and reactionary or aggressive and progressive. The more imaginative and reflective the secretary, the more frequent and constructive will be the stimuli.

No Cabinet member can make such stimuli effective unaided by persons who share his peculiar responsibility for suggesting such adjustments. There will be large areas over which his mind does not range fruitfully, and this in turn will prevent his imagination even in its active areas from being adequately considerate of the entire department. No secretary, no matter how imaginative, can, by himself, provide adequate stimulation for his whole department.

Although an incoming secretary may bring in a number of yeasty people, it is inevitable that the new regime will steadily become involved more deeply in its own program. When this happens, it will frequently succumb to the temptation to release from its rolls its more irritatingly stimulating personnel and will endeavor to settle down to the entrenchment of its strength on the ground first occupied. Few people and few organizations have the capacity to keep moving in proportion to the times. It is therefore incumbent upon every top administrator to try to find ways of generating a dynamic spirit and outlook within his organization.

Dynamics in Policy and Program

One of the interesting possibilities developed in the Department of Agriculture is that of *organizing* for progress by assigning to one unit, as its sole responsibility, the duty of looking ahead. Some six years ago the regulatory and semi-regulatory activities of the old Bureau of Agricultural Economics were transferred elsewhere within the department, and the bureau's fact-finding, statistical, and analytical functions were reinforced with the functions and personnel of several planning units in order to make of it a program-planning agency for the whole department. Free of direct administrative responsibility, its whole job became the business of examining programs and needs and proposing shifts, modifications, and new developments.

Planning should be an active process at all levels—national, regional, state, and local. There should be various types of planning—program, administrative, budgetary. Program planning will be most

immediately serviceable to the secretary in Washington, but it has distinct contributions to make at each level. Beginning in the county by bringing representative interested citizens together with officials representing both educational and action programs in agriculture, planning makes a great contribution to popular understanding of the whole effort and supplies great stimulation for improved integration and co-ordination. People in the counties come by this process first to see the whole activity in its broadest local terms, and second to know and appreciate the considerations that must be weighed in Washington because of the impact of issues arising in all the other counties of all the other states. This process of translating county outlooks and county needs into a feasible and acceptable national program is furthered by state and regional handling. Educating the citizen ultimately affected by any program is equal in importance to the process of educating the officialdom in Washington.

It is implicit in such an arrangement that there should be some friction which would provide a continual problem for the department. Administrators will feel that the planners are theoretical, impractical, and unfamiliar with their problems. Even if these things are true—and they are only relatively true—the contribution of organized planners has tremendous value as a supplement to the unorganized complaints and appeals that come from individuals throughout the country. And although planning units are unpopular with politicians, planning makes for a politically more vital department. To create thus a bureau whose function is wholly dynamic is to give an important hostage to progress. It is worth what it costs; for a program adjusted to the demands of administrators, politicians, and planners will be a superior program.

The building of an organized bridge between planners and doers is essential. The bridge must have different forms to meet different organizational situations. It needs to have several parts. To have small operational planning units in the bureaus is a helpful part of the bridge. To have staff men around bureau heads and around the department head—staff men of general rather than specific responsibility, or staff men of no administrative responsibility at all except to move from item to item and to produce reports, suggestions, ideas—this is a helpful part of the bridge.

One common shortcoming lies in the fact that too often the flow of work runs too exclusively along the lines of the administrative hierarchy and fails to reflect the co-ordinated thinking of the whole staff at the various levels. Some years ago, for example, when we on the departmental level called on the old Bureau of Agricultural Economics for comment on some proposal, we usually got back a memorandum written in one section of the bureau, transmitted to the head of a division, then to the chief of the bureau, who signed it and sent it to us with a covering note of transmittal. Instead of the wisdom of the bureau we got the opinion of one specialist, which usually made a wholly inadequate contribution to departmental or governmental thinking. Only very important or very hot matters would be considered more broadly, and then the consideration would tend to be defensive rather than constructive. Invariably the use of more staff people gives greater breadth to the work product.

Dynamics in Administration

Program planning has an influence on the development of administration as well as on policy, but it cannot deal with the whole problem of administrative improvement. Bureaus need to emphasize management and to be equipped with staff charged with the duty of improving administration. But in this as in every other field, bureau responsibility is not enough, and bureau considerations and outlook are not enough. Departmental and governmental responsibilities and outlooks must be brought to bear.

No secretary can himself "administer" a large department in the sense he is generally felt to do so. He embodies the whole authority within a department and can be responsible only by dividing and assigning his authority. Nor can he do this simply through bureaus. His performance then would have exactly as many variations as he had bureaus. Yet his responsibility is more than that of the assembled bureaus. His accountability must be in generally common terms. He must be able to say to the public, to the Congress, and to the President what he does in his department, not what he does in each of twenty great bureaus.

Specifically, in administration a secretary who will function well

on his proper level will rely heavily on departmental executives charged with department-wide responsibilities. Having a departmental status, they will naturally uphold the secretary in his departmental function. They will manage general relationships on the governmental level—with the Bureau of the Budget, the General Accounting Office, the Civil Service Commission, the governmental information office, other executive departments, Congressional committees, and the like. It is in these relationships that they will have their influence on the bureaus. And they will be checked, in turn, by the powers and needs of the bureaus themselves.

In these departmental offices will lodge special responsibility for improvement in administrative management throughout the department. Since no one of them has total administrative responsibility, however, in many circumstances it will be helpful to associate these offices under a career assistant secretary. Either with or without that unification it is desirable, however, to have an additional central official to co-ordinate and give leadership to the administrative management functions of these offices.

In the Department of Agriculture these central offices have been held by departmental directors—for example, the Director of Budget and Finance, the Director of Personnel, the Director of Information, and the Director of Extension. The Solicitor of the Department has had in certain respects a similar function. The departmental work in administrative management was in addition to such work of the kind as was carried on for single bureau application within some of the bureaus. Departmental administrative management work was carried on in the Office of Budget and Finance, the Office of Personnel, and the Administrative Council. The last gave general supervision to and co-ordinated projects within the two offices or jointly conducted by the two. A rather random selection of a few of the simpler project titles will hint at the range of this work:

1. Summary of recommendations concerning economies and efficiency—to prepare for convenient reference a summary of recommendations for economies and improvements in administrative organization, management, and procedures contained in bureau chiefs' replies to the secretary's letter of August 16, 1939, and to include with these recommenda-

tions the suggestions of the Division of Fiscal Management as to how they might be further studied.

2. Survey of departmental committees—to make a survey of departmental and interdepartmental committees on which the department personnel holds membership; to determine which of these committees are obsolete, inactive, terminated, or which have completed the task assigned to them, no further reason for their existence remaining; to determine the approximate work load of the committees (hours per month spent in meetings); and to determine the extent of overloading the department personnel with committee work.

3. Telegraph study—to discover ways and means for securing maximum economy in telegraph and telephone operations in the department.

4. Ordering, stocking, and distribution of forms—to recommend improved methods of administering or managing the ordering, stocking, and distribution of printed and duplicated forms used in the department.

5. Restriction on airplane travel—to develop means by which the Department of Agriculture can restrict unnecessary and costly airplane travel within the general policy laid down by the secretary's office.

6. Rental of equipment—to obtain legislation that will permit bureaus to rent equipment from other bureaus and thus assure the bureau which owns the equipment that the bureau will be made "whole." It is hoped that the availability of the rental plan will reduce, even eliminate, the reluctance that bureaus now have to lend equipment to other bureaus.

7. Field procurement authority—to develop a plan which the Division of Purchase, Sales and Traffic can put into operation for permitting bureau field offices to do more of their own procurement work subject to central office control.

8. Bonding of certifying officers—to analyze the effect of HR-5785 on the department and to prepare a reply to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Senate.

9. Administrative changes required by the moving of Farm Security Administration and Rural Electrification Administration—to take leadership in the Office of the Budget and Finance for making such arrangements and proposing such administrative procedures as may be necessary for the co-ordination of accounting, budgetary, procurement, and other matters relating to Budget and Finance, Treasury, General Accounting Office, and Bureau of the Budget, arising out of the moving of Farm Security Administration to Cincinnati and Rural Electrification Administration to St. Louis.

10. Survey of library facilities in the department.
11. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation: organization survey of Washington office.
12. Survey of methods of keeping leave records in bureaus.
13. Decentralization of Retirement Unit of Office of Personnel.
14. Delegation of field employment authority—personnel procedure study.
15. Alleged delays in personnel procedures as cause of delay in making up payrolls.
16. Personnel records in Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
17. Wage rates in the Unclassified Service—analysis by occupation, geographical location, and bureau of 200,000 positions not subject to the Classification Act (indicated need for more attention at the department level to problem of salary and wage administration).
18. Attendance at meetings of scientific groups—attempt to work out a new policy for the department.
19. Average salary, age, and length of service of all USDA employees.
20. Five-day week in Cartographic Division of Soil Conservation Service at Beltsville, Maryland.
21. Analysis of demands on time of Chief of Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and Engineering.
22. Claims procedure, cost of handling small claims in solicitor's office and bureaus.
23. Public patents—policy concerning their use.
24. Reorganization—office of the secretary.
25. Study of Investigation Units.
26. Expediting clearance of communications in secretary's office.
27. Consolidation of duplicating work.
28. Local administration study (county study).
29. Study of county employees who meet the public.
30. Study of combining identification cards.
31. Study concerning consolidation of field warehouses.
32. Study of information demands on AAA county committees.
33. Delays in clearing letters of authorization for forest roads.
34. Organization in Virgin Islands.
35. Delegation to sign contracts and approve bonds.
36. Statistical reporting by county agricultural agents.
37. BAE-FCIC dispute concerning planning activity.
38. Beltsville Center—management problems.
39. Secretarial office memoranda.

40. Preparation of educational program material for internal use.
41. Fostering USDA Clubs.
42. Analysis of different forms and varying extents of decentralization.
43. Recruitment and training of "generalized specialists."

Use of Committees and Other Devices

Another aid to the development of departmental policy and departmental administration is the proper use of committees. The creation of such committees may be overdone, but they can be distinctly helpful. Usually the number in existence in the Department of Agriculture has ranged between two hundred and three hundred.

Another aid may be found in the establishment of more points at which specialized undertakings come into focus as departmental activities. By giving regional staffs to the solicitor, for example, in place of having single lawyers working in scattered locations on single activities of single bureaus, the secretary secured a greater measure of departmental consistency in the handling of a wide variety of legal problems with which the department had to deal. Again, moving regional offices of various action agencies to the same city and, if possible, to the same building will make for an increase in understanding and a better integration of activities.

Systematic Search for Superior Personnel

Another field requiring special attention in terms of progressive improvement is that of recruitment of new personnel at various levels and the related business of arranging for their appropriate training.

Most recruitment in most organizations is on the simple basis of trying to get persons qualified to do the work represented by the vacancies to be filled. The Department of Agriculture has thus employed each year eight hundred or more persons in the lowest professional grade—and usually has selected them for their ability to do work in that grade. Yet from such recruits administrators must later on select division head and bureau chief personnel. Certainly much can be done to ensure that a larger proportion of the recruits have some of the flair for generalization that is of the essence of higher-level performance.

It is also a matter of common experience that a good deal of re-

cruiting must be done at a higher level than the lowest professional and administrative grades—those in which the beginning salary is \$2,000. Indeed, it seems imperative to bring in some bureau chiefs from outside government, especially when there is a marked shift in policy and much new activity. In the Department of Agriculture, for example, if one looks at a recent chart of organization and leaves out of consideration the three Presidential appointees and their immediate aides, one will observe that there are twenty-eight heads of bureaus and offices. Of these, sixteen were in the government ten years ago and twelve were not. Of the twelve, two had been in government in earlier years and were brought back, and six others had been engaged in analogous careers. Of the four who lack this logical background, three had nevertheless had broad and diverse experience; they rank among the exceptionally able chiefs of the government. As a whole, the group sustains a high average. But wise selection from governmental, semi-governmental, and non-governmental sources is necessary to get such an average. Persons having the needed combinations of qualities are so rare as to require the most painstaking search. Mathematically, government itself provides the best reservoir of talent, and that pool can be made even better by changes in the recruitment and training of personnel. But some of the yeast and some of the rare combinations will continue to be found in other places not readily to be identified.

Reliance on accident in locating such individuals can be further reduced by developing in government organized information about superior and unusual persons of the kind desired and by supplementing an improved recruitment of persons just out of college with a similar systematic recruitment of persons at about the age of thirty. In some respects this last could be made the most helpful of all means of getting personnel capable of developing later on into top officials. Non-governmental experience in earlier years, particularly when it has been secured in a number of different fields, coupled with a stout devotion to the general welfare and a flair for generalization, provides a better bet than the same qualities in a man experienced only in government. He is a much better bet also than the man who has stayed in business until his outlook and attitudes have been crystallized by that environment.

The conditioning of younger personnel has never been given the attention it deserves. Much depends upon individual supervisors, but from higher levels there should come much more stimulation and concern for especially promising people. Those with the widest range of interest and capacity should be moved from bureau to bureau and from bureau to departmental assignments, and should be given experience of various kinds, including field work at the ultimate point of contact with the affected public, before being moved into the more rarefied atmosphere of top-level administration.

Dynamics through State Experimentation

There remains for consideration the possibility of securing dynamism in national administration through experimenting with variations in Federal programs among the states of the Union. Our federal system has been praised for making possible the conduct of various kinds of governmental experiments in "the insulated chambers of the States" and, indeed, there is value in having forty-eight states able to handle governmental problems in different ways. Actually, however, there seems to be less and less differentiation in their methods and procedures and there is much desirable experimenting that will never be done if we rely upon the states to do it. In some ways it is more possible and in some respects it is more likely that the national government will do the experimenting.

Doing things nationally does not require absolute uniformity, universal applicability, or certainty of results. Opposition criticism of the present Administration for its experiments surely leaves no room for the assumption that growth of Federal activity always makes for rigidity and petrification and that it rules out experimentation. Some kinds of experimentation carried on in recent years have attracted practically no attention. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, for example, while carrying on national programs, has found it possible to have each year a number of experimental counties where its programs have been markedly different. Numerous constructive changes in its general or national programs have grown out of these county experiments.

In their volume *American Schools in Transition*, Mort and Cornell have made a study of change and development in education in

Pennsylvania. Some readers discern in such changes what they regard as a distinct state contribution to educational experimentation. For reasons not directly relevant to the present discussion, I am much opposed to placing education under national control. But I see nothing in Mort and Cornell's report that is not duplicated in other fields where state administration is not involved. There is nothing in such experimentation as they report that could not have been tried through *any* form of decentralized national administration.

It is perforce true that all experimentation has been conducted *within* the states. And much experimentation has been conducted *by* states. As Paul M. Herzog has pointed out in the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, much American social legislation has had its beginning in the states, with the national government finding models in them for its own expanding program. But, as he also points out, the history of legislation pertaining to labor relations has run in the opposite direction, with the national government moving first and the states following. It is not my contention that the states do not and should not experiment. My only argument is that it is not necessary to rely on them as an exclusive or even a preponderant source of experimentation. All administration that is divided into parts contemplates deviations from uniformity. All legislation represents segmental attacks on public problems, and all legislation, whether state or national, is to a degree experimental.

The point is simply that we can and must organize the function of experimentation; we can and must administer flexibility; we can and must open the door to dynamics. There is more of this being done under national leadership than has been realized. Yet national experimentation has not precluded and will not prevent the states and municipalities from making any experiment they may wish to try.

Dynamics through Politics

Finally, in a democracy there is the dynamic of politics. The logic of events is superior to the logic of the mind. Events, working through politics, will force changes on planners and administrators. The dynamic factor of the most basic importance is outside of government in a people free to vote, free to discuss, free to organize politically to influence their government. Democratic government cannot and

should not grant exclusive franchises for consultation and agitation to any group. But it will inevitably be affected by popular movements, whether old or new. Free competition between political groups furnishes the most important kind of dynamism for both government and administration.

Big Democracy

BIG DEMOCRACY is different from little democracy. The difference is the difference between the simple and the complex. Our governmental problem today lies in the question: "How can we be a complex society and yet be a democratic society?"

Basic Urges for Order and Freedom

With respect to social organization man has two conflicting urges. He wants security and order and he wants to be free. There is a dynamic character to these wants, too; he wants *more* security; he wants to advance; he wants *more* freedom. He is curious; he wants to learn. He is adventurous; he wants to dare. Life is at once a search for order and a search for change and betterment, a search for organized security and a search for freedom. We establish laws, institutions, conventions, and habits so that we may have order, so that we may have a feeling of what the world expects of us and what we may expect of the world. Social security is much more than economic security. But then we defy, modify, or abandon these same laws, institutions, conventions, and habits because life is change and because we thirst for life. If some mathematical-psychological philosopher were able to devise a series of formulas showing the workable ranges of relationships between disciplines and freedoms, he would rank at once among the titans of the art and science of politics.

Discipline is essential in all organized groups. Studies made at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company show, for example, that an intricate discipline is developed by the members of each working group. This discipline is a part of the larger discipline involved in the worker's acceptance of plant administration. There are for him also the disciplines of his family, of his neighbors, of his friends, of his union, of his church, of his town, county, state, and nation, some of them social, some economic, some political.

Among the great nations of modern times, the disciplines of government have been lightest in the United States, and heaviest in Germany and Russia, with many variations between the extremes. Our national beginning was in revolution. Our development was through pioneering, each individual going out into new country on his own. Here the tradition of rugged individualism is high; here there is contempt for the too easily disciplined Caspar Milquetoast; here is contempt for convention; here there is hostility toward government. Yet the sequel to our pioneering is unprecedented and sudden bigness and complexity. With them have come many severe disciplines. But the interdependence of things somehow has not been very systematically organized. Our millions recognize their dependence on many vague things far beyond their control.

For them in certain respects the freedom to venture has little appeal, however attractive it may be to potential captains of finance. What they seek, rather desperately, is more order, more certainty, and more security.

In other countries the passion for adventure was never so great, but the search for security has gone to even greater extremes. There can be little doubt that here the height of the movement for security is still ahead. Shall we go from one historic extreme to the other and outdo even the authoritarian nations of the Old World? With such a swing, entailing as it would vast violence to our heritage, we might explode into anarchic chaos.

Surely the rational and conservative course is to develop now such a system of discipline and organization as we need for social security and then keep it tolerable by using it with a sensitive regard for individual values. These new disciplines, it goes without saying, should be informed with the spirit of democracy and administered through democratic techniques, and wherever possible there should be a conscious, compensating abandonment of other, outworn, and irrelevant disciplines.

The movement is on to a more intensive organization, a greater unification, a greater stabilization of our society. It will mean more authority in, and more action by, government. Hence we must improve the processes by which men are enabled to reach agreement for action. There must be increased realization of the importance of

establishing procedures which will discourage hair-splitting and filibustering. Since majority government is government by majorities made up of acquiescent minorities, we shall need readier acquiescence from minorities in those matters about which they do not feel deeply. If free government is to have the regard for minorities and for individuals that it ought to have and must basically have, minorities and individuals must learn to yield less reluctantly than they often do today on issues of secondary or tertiary importance.

All government ultimately, and democratic government more immediately and constantly, do those things to which a sufficient minority does not sufficiently object. When democratic government is faced with a basic necessity to do more, individuals and minorities who cherish democracy must in good faith acquiesce in more matters and do it more readily. Only by so doing can they look forward to a government that will abstain from action to which a relatively small minority very vigorously objects. The alternatives seem to be a government that imposes a majority or even a minority will on the whole people, and a majority government made up of acquiescent minorities each of which retains a right to veto. If we choose the second, better course, the impact of that government on its members will always be more or less tolerable and more or less in harmony with our history and our individualistic aspirations.

The basic urge of the American people reflected in contemporary government is toward an order that is more unified than the system of control maintained by business and more comprehensive, more representative, and more responsible than any of our other systems of non-governmental control. Government is not simply the summation of the needs of agriculture, business, and labor, and not merely the reconciliation of their competitive demands. Government must take into account tens of thousands of considerations other than those attaching to the pressure groups in the body politic. Government must be more powerful, therefore, than any single pressure group or any working combination of pressure groups.

Temper in the Use of Power

Assuming, then, that government is inevitably going to have more responsibility and power, what are the means by which that power

may be exercised in a way acceptable to Americans? First of all, governmental power must be conceived and developed as the power of a social organism rather than the arbitrary authority of a few. The reality here is far beyond what is ordinarily believed. What government does in any particular reflects an enormous number of influences, judgments, points of view, and responses to popular expectations. This is true because government produces an organized product.

Walter Lippmann is fond of saying that the Presidency is an institution, not simply a man in an office. This is true, but not simply because the man who is President today still operates in part according to executive orders issued by McKinley, Taft, Wilson, and other predecessors. In the same way heads of departments and establishments are also institutions. It is not simply that a secretary incumbent signs letters saying "I" did something or other twenty years before he was secretary. It is not simply that under secretaries and assistant secretaries sign statements accepting responsibility or assuming a new responsibility for a formal act of their chief or for one another. It is that whatever any of these high officials does is an intricate, organizational product growing out of the Constitution, a great body of Congressional enactments, and a great bureaucracy widely exposed and intricately influenced.

There is much discussion today of the powers of the President and of the powers of a department head. But there has not been nearly enough discussion of those many factors which, particularly in a democracy, temper the exercise of these powers by whatever individual may happen to hold either of these high offices.

The picture is the same whether one starts at the Cabinet level and works down, or in some work unit of a department and works up. In the work unit three or four persons closest to the particular function and to the people affected by it draw up an action "docket." In it they put the essence of what they feel combines the public, governmental purpose and what they feel the affected citizens will accept. The docket may be a revision of an old one, called for by persisting dissatisfaction on the part of citizens concerned. The new one will attempt to alleviate that dissatisfaction without, however, causing dissatisfaction among those persons who are not complain-

ing. Or the revision may be one dictated by a rather remote criticism made by the Budget Bureau or the Comptroller General, or the opposition party, or a few members of Congress who have no reason to be positively interested in that particular activity. Most dockets must take into account many such forces, influences, and considerations.

The work unit completes the docket. It goes to the section head, who reviews it for other such considerations, of which only he may be especially aware. Then it goes to the division head, where it is similarly reviewed, and finally to the bureau chief. In the meantime it has been in review by someone on the solicitor's staff who has looked at it from the standpoint of review by the courts or by the Comptroller General, and by someone in the finance office who has in mind budgetary, governmental, and appropriation-committees considerations. A press release describing the docket will have been prepared by the bureau information office and sent on to the department information office where it is examined with reference to the whole stream of such press releases and freshly appraised in terms of the public relations of the whole department. Dozens upon dozens of persons with many varied responsibilities have contributed from their sensitivities, their backgrounds, and their judgments. This internal process will, moreover, usually have been supplemented by conferences with interested visitors. But whether such conferences are held concurrently or not, everyone concerned will be well aware of previous conferences and thoroughly cognizant of the way the proposed action is likely to be received. Each person is anxious that the man to whom he is responsible will not have found him to have slipped in any way; each one knows the dynamite in every docket and the potentialities for public outcry. Finally, each one knows that trouble for top executives as a result of the docket will inevitably involve him.

By the time the docket reaches the secretary, the initials of half a dozen high executives of various responsibilities certify the completion of these several steps. No one person has exercised much power during the process, and each one's power has been restrained and directed to the end of ensuring an action as satisfactory as possible to the public. The secretary, too, can contribute only a little.

From his knowledge of the President's views, of the attitudes of other department heads, of conversations with Congressmen and publicists, he may *sometimes* be able to make a significant contribution, but not often. He may, in handling the docket, ask some penetrating question, news of which, going back on the grapevine of the bureaucracy, will slant their efforts a trifle differently in the next docket. Or he may send back a formal note suggesting that in successive dockets the course might be a little more in such-and-such a direction. Only rarely can he be certain enough about the importance of a change that he will feel warranted in refusing to approve the particular docket. Usually his questions can be quickly answered by those who have labored most on the docket. The secretary's usual influence is in respect to trends and is an outgrowth of his own exposure to broader influences. His main function consists in making general decisions.

No department head can hold principal executives responsible without going along with them substantially most of the time. Watching their product, he may, after an accumulation of dissatisfaction, displace them, if he can find men he thinks abler—but he must then uphold the new men substantially most of the time. Similarly, these executives must normally uphold *their* principal executives in the same way. Yet the consultative and reciprocal method in which these actions take form, and the occasional insistence for change at any one of several score vantage points, make for a representative product in which every official has been keenly aware of the limitation of his own power and most concerned about the public impact.

This process reflects in part a similar administrative process in which this and similar dockets are enforced. Administrative people work chiefly with affected citizens. They work under rules, but have always some discretion. It is natural for them to try to make themselves and their functions acceptable. When they find irritations which they think could be avoided by changes in the rules, they consistently recommend the changes. In the department all of these concerns come into focus with those of the larger public interest. So long as the people vote and have unrestrained the right to complain, the whole process of administration is in a sense political on every level. *In toto* it brings to bear the condensed political essence of the

entire nation. That is the essence of democratic administration. After insistence on free and regular franchise and the right to complain, nothing is more essential to making and keeping big government democratic than to conceive of governmental power and to develop it as the power of a social and political organism.

The various phases of this process are a product of tradition, growth, instruments, and institutions. They are carried on within a framework of standards and statutes laid down by Congress and subject to change by Congress. Together they form an instance of the exercise of national power. Unification of that power around a core of definite authority—unification first in bureaus, then in departments, and finally under the President—means that governmental action will have the character of a fair response to national social need rather than simply the sum total of a series of separate responses to many individual needs.

What is individually wise may often be socially unwise. The nation as a whole needs an embodiment. The embodiment is to be found in the national government, and the sole representative of the entire nation is the President. He is the democratic head of the American body politic, the organism which comprehends all the parts of the nation, but which is somehow more than the mere sum of those parts. He is the symbol of all the government's executive power, subject to Congressional specification and withdrawal. Through Congress, and through elections, it is a power popularly controlled.

Consideration for Citizens as Individuals

The government I am trying to describe, and for the most part it is what exists, is a government that grows out of the life of its people rather than one that is imposed upon them. The second chief requirement for government under Big Democracy already has been suggested. It is simply a conscious and steady emphasis on the consideration of citizens as individuals. This emphasis calls for a limited but important participation in government. But it involves an enlarged elasticity in administration and requires increased concern for everything that makes government more co-operative, considerate, receptive, and responsive toward its people.

There must be limits to the direct participation in government by

the citizens. It should be obvious to everybody that the town-meeting technique is not suitable for the big government of a great nation. In specific matters we must work out our salvation as a Big Democracy through representative rather than through direct popular government. On a titular basis the President represents the whole people; yet no one man can do that perfectly in practice. Congress represents the people according to geographical areas, yet not even Congress would assert that it can fully represent the nation or all of its interests and aspirations. The American Bankers Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the United States Chamber of Commerce all represent business. Though to some extent the Chamber of Commerce comprehends the other two groups, apparently it is not felt to represent adequately either bankers or manufacturers, else the two former associations would disband. Yet not all three together fully represent all of the important beliefs, needs and aspirations of American businessmen. For those businessmen also belong to churches, lodges, luncheon and country clubs. They read various books, papers, and magazines, listen to assorted radio programs, see different movies, and have different wives. They are of different ages and different experiences and have different numbers of children of various ages. The members of these three great business groups are not by any means unanimous on the questions of the day, even on those relating to commerce, or manufacturing, or banking. The ideas they have they hold with great differences of certainty and passion as mixtures of views about other matters influence them. All three of these business organizations have important and legitimate functions. They may properly influence government. But they should not *be* government, not even with respect to business.

This is equally true with respect to labor unions. Members of labor unions are many things else. Labor organizations do not and could not represent them in their whole capacity as American citizens. Labor unions can properly influence government, but they cannot properly *be* government or exercise governmental functions, even simply with respect to labor. And so it is likewise with farm organizations.

Government must show consideration for numberless organizations of citizens, can be influenced by them, and profits from that

influence. It may have a consultative relationship with all of them, but it must not have an exclusive consultative relationship with any of them and it cannot delegate governmental authority to any of them. Government can be responsible only if it exercises governmental responsibility. An official in government must be responsible to government—the whole government, the whole people—not to any single, special, or partial group. Persons who know business or labor or agriculture can helpfully serve government, but they can exercise governmental authority helpfully only when responsible to government, only when subjected to all of the influences that are properly brought to bear on governmental officials themselves. Government in action-administration comes into contact with individuals and not merely with organizations. It is therefore tempered, and should be, by all the diverse considerations they represent. If government is to serve the welfare of all persons and groups, it must therefore provide an open channel for each to “get through.”

This conviction has been widely shared in the Department of Agriculture. With adoption of its many large action programs it has endeavored correspondingly to develop its contacts with farmers and agricultural groups. County land-use planning committees have brought together representative local farm leaders to study and discuss programs. Discussion groups, county advisory and other committees, and state and regional committees of various kinds have brought into close association with government personnel perhaps a million people in the last ten years. Personal contact between department personnel and farm people has been at an average rate of at least two or three visits a year for all farmers, and at some times and places at an average rate of one a month. Hundreds of thousands of farm families have a strong sense of participation in, and shared responsibility for, our governmental agricultural programs. There is a vastly greater championship of those programs by farm people than there is resentment of them. The great majority of farmers come of course between these two extremes; their attitude is simply one of untroubled acceptance of the programs. Cultivation of these relationships has naturally made for better public relations for the department. But this has been only their smallest benefit. What is of

most importance is that they have made for better programs, for more flexibility, and for better administration.

The spirit of consideration for the citizen affected by governmental action must be fostered first in the administration of the department itself. Administration used to be thought of simply as giving orders and getting compliance. But it has already been shown that organizations cannot actually be so run. In recent years recognition has been growing that, by themselves, mechanical co-ordination and legal delegation can never call forth the full zeal of an organization or get the full advantage of the abilities of all its personnel. And that is the newer goal. Government departments which are themselves responsive and considerate and which operate with appreciation for human dignity and human diversity within their own staffs are the only ones that can hope to be able to have their personnel take a similar attitude with respect to the public with which they deal.

But not merely in government is this kind of administration desirable. Its greater development in all fields could contribute significantly to easing the burden of the disciplines necessary in our complex world. Fortunately it is already spreading. Relatively arbitrary business disciplines have been much tempered by changing social attitudes, by the demands of organized labor, and by the operation of governmental controls. Our more enlightened corporations have found that intelligent personnel policies make a great contribution to efficiency in production and management. Here the experience of the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company is most profound. But with the added experience of the Dennison Manufacturing Company, the Nunn-Bush Shoe Company, and many others we have the basis for enormous improvement in satisfying the needs of both workers and management.

Government, however, should try hardest of all to make these advances. Administration on these terms is what we need and what the public has a right to expect in Big Democracy. Let our public administrators cherish the importance and the value of individual differences among our people and they will never allow the disciplines that government must administer to become intolerable.

Politics—Source of the People's Power

IN DISCUSSING DEMOCRATIC METHODS I have referred to the necessity (which exists for other reasons as well) to get an organized product from government as an insurance against arbitrary exercise of power. The larger check on arbitrary power is in the fact that we have *political* government. This phrase "political government" is rather absurd, since government is the science and art of politics. But so many persons talk about government as something to be improved only by reducing or eliminating its political composition that it is necessary to emphasize the facts that popular political processes, which are the essence of democracy, can only work through governmental organizations, and that all governmental organizations are not merely administrative entities; they are and must be political organisms. In its most common or popular usage the word "political" does not have the same connotations as the term "government." Some governments are more "political" than others. Democratic governments are far more political than authoritarian governments; that is in great part the measure of their superiority over such regimes. We have political government in the United States in the degree we do because of the rights of franchise and free speech. The improvement of our government is a political problem to be solved by political processes, whether citizen snobs agree or not.

In a democracy, bureaucracy is a tool of the people. The necessity for administrative delegation and co-ordination derives in part from the necessity for wide and intensive exposure of governmental action. Popular sentiments come to bear on all levels of all parts of the executive branch of the government and similarly on the legislative branch. Their influence is reflected in the co-ordinated action that results—action that is a product of that exposure. Such action takes into account myriad considerations important to the people, but comprehended in no other one organized entity than government.

There is much more to democratic government than bureaucracy. But it is all political. And in those political processes lies the principal guarantee of democracy, for they supply the all-important check on arbitrary power.

Political Generality and Political Detail

There are many levels in politics. On all the levels there are aspects of detail and aspects of generality. On the national level in the last twelve years the quality of our general political management and general political leadership has probably surpassed anything our history has to record. The more candid among the opposition party admit as much. Political detail, on the other hand, has not received corresponding attention. There has been some concern, to be sure, to extend and improve the use of consultative techniques by various administrative agencies, and this has been all to the good. But little attention has been paid to party organization, party prerogatives, or party discipline. The President's political management has been general and personal rather than organizational.

Political detail is not normally of immediate significance to the people, and for the most part they distrust it. Yet it is of great intrinsic importance. Magnetic personal leadership can of course relieve a political organization of part of the burden of detail it must carry. But it is not too much to say that some organized attention to political detail is always required to assure sufficient governmental unity. The formal leadership of the two Houses is, for example, of great importance to the President. The nucleus of support that comes from the simple fact that his party is in power is the base on which the President builds his political leadership. The sharp separation of our government into Congressional, Executive, and Judicial branches is on the other hand a great handicap to such leadership. The fact that the political fortunes of the members of Congress do not necessarily rise and fall with the fortunes of the President often makes his leadership extremely tenuous. The President may have what he regards as a clear national mandate, but it will not for that reason be easy for him to get the members of Congress, who will usually have been elected for local reasons, to follow him.

It is always desirable and generally necessary that there be many

matters of common concern between the President and the Congressional majority if they are to be able without difficulty to agree on a legislative program. Inadequate party unity and discipline obliges a President to rely on the personal attention he can give Congressmen and Senators, on administrative favors such as approving projects for their states or districts, on patronage, or on his personal strength with the people. President Roosevelt has had occasion to resort to all four of these stratagems, chiefly the last. Coupled with his unequaled political judgment and unprecedented political sensibilities, they have enabled him to function as politician-in-chief with rare success. He glories in the American political process, would not exchange it for any other, and likes to think of himself as one of its ablest practitioners. That is why Heywood Broun was thoroughly profound when he said: "Those who see Roosevelt making himself dictator would see Babe Ruth doing away with the home run."

With the increasing demands of his office, however, a modern President cannot possibly reserve enough of his time for interviews with Congressmen to enable them to bask in his strength in their home papers. And were he to devote all his time to such interviews, members still could not average more than one visit in about sixty days. This is unfortunate, for not only do they have their own necessities for maintaining their own leadership in their home states and districts, but it is to the President's interest that they maintain that leadership in connection with his own greater leadership.

Like the President most members of Congress function individually, too, rather than organizationally. If a Congressman is instrumental in getting a much wanted reclamation project for his district, his party gets some kind of reflected or indirect credit, but most of it goes to him as an individual. If a constituent wants a job, he is likely to write straight to the Congressman, and the Congressman is likely to try to get the job for him directly, without referring the matter back to the party committee. Not one per cent of the positions in government are filled as political patronage, but the handling of patronage is a matter of much importance.

Management of Patronage

Common assumptions to the contrary, James A. Farley exercised more of a personal leadership than an organizational leadership while chairman of the Democratic National Committee. He relied for his success on an amazing genius for getting acquainted with people and on his personal political judgment. Through his management of patronage he tended to build up individual Congressmen and Senators rather more than the party organization itself, for recommendations for appointment would generally come to the departments from Capitol Hill rather than from Democratic party headquarters. It may be that the departments were more responsive when the advices came that way, and, of course, it was also necessary to recognize Congress. But the procedure left party committees without much either of status or of function, and caused them to be irritated over appointments of which they had no prior knowledge.

When Ed Flynn came in as national chairman he attempted to reverse the process and require all recommendations to come from committeemen. Unfortunately, however, the committeemen know less of the actual functioning of Federal government than do members of Congress, and on the whole the departments find them harder to deal with. Moreover members of Congress are not easily disregarded. Flynn's efforts ended with the former procedure pretty much intact, but with somewhat more cross-reference between Congressmen and committeemen. This, of course, has been the theory all along: that for that small part of the government's personnel not selected by Civil Service processes Congressmen and Senators should receive recommendations from party committees, and that applicants consequently should be dependent for appointments on both the party and the member of Congress. Yet all Congressmen will need or want to act otherwise in individual cases. All of them want to have some personal patronage, just as all administrators will need to be able, and will insist on the right, to select some non-Civil Service personnel without reference to politics. The function left for party committees between campaigns is not very great.

The President also needs to make many of his top-place selections without much reference to strictly party considerations. This he is generally able to do; for whether he chooses for a Cabinet post John

Jones of Nebraska or Henry Smith of West Virginia has little national political importance, even though it may make a difference in Nebraska or West Virginia. The feeling of participation on the part of committeemen, from the precinct up, matters far more than actual choosing of top officials from party recommendations. But the presidential function is not exhausted in mere party leadership, and to do what he needs to do he will invariably make many very personal selections. They may be none the less adequately political selections, yet the method used will make them irritating to the party. Like other pressure groups, it wants a monopoly—in this case on the function of recommending and approving personnel. That monopoly cannot be granted.

Not All Politics Is Party Politics

It will help to illustrate the situation to call attention to the fact, which further restricts the party function, that certain departments have to play specific kinds of politics other than party politics. The Department of Labor, for example, has to play highly specialized labor politics far outside the competence of a national party committee, balancing things between the A. F. of L., the C. I. O., and the Railway Brotherhoods. The Department of Agriculture must play the complex of farm politics. In many instances this means that it can best support party politics by being nonpartisan. It is subject to patronage and other pressures from the farm front which are every bit as real and as political as party pressures. It has in addition, of course, technical and highly specialized managerial needs. Through the years it has learned that, in the long run, to do a good job is, far and away, the best kind of politics.

Much that is important, however, is bound up in such political detail. Relations between Roosevelt and Farley developed as they did because of differences in their political functions and the manner of handling the relationship between those functions. Relationships between the Executive and Congress have suffered for similar reasons.

Theoretically, one might argue that party politics can be made to comprehend all the specialized forms of politics. Actually, it is impossible. The differences in functions and responsibilities, as between party committees, Congress, and the executive departments are too

great. The functions are all related and all political, yet they are distinct and different parts of a political complex. Each part learns from and contributes to the others, but they remain separate. Where administrators are too technical or politically inept, trouble invariably develops. Likewise where party committees exercise too direct and specific a control over administration. Likewise where Congress as a whole or particular members of Congress insist on too close a surveillance. Likewise where the Executive pays too little attention to the political function of Congress. There is need for improvement in each field, and perhaps even in our basic political structure. But good government can be built and sustained only by a continuous reconciliation of the functions of the technician, the administrator, and the politician.

Democracy—Free Political Enterprise

Parties and pressure groups in a way are competitive. Both seek to dominate government. Both are political in nature. The League of Women Voters, the Federation of Women's Clubs, the American Legion, the American Bar Association, the American Bankers Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chambers of Commerce, the various unions, the farm organizations, the lumbermen, the packers, the commission men, the millers, the bakers, the candlestick-makers—all of them are in varying degrees political. The press, the radio, the movies, educational associations, the churches—all have a political character, positive or negative, general or specific, constant or spasmodic, static or kinetic. The parties have no monopoly on politics. Nor do the parties and all these other groups put together enjoy a monopoly—not in a democracy. There are still the rugged individualists and they must be a special concern of intelligent politicians because they can turn minorities into majorities. Lastly there is always the fact of free political enterprise, the opportunity for new organizations and movements. Only government can comprehend all politics.

Voters in towns and counties understand roughly and sufficiently why the state does not respond to them in the way the towns and counties respond. But voters in states seem not equally to understand why the nation does not respond to them as do their states. National

pressure groups seem not to understand why the national government does not react as does the city government when the same group makes local demands. The differences are of the same kind, but greater in degree and in complexity. Voters in a state become generally aware of important state political forces. State politicians become expert in such matters. But even highly intelligent state voters will miss scores of national political considerations.

There are extremely few *national* politicians. These few tend to emerge suddenly and to function briefly on the national scene. For they usually reach this level at an age when physical mortality is high—and political mortality is higher yet. One of the great weaknesses of our Big Democracy lies in the fact that we have no adequate system for developing such a pool of national politicians. Members of Congress are essentially state and local politicians. They are under no particular pressure to become really national politicians, nor are they given any special opportunity or encouragement to do so. Some become sectional politicians, but very few attain national stature. Leaders of pressure groups are even more restricted in function and exposure and have even greater difficulty in formulating their proposals with anything like a national governmental perspective. Congressmen, by having to compromise local, state, and national differences, do, in that sense and in that way, tend to function nationally. But the pull of their attention toward local concerns is very great, and the national interest is something definitely more than a mere compromise of area differences.

There is virtue in a national point of view just as truly as there is virtue in a state point of view, and the necessity is even greater. It is by and through the joint endeavors of technicians, administrators, party spokesmen, members of Congress, and the leaders of interest groups in all parts of the country that democracy lives and acts. This is the political governmental process. It is the free and yet disciplined interplay of all these elements that makes the good society.

The Nature of the People's Power


THE COMPLEXITY OF GOVERNMENT begins with the complexity of the individual. The very citizen who expects national government to be simple is himself a physical, psychological, political complexity. His life is a sort of working agreement between his various aspects. He has contradictory opinions and emotions; he has different degrees of belief and feeling; and these beliefs and feelings change. John Citizen will not trust fully any Gallup poll of his own individual sentiments; he knows, somehow, that there are many imponderables. Given some change in circumstance, some mild sentiment may become a passion or vice versa. Nor will he always know what change in circumstance affected him. If John Citizen worried about his own complexity and his own methods of making decisions as he worries about political complexity and the methods of making decisions in government, we should have a nation of psychoanalysts going about greeting one another: "You are nuts. How am I?"

John Citizen: An Intimate View

Usually John Citizen is relatively radical on some points and relatively reactionary on others. But his sentiments tend to bulk around a personal center of gravity between these two extremes. Each sentiment in turn has its more radical and more conservative aspects, but has a center of gravity around which the various aspects of that sentiment tend to group. He cannot do with respect to any one thing just what he wishes to do, because others of his sentiments qualify that desire. A sentiment, then, may appear as a sort of diamond-shaped molecule made up of smaller diamond-shaped atoms which are aspects of that sentiment, the more radical atoms being at the left, the more conservative ones at the right, the bulk clustering around a small central diamond which serves more or less as a center of gravity for that particular sentiment. That small diamond

describes how he believes or feels typically on that particular matter.


As a matter of fact, he is not utterly consistent or stable with regard to single sentiments. The atoms move and in turn change the



One of John Citizen's Sentiments

location of the sentiment diamond. The dotted lines represent the area on a sentiment spectrum within which in practice his sentiment will fluctuate.


John Citizen as a person and as a voter is a body of such sentiments, some of them rather radical, some rather conservative. He may be represented by a much bigger diamond, made up of smaller sentiment diamonds. As a person he is not utterly consistent or stable or petrified, and again there are dotted lines to show his center of gravity. As his beliefs, judgments, feelings, and sentiments change, his center of gravity moves with respect to the general public-opinion spectrum,



John Citizen as a Composition of His Various Sentiments

but the feelings reassemble as a diamond, and it represents what he generally believes, feels, and does, and how he votes.


John Citizen Diamond has many uncertainties. He has some diffi-



Mr. and Mrs. John Citizen

culty about getting himself to do what he feels he should do. In this he resembles the Negro farmer who responded to urgings to attend a short course on better farming with "Laws, Marse Boss, Ah knows bettah now than Ah does." But he does have a center of gravity, which is a sort of working agreement with himself.

When he marries, his situation is further complicated. There then are two Diamonds, each complex, in a new, special working and living relationship. They may be relatively close to each other in the



general scale of sentiment and traits, but the center of one is not the center of the other; there is a new and distinct center which represents their center of gravity as a couple and the basis of their agreement as a family.

Mrs. John Citizen never does just as her pressure-group husband thinks he wishes her to do ("There's no way to understand women"), and he never does just as his pressure-group wife wishes him to do ("Men are like that, I guess"). But somehow a balance is established between them. They *affect* each other, but do not exactly *control* each other. When they have a flock of little Diamonds, the situation becomes more complicated, but the family still has a center of gravity.

Altogether too few of our people seem to understand that this is the nature of the political universe, that democratic government is something *affected* by all citizens and interest groups, but not specifically or precisely *controlled* by any of them.

The People and Their Parties

The American political universe is made up of various voting groups containing at present some sixty-odd million John Citizen diamonds plus again as many people who either cannot vote or do not. These latter are satellites; they always exert an influence on the spectrum location of the various group diamonds, but it is never certain precisely what the strength or character of the influence will be. Our political universe may then be symbolized by three great diamonds, each in motion within a fourth larger, universal diamond representing the totality of the social forces within our body politic. Two of the big diamonds represent the two major parties; the third denotes our large body of unattached or independent voters and the members of our union parties. (See chart on page 137.)

Let us say that diamond ABCD represents the Democratic Party, the diamond EFGH the Republican Party, the diamond IJKL the membership of the minor parties and all our independent voters. The Democratic diamond has, for reasons of political symbolism, been placed at the left of the Republican diamond. Diamond IJKL has, advisedly, been drawn so that it covers virtually the whole present political spectrum, extending both farther to the left than the diamond for the liberal party and farther to the right than that for the con-

servative. Each diamond has a center of gravity representing its base of agreement. As suggested by the size and shape of diamond IJKL, there is in the minor-party independent-voter group little agreement and little unity, but great power to contract and expand. Each party *tends* to nominate presidential candidates representing a position somewhere near its center of gravity. If the millions of small diamonds within the larger diamonds are visualized not as being inanimate and identical but as representing forces—or heads or hearts or spleens—rather than simply noses, one will begin to get at the reality of the political process. Organized groups are more powerful than unorganized individuals. The parties themselves are the great diamonds because they are organized forces. Within the great diamonds the normal distribution which gives the diamond its shape is a distribution of forces and not simply a distribution of inert bodies. Voters *can* exert new pressure because voters must be bid for. Yet the forces are strongly influenced by the nature of the political process to act in the manner symbolized by the center of voting gravity.

Party ABCD and party EFGH bid for support of voters in the competing diamond, and more particularly for voters in diamond IJKL. The national vote consists of the total number of votes cast by the citizens in all three diamonds and it determines the center of gravity for the whole political universe, represented by the diamond MNOP. This center identifies the base of agreement of the national majority. Its location will depend mainly upon the relative strength shown by the two major party diamonds, but it will be somewhere within the area of the diamond EQRC. A part of this central diamond is the area within which leadership has some choice, some discretion, some determining power. The whole central diamond represents the whole government with its historical and accepted as well as its newer and more controversial functions. This is the area from which it is possible for national leadership to maintain a position of authority. For the ins are trying desperately to stay in; the outs are trying desperately to evict them. The political process goes on daily, not simply during campaigns. The sensitivity of officials to signs of approval or disapproval, to symptoms of unrest and defection, is vastly more constant and acute than citizens believe. It may be that officials will seem unmoved by a chorus of pain from visitors in their offices. Appear-

ances can be misleading. The officials are listening to these voices and to other voices not quite so near; they are straining to catch significant overtones and undertones. For they must dance to a tune of which this office effort comprises only a part of a measure.

Noses count in politics, but noises do, too. Big Noises count extra. Individual leadership is always an important factor. Organized groups invariably exert an influence disproportionate to their number. The nature of the forces in politics and the kind of leadership we have in politics is for our citizenry to determine. But there is more political democracy in America today than ever before. The politicians know it. The voters *can* determine anything about which they feel deeply enough. They can and consistently do stop anything about which even a fairly small minority feels deeply, for a small minority can change a majority to a minority.

Politics has been defined as "the art of the possible." Citizens determine in a general way what it is possible for government to do. Collectively they affect policy to the point of determining it, but they determine it in a way that is not like the determination any individual or pressure group wishes. The determinations are a composite. The determinations are most nearly made by that small number of people who, depending upon how they are persuaded, change a minority into a majority. If 12,600 voters had voted *against* Roosevelt for Governor of New York in 1928 instead of voting for him, the history of the country would have been different. Those few votes let him stand out as victor when a national landslide defeated Al Smith for the Presidency; they put him in a position to lead his party in 1932. Small bodies of voters, particularly in politically strategic political sectors, may have extraordinary influence. And there is always the possibility that new political enterprise may be able to launch a movement of great significance.

Problems of Political Leadership

For these reasons the power of leaders in high places in Washington is a power definitely limited and quite immediately determined by the bounds of a public sentiment representing an acquiescent majority and similarly limited by the position of any substantial minority which might threaten the conversion of the majority into

a minority. The ear-to-the-ground posture actually is constant with Washington officialdom, in spite of the fact that the visitor to the capital rarely sees it and sincerely doubts it. The explanation is that the visitor simply does not know the art. Interpreting ground sounds is an art—and a most difficult and intricate one.

The individual caller is viewed by an official as an individual caller. Requests for favors and expressions of individual or group self-interest are received as just what they are; for the most part they are taken for granted in advance. Minor officials will give them due and orderly consideration, having regard for procedures established to deal with other individuals and groups and for refining or otherwise improving those procedures. What top officials look for and listen for is the sign of a widespread reaction different from what had previously been expected. If a widespread reaction is genuine, it is given prompt and serious attention. Artificially "drummed up" expressions are quickly detected and discounted. How widespread is a sentiment? How real? How deep? How lasting? How much does it extend to others beyond those whose interest and reaction were known and weighed in advance? These are the questions top officials are continually asking. Does the person crying alarm know a wolf when he sees one? Does he cry "Wolf!" when he sees one and not otherwise? Are the sentries on the Hill crying alarm because they have seen a wolf, or are they only going through guard drill? I have seen a barrage of thousands of telegrams leave a department unimpressed and unmoved. I have seen an important group of thirty or forty members of Congress try to bring pressure on a department but leave it undisturbed. On the other hand I have seen a major policy reversed after a single phone call from a single member of Congress. And I once spent \$75,000 investigating a matter brought to my attention by an anonymous letter.

The persistence of a complaint or a sentiment gives it added weight—and should. An individual aggrieved over some specific transaction may be further offended if his first letter fails to get the type of consideration he seeks, but he will serve both himself and the government if he persists in his point and shows the depth of his sentiment. In larger movements of public opinion, persistence is one of the most definite measures of the reality and importance of a popular senti-

ment. In a democracy sentiments demonstrate their fitness by survival. Many stories are flurries of a day or of a week in American politics. The skilled politician or political administrator recognizes most of them as such, quickly and certainly. Occasionally, however, a flurry surprises him by turning into a storm. When it does, he must change his tactics, and that immediately. He dare not treat a storm as he treats a flurry.

It is a special function of government and of leadership to be foresighted. Foresight contributes greatly to success in politics. A leader fortified with reliable information can play confidently to basic popular needs, knowing that time is on his side; he can disregard a political flurry with equanimity when he knows that a heavier wind is gathering in the opposite quarter. What the public first interprets as an apparently inept political response may well turn out because of foresight to have been the soundest and the wisest politics. The amount of foresight leaders can exercise is limited only by their own capacity to see ahead; the amount they can afford not to have is limited by their popular constituency.

There are times when the power of leadership is extremely small. It is doubtful, for example, whether the course of the country would have been substantially different from 1920 to 1932 if the Democrats had been in office instead of the Republicans. The government during those years was a pretty precise expression of national sentiment and, because of the nature of that sentiment, would have been much the same with other men as Presidents or with another party in power. The classic speech of Claude Bowers nominating Al Smith in Houston in 1928 was made four years too soon for the wrong man; it was the ideal speech for presenting Roosevelt four years later.

The year 1933 was politically the direct opposite of all the 1920's. It was a time when the power of leadership was enormous. Ordinarily what is possible for leaders is sharply limited and pretty definitely determined by popular sentiments. Normally, political change is a product of grass-roots change, of education, discussion, development, and the logic of events. But there come moments in history when the logic of events causes the people to turn to a leader and to give him a broad charter. What he does must be in response to their sense of need. What he does is rooted in the opportunity they give

him and is admittedly subject to established processes of political control. But in those rare moments leadership has extraordinary discretion and scope.

Yet even these moments come because of changes in basic popular sentiments. When they have passed, the processes of refinement and adjustment begin their work and the people continue in their normal way with the development of new political sentiments.

Patronage

ONE OF THE WIDELY HELD MISCONCEPTIONS about government is the belief that with party change there is a wholesale turnover in personnel. This simply is not true—no matter what the incoming party may be. That it is not true is attributable chiefly to two things: First, it simply is not possible; wholesale turnover would mean complete governmental paralysis. Second, established laws and practices protect the overwhelming majority of governmental employees against arbitrary dismissal.

It is impossible to make wholesale changes because an incoming head has enough trouble directing the operations of a huge, complex organization without first compounding his problem by destroying his organization. Even a substantial percentage of change in personnel, suddenly effected, will wreck morale and so damage nicely balanced working arrangements within the organization as to ruin for the new head all prospect of success.

Civil Service Regulations

Civil Service laws cover most of the government. Departmental regulations and personnel practices, such as appeals procedures for persons aggrieved, add to the complexity of the situation. They alone will baffle, for a while, any new official. It will be his experience to be told repeatedly that he "can't do" something he proposes.

Yet Civil Service laws are not nearly so rigid as the public believes. They do not guarantee permanent tenure in a particular position; indeed, they do not guarantee permanent employment at all. Under these laws administrators actually can do whatever good administration may require—and good administration requires shifts in policy and changes in personnel. But under Civil Service laws what needs to be done can be done only in certain ways. Personnel is protected against arbitrary action. To the new administrator such protection

will appear to be a barrier to his own efficient management, but this is only because he has not mastered the techniques involved. If he will put to career administrators in the department a statement of his *general* objective and ask them to tell him how to reach it, they will find a way. The incoming administrator is likely to make the mistake of attempting to issue orders based on some one particular way of attaining an objective, and the way may be, and frequently is, utterly illegal. His objective is then defeated. If, on the other hand, he makes it plain that he knows he must proceed in an orderly way and that his concern is with objectives, he will begin to get results. In due course he himself will begin to learn the techniques, and his knowledge of them will increase both the range and the velocity of his power. The man who comes in with a swashbuckling attitude may make a lot of noise in the public prints, but he will not manage to get very much done with and through the resources of his organization.

In my experience, career executives have an amazing loyalty to their departments and to the government, one that usually recognizes the part that policy shifts must play. It was understood in our Department that if in the last few weeks of the Administration we should issue orders designed to predetermine things for our successors, those orders would never actually be implemented and would be brought up for reconsideration almost immediately after our departure from the scene.

Wallace's Personnel Changes, 1933

To return to the fact of small turnover, let me point out that when Henry Wallace became Secretary of Agriculture there were exactly seven positions he could fill without regard for Civil Service processes. (Even in these cases, however, the salaries were, of course, fixed under the Classification Act.) These positions were: two Assistants to the Secretary; two chauffeurs or messengers; the Secretary's Secretary; the Solicitor; the secretary to the Assistant Secretary. Only four of these were actually filled by new appointments within the first three months. One more was filled in the fourth month, the others never. Several of the predecessor-appointees had established career eligibility; four of them are in government service today.

Going back still further, as political and other pressure for jobs

hit us in a terrific and unending broadside, I had occasion to discover that in the preceding Administration only a dozen or two non-Civil Service appointments had been made in the Department, and several of those had been through Executive Orders making eligible widows of valuable, deceased career men. This statement ignores the "Crop Loan" establishment begun in the preceding Administration. It had been largely staffed by the patronage process—it was outside of Civil Service. This establishment was transferred to the Farm Credit Administration, then outside of the Department, early in the Roosevelt administration.

The principal features of the scene for us in the Department of Agriculture in those days of 1933 were then: a Department in which no patronage or non-Civil Service jobs existed (the seven were simply recognized as personal prerogatives and necessities of the incoming Secretary); a country with unprecedented unemployment creating a situation in which literally millions expected that *they* would be given jobs in government; an Administration representing a party which had not been much in power, which was not well acquainted with the legal and administrative restrictions, and which had its hunger for pie whetted first by long years of abstinence and then by wholly unprecedented popular pressure; an Administration brought into power by a political tide demanding great shifts in policy; a Department with a staff composed almost exclusively of Civil Service personnel. Both legislation and administration had to take cognizance of these facts of life.

The Secretary faced the problem of reconciling these facts with the basic necessities of governmental administration. These necessities are at least three in number: (1) It is essential that there be sufficiently direct political control to ensure responsiveness to changed national policies and national needs. (2) It is imperative to maintain and safeguard the career service to assure administrative continuity and technical and managerial competence. (3) It is essential that there be on the part of the public, the politicians, and the administrators adequate realization of the immense importance and delicacy of proper placement.

The recognition and reconciliation of these essentials is a considerable part of the job of public administration. Almost on the same

level of importance is the need to recognize party and public demands for jobs in a way that will support the first- and second-named necessities. This may be regarded as covered by the first necessity listed, but it is not so covered in all respects. With regard to methods of choosing personnel, government must satisfy important popular expectations. In this country there is not the overwhelming reliance on the Civil Service there is in Britain, and government naturally reflects the difference. We may note parenthetically that the Civil Service in Britain has been criticized for not being quite so responsive to policy shifts as it should be.

Need for Adaptability

Certainly in any democratic government there is a problem in making established governmental organisms sufficiently adaptable. The practices in Britain are much more rigid than they are here. Good management, comprehending adequate mobility of the administrative organisms, is dependent on three things: command of the techniques that give control; the sustained competence of a career service; political controllability and adjustability.

It is my belief that the course taken in the Hoover Administration, when the crop, feed, and seed loans were first handled by a non-Civil Service agency, is on the whole a desirable course. That is to say, new governmental agencies frequently need to be set up on a somewhat flexible and political basis, and be converted later into career bodies subject to Civil Service procedures. We have accomplished many such adjustments during the last decade.

New agencies will function best if they are built with a nuclear element of experienced government personnel in the higher brackets. Civil Service usually should be the recruitment basis for the lower-bracket positions. But usually it is not possible by the Civil Service process quickly to identify the rare individuals who would be particularly competent at many of the key jobs required for these new programs. This is especially true in view of the further fact that it is of importance that these new agencies be staffed by people who are genuinely zealous with respect to the new program. Far more often than not it will represent a major Administration policy.

Political endorsement is, of course, no guarantee of the suitability

of an applicant for a place in one of these new agencies. Neither is intelligence. Neither is experience. Neither is honesty. Neither is a pleasing personality. Nor do all of these things put together guarantee even a fairly satisfactory selection. Adequate selection is much more complex than that, particularly for the new agencies through which an administration is trying to satisfy the popular demand that brought it into office. Yet each of these things is a factor, and I see no reason that warrants ruling out the political factor in the case of a program which is of the political essence of the time. On the contrary, I see substantial reasons for including it. The question is *how* to include it, and to this point I shall return several times as I attempt to discuss the structure and the techniques which make for political responsiveness and managerial and technical soundness.

Assuming a legal structure that recognizes new agencies as more political than old ones, I believe certain resources are needed by all secretaries. No incoming secretary, unaided, may be expected to be able to crack the shell of tradition in his department. He therefore needs complete freedom in selecting a few staff aides, the number varying with the size, nature, and complexity of the department. It has become not uncommon for some of the secretary's assistants to be administrative, rather than staff, personnel. It may be that this is necessary. But I have no doubt whatever that he requires some staff men who can make special studies and report to him what they find out, unhampered by administrative responsibilities of any kind. He should be free to select as many as a dozen such aides.

Next, I believe there should be recognition of a right to name up to perhaps a dozen persons in any one bureau and up to a total of perhaps thirty in an entire department—these in addition to his personal staff. This would expand somewhat the latitude he now has under Civil Service rules. These appointments, however, should all be subject to the approval of the Civil Service Commission and to the understanding that they would be used only as and when the need for greater political and administrative responsiveness might develop in unanticipated places. These processes, coupled with his right to demote, promote and transfer and with present Civil Service recognition of "rare bird" and other needs will put a department ade-

quately at the command of the nation, if the secretary knows how to exercise his command.

What I have said takes care in a general way, I believe, of the strictly administrative needs and of the broad secretarial control essential to general political responsiveness. It does not cover, however, the question of adjustment to more specific political realities that are a part of the whole political scene which is government.

The Political Side of Administration

It is my judgment after eleven years on its staff that in the Department of Agriculture we were on the whole too little political rather than the opposite. I do not mean that we were too little affected by pressure groups; I do not mean that we paid too little attention to agricultural politics. I mean that if anything we operated too far away from the party in power; we resisted it too much; we accepted too little responsibility for devising satisfactory ways of recognizing it and co-operating with it.

This is a field in which nicety of distinction is important. There are many examples of individuals and governmental agencies and parties and state and city administrations being *too* political. In Washington the extreme nature of the political demands made on us by some state or local party organizations was usually clear enough so that one could with confidence predict coming political disaster. It was my experience to sense the development of such situations a number of times—and later to see my expectations of disaster realized. I have also seen individuals so ambitious that they became more political than they knew how to be. Such men compromise not in terms of pertinent political realities but in terms of their irrelevant personal ambitions. The result invariably tends to be bad for their functions, bad for their programs, and bad, politically, for them. Consideration of the other fellow is always good politics; but weakness is not.

What I have in mind in saying that we were too little political in the Department of Agriculture is that we made too little effort to draw to the Department the interest, the understanding, and the support of the professionally or constantly functioning political people.

It would obviously have been necessary for us to use discretion. But there were some circumstances in which it would have been possible for us to be political in wholly proper and legitimate ways and thus to generate enlarged popular interest, understanding, and support.

Let me just describe, not our whole political attitude and procedure, which is much too complex for brief discussion, but simply our method of handling patronage. By telling how it began it may be possible to give a very clear explanation.

Recall first the situation that confronted us at the beginning of the Administration: a Civil Service Department in which spoilsmen's jobs were nonexistent; a staff knowing a great deal of pressure-group politics, but on the whole composed of technical people definitely afraid of and unacquainted with party politics; a party new in power expecting to place a large number of important people in important positions and a much larger number of less important party people in less important jobs; unprecedented unemployment, with hundreds of thousands of persons expecting the new Administration to give them employment. Many persons stated their claims merely by asserting that they had always voted the Democratic ticket. Many in effect simply said: "I'm unemployed. When do I go to work, and what is the salary?" One local party worker, in submitting the case of a fellow worker, was kind enough, however, to say that the job would not have to be forthcoming immediately. "We'll have to wait," he said, "until our friend gets out of jail."

There was no way adequately to attend to the applicants and their sponsors. There were neither offices nor personnel available to attend to them. The flood was unprecedented. We were almost equally beset by persons and groups telling of their economic woes and presenting farm plans. Even the thousands of letters of congratulations to the new Secretary were a problem. Meanwhile the business of our getting acquainted with the Department and getting ready to do something about the general farm situation really demanded all our attention.

It did no good to say any of these things to anybody. *Their* needs and demands were important enough to demand attention—and top attention; other people could be handled otherwise. There was no way of convincing the politicians that we had no jobs; such efforts

only made them sure we were giving the jobs to other politicians or—much more probable and criminal in their eyes—to Republicans. (Incidentally, Democratic politicians commonly made the fundamental error of treating as Republicans those who had swung over to the Democratic Party only in 1932. Even those who had also voted for Smith in 1928 were suspect. To be recognized as a Democrat one had to have a political pedigree going back to the cradle. This had the tendency to throw back into the arms of the Republicans those whose votes had changed the Democratic minority into a majority.)

How to Handle Patronage

We were already in an almost impossibly difficult situation by the time the earliest of the new programs came into being. The Civilian Conservation Corps, planned before the inauguration, was the first. It was not made subject to Civil Service procedures. Its administration was a joint responsibility, with a head appointed by the President but with functions assigned to the Departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and Interior. The two latter agencies had charge of the work programs and had therefore to provide necessary technical direction. For the Department of Agriculture, the Chief of the Forest Service had major responsibility, subject, of course, to the Secretary. It was his duty to make sure that the CCC was staffed with the same kind of personnel as the Forest Service and managed in the same way. He immediately proposed to the Secretary a departmental order providing for this, voluntarily extending Civil Service coverage to the new agency. This made it possible to get a skeletal structure and personnel for which the Chief could accept responsibility. After the beginning had been well made, I called in Major Stuart, the Chief of the Forest Service, and proposed that he now help us out of our political trouble. To persuade him I had to make it easy. I asked him to locate in the new set-up one hundred jobs which could be filled just as well as not from lists of politically endorsed persons, provided the lists were long enough. "You set up the requirements," I told him; "you determine what jobs are to be so filled; you fix the required qualifications. You can be assured that you and not the politicians will actually select the individuals—the politicians will

make the lists, but you will choose the particular man. You can require lists as long as you want. If you don't find a satisfactory man in a given list, we'll call for more lists, with as many names as you want." It took two or three weeks to persuade him and to work out the arrangement. But it proved to be so satisfactory that the Forest Service voluntarily extended the system to cover several thousand CCC jobs. With some variations, this became the departmental system for obtaining personnel for new, non-Civil Service agencies. In order to persuade Major Stuart, I had stumbled upon principles that now seem to me to be of basic importance in handling patronage where patronage has to be handled.

The responsible administrators should determine what jobs are of the type that require only simple qualifications and where, consequently, controlled patronage will not result in deterioration of personnel.

The responsible administrators—not the politicians—must select the specific people who are employed. Whenever a Congressman or a national committeeman says: "I appointed John Smith to a job in X Department," or whenever an employee says: "Congressman Y appointed me to this job," damage is done both to administration and to public attitudes toward public administration. For such remarks have the effect of beclouding responsibility. The administratively protective principle I have described is actually helpful to the politicians, too. They can "clear" for eligibility many more constituents than can possibly be appointed. And they do not have to discriminate between them. All the onus of not appointing all those not chosen falls on the executive branch, and not directly on either the party or the Congressman.

As an illustration of how this works, I recall the case of a Congressman who fathered a bill amending and extending a certain act. It happened that the original act covered an activity under Civil Service, which the Congressman had not realized. The day his measure was approved he came to us demanding that we appoint one of his constituents to one of the new jobs. The circumstances were unusual, and I handled the case outside of our normal procedure. After explaining that under his measure personnel would have to be recruited under Civil Service, I went on to say: "In any case, even if the positions were

not under Civil Service, we could not undertake to appoint any single person you may propose. We have to choose the appointees. . . . But I'll tell you what we'll do. You write me a letter giving me the names and addresses of twelve of your constituents. I'll write to each one, saying that you have urged his appointment to a position and asking for relevant information from all of them. Then, I promise you, we'll appoint one of the twelve to *some* appropriate job." He went away fairly well satisfied.

To the principles mentioned should be added that of concentration of patronage responsibility. To have that responsibility divided among bureaus and among individuals within bureaus, except as other administrative responsibilities must be taken into account, has all the social disadvantages that bureau autonomy has. The effects of patronage then become more and more undesirable, the principles less enforceable, and the patronage less satisfactory politically. By maintaining a single patronage office a department can have a place where all demands come into focus, where they can be balanced as between areas and individuals, and where they can be controlled on the basis of some definite policy. A frankly political office, operating under principle, can defend administrative integrity more effectively than can administrators who are politically aloof.

To our departmental practice there could well have been added a little more conscious and organized search for persons with political prestige, administrative understanding, and desirable policy attitudes to fill a number of places which, as it was, were filled on the basis of straight, non-political selection.

Another point is the desirability of getting something more than simple "clearance" for those persons administrators wish to appoint. Mere clearance is not enough. A Congressman or committeeman, when asked to agree to an appointment desired by an administrator, feels that *he* is doing the administrator a favor and that he is moreover put on a spot where to refuse would make an enemy of the prospective appointee. This does have the advantage of maintaining communication between the Department and the politicians, of reminding the politicians that their wishes are considered, and of saving them the embarrassment of hearing about appointments of their constituents after the fact—all of which is necessary and desirable. But

it should be only one phase of a larger process by which patronage is handled to yield maximum benefits. Administrators can often find throughout the country men of real political standing who possess all the other desired qualifications as well. These men could be used to fill a somewhat larger percentage of the fairly important, non-Civil Service positions than is now the case. Political leaders would accept such selections with enthusiasm and would moreover be drawn closer in communication and understanding by them. The process must not be carried to the point of giving undue emphasis to party politics, of neglecting technical and specialized qualifications, or of undermining administrative responsibility, but it can contribute to total effectiveness.

A Doubtful Asset

It should be said in this connection that, quite naturally, few members of Congress and few committeemen have much perception of the difficulties and importance of proper placement. Few understand that there are in the entire country only a very small number of persons who could properly be considered for the really important executive positions in Washington. Few understand clearly what the delicate complex of qualifications must be. In fact, it may be seriously questioned whether patronage actually confers any net advantage either on members of Congress or the party organizations. Some among the stronger members of Congress almost refuse to have anything to do with patronage, and there are many who would be relieved to have it disappear from the picture. They are all driven, however, by the expectations and demands of their constituents who attribute to members of Congress the function of a precise and direct control of administration which they neither have, can have, nor should have.

Except for this popular demand on them, members of Congress as a whole would gladly see patronage discarded. The larger question is not one of direct political benefit to them but rather one of maintaining and developing greater unity between the legislative and executive branches. The major party, which ordinarily controls both of them, offers practically the sole means of establishing such unity, for the Constitution itself formally divides these two great political

branches. And patronage serves to bring the two branches to at least some little area of common ground. To rule patronage out of even new, non-Civil Service agencies will raise more insistently the question of certain fundamental, structural reforms within the government.

Relations with Congress

Congress Held in Respect

LET ME BEGIN my discussion of Congressional relations and functions by saying that I have great respect both for Congress and for the legislative function. I have tried throughout this book to emphasize the fundamental importance of politics as the safeguard of the people's liberties. It is the means by which the people are enabled to determine the course of their government and make it continually respond to their needs. It is inconceivable that the political process could work adequately if it were confined exclusively to a direct influence on the executive branch. As I see it, the correct view of our government would accept the functions of the legislature and the executive as complementary rather than emphasize their role as parts of a structural system of checks and balances. Overemphasis on the idea of checks and balances and minimization of political considerations should be equally obsolete. The realm of the political has expanded greatly and must expand still more if democracy is to keep abreast of the conditions under which it must live in the middle of the twentieth century.

Congress is enormously important as a political agency of the people. Differences between Congress and the executive departments grow in part out of an imperfect governmental structure, in part out of complexity, in part out of carelessness, and in part out of differences in functions. The greater complexity of popular interests and concerns today and the consequently greater complexity of government are reflected in increasingly more complex relations between the two branches. Government finds its tasks more complex and difficult today because society finds its problems more complex and difficult. The Congress is no more immune from the consequences of this fact than the executive. One of its results has been to make communication and understanding between the two branches less easy than it used to be.

Many members of Congress believe that persons in the departments are contemptuous of the Congress and of the Senators and Representatives who compose it. While in some few particulars and with a very few specific individuals there may be something to such a belief, I have never seen an individual in any of the executive departments who actually had a general feeling of that kind. In some specific matters they may feel that some individual members of Congress do not sufficiently understand the nature of big administration or that others are too exclusively or too narrowly political, but this feeling is far from contempt. The general attitude in the departments is definitely one of respect for Congress, of dependence on Congress, and of belief in the central importance of the law-making function.

If members could overhear the constant references to Congress in administrative discussions, they would be surprised and complimented. "Congress determined this"; "the attitude on the Hill is against that"; "Congress wouldn't consent to that"—these and like statements are as common as daily breath in the departments. Career officials have this sentiment of sensitivity to Congressional attitudes in a high degree. Departmental executives especially charged with responsibility for relationships with Congressional committees find in that responsibility their great resource in policing administration and in enforcing governmental standards.

The attitude members of Congress encounter in the departments that makes them uneasy is really an attitude of fear. To the departments the power of Congress is immense and clear. The rank and file in the departments are exceedingly timid before Senators and Representatives, and the higher-ups range from extremely careful to cautious. These conditions make effective communication difficult. It is not that persons in the departments are unwilling to communicate fully or wish to cover things up. It is basic doctrine, invoked daily and never questioned, that everything done must be so done as to be ready for Congressional review. I have never seen a departmental situation in which the prospect of a really thorough investigation by Congress was not welcomed with a sense of relief. Usually the feeling is: "While Senator X or Congressman Soandso will be awfully hard and mean, the Committee as a group will get the complete story.

They will find that as a whole we did a pretty fair job, and they'll act accordingly."

Communication between Branches Defective

It is because of the difficulty of telling a whole involved, technical story in each particular interchange and the fear of the power of Congressmen who consequently react to scant information that personnel in the executive branch may at times seem to be lacking in candor in giving information. Many persons in the departments feel themselves to be inept in such interchanges. Nor are they confident of what their more remote superiors will do in the face of particular kinds of influences. In many cases, therefore, communication is poor because it is between different levels of power. In the eyes of the bureaucrat, the advantage lies entirely with the Congressman.

Another factor accounting for poor communication is that most discussions necessarily relate to rather precise administrative questions and not to issues of policy or program. If members of Congress and bureaucrats could confer now and then when the Congressmen were not trying to get the administrators to do specific things being demanded by constituents, or trying to dig up something for the sake of personal publicity, they would find an extraordinary measure of common ground, common purpose, and mutual respect. In almost every instance where members of Congress and persons in the departments become *generally* acquainted, real respect and friendship develop. But when the member is under pressure from his constituents and is forced to ask for something which often he knows is not in order and which other times, if there were opportunity, he could often be made to see as at least dubious administratively, his reaction is almost certain to be an unsatisfied and angry resentment against bureaucrats.

In general, the level of ability and quality among members of Congress is high. They are persons of patriotism and intelligence. In personal traits they differ perhaps as widely as any other group of 531 individuals—though they may and probably do have some common attributes because of their common interest and common experience in politics. Persons who will regularly submit themselves to popular franchise must have certain qualities not found among

more retiring people. One of the difficulties in the relationship between Congress and the executive departments lies in the fact that unfortunate experiences with a few members of Congress naturally cause administrative officials to shy away from all unnecessary contact with "the Hill." I recall at least two Congressmen who had so violent a disregard for the humanity of administrative personnel as to warrant anyone in trying to avoid an encounter with them. There are too frequently—although by no means regularly—instances in Congressional committees of individual members, in temper or in partisan heat, grievously insulting government employees called before them. Such abuse of power damages relationships for guilty and innocent members alike. It stems largely from lack of acquaintance and poor previous communication, from the fact that even business of common concern cannot always be easily and quickly mastered. It arises also from a cross-examining technique in which many members of Congress are expert. Such expertness on the part of an opposition member keen to embarrass the Administration can make a committee appearance a terrible ordeal. And persons in the departments, though they may be familiar enough with pressure groups, often fail fully to appreciate the situation in which Congressmen are placed by the pressures on them from their constituents. Where there is real acquaintance, the bureaucrats invariably develop an improved understanding of Congressional perspective and find some ways for making pressures on Congressmen more tolerable. On the other hand, Congressmen do not adequately appreciate that the bureaucrats actually do function in their own field in a way basically political and that responsible bureaucrats are more broadly—that is, more nationally—exposed politically than members of Congress, even though they function in a way different from Congressmen. The lot of Congress would be intolerable if it were otherwise.

Rayburn's Incisive View of Congress

Just as there is need for improvement in governmental administration, so there is need for improvement in the functioning of Congress. Fundamental to any such program of improvement, however, is a clearer conception of the role of the Congress itself in American government. Several years ago Speaker Sam Rayburn discussed this

subject in a way that deserves to live in our literature of government. His address, delivered at Dallas, Texas, December 10, 1941, is worth quoting at some length:

"Even for our most gifted lawmakers the problems of government are not as simple as they were a hundred and fifty years ago. It is not as easy as it once was for the Congress to meet both the demands for adequate discussion of the nation's needs and the demands for the necessary legislative action to meet those needs. The ability of the Congress to meet these insistent demands is the test of the ability of our democracy to survive. Out of its own experience and within the broad contour of the Constitution the Congress is evolving the means necessary to meet that test.

"For some years, gradually and experimentally, the Congress has been wisely delimiting the field of effective legislative action. It has been confining itself more and more to laying down definite standards of legislative policy and leaving the detailed application of these standards to administrative agencies with technically equipped staffs. This procedure gives promise of improving rather than impairing both the character of the legislative debate and the quality of the legislative product. It enables the Congress to debate broad matters of policy without being lost in a mass of technical detail. It enables the Congress to know and understand the nature of the legislation upon which it votes. And it does not take from the Congress the power to amend or supplement legislation of this character at any time that it finds that legislation is not being applied and enforced in accordance with Congress' own understanding of its declared policy.

"Far from undermining the constitutional authority of the Congress, delegation of authority to administrative agencies is one of the surest safeguards. It is a procedure which conserves the vital powers of the Congress for vital matters. It removes rather than creates the danger of dictatorship by providing the means of making democracy work under the complex conditions of modern life. I am proud to have taken an active part in the creation of many of those commissions and boards. I might name the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Tariff Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board.

"The Interstate Commerce Commission is an agency of the Congress. The Interstate Commerce Commission does not perform any act that the Congress has not the power and the authority to perform itself. Members of Congress are too busy with other duties, among them fixing great legislative policies, to take the time to go into finer technicalities of a

rate structure or granting the right to a railroad to issue new securities, whether in the form of stocks or bonds. Congress therefore delegated this authority to a commission of eleven men with trained experts to work out the details for them. The same might be truly said of every board and every other commission formed in the government.

"The passage of these acts was not the abdication of Congress of its authority, but a delegation of that authority to its creature.

"The growing demands made upon the legislative branch of government make a responsible national leadership and national direction increasingly vital. That leadership and direction must be intimately informed through the administrative organs of government of the multitudinous problems with which modern government must deal and with which no individual unaided by a large and co-ordinated organization with a highly trained and efficient personnel can hope to deal. Legislation does not spring full grown from the head of Zeus. Legislative ideas may come from an individual legislator acutely aware of his constituents' needs; they may come from some unknown administrator keenly conscious of his own bureau's inability to meet legitimate demands made upon it. But a legislative program requires technical competence to insure that its objective is effectively accomplished. A great national legislature cannot safely rely upon the technical assistance and advice which private interests, sometimes selfishly and sometimes unselfishly, are willing to provide.

"In nearly all democratic countries other than our own, national leadership is vested in a cabinet of ministers composed of the leaders of the majority party in the legislature or of the leaders of a coalition of parties or groups able to command the support of a majority of the members of the legislature. These ministers become the responsible heads of the great administrative departments of government, whose staffs are at their command in helping to devise and shape their national legislative program.

"Under our Constitution, executive leadership is vested in a President, elected by the people and responsible to the people. He is not only charged with the faithful execution of the laws, but under the Constitution it is his duty from time to time to give the Congress information of the state of the Union and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. The President is not a member of the Congress, but he has power to veto legislation and prevent it from becoming law unless passed over his veto by a two-thirds vote of both Houses.

"There has been much dispute as to the relative merits of our form of

government as compared with the parliamentary or cabinet system. I think that the two systems differ less in their practical operations than has commonly been supposed. It is sometimes said that the cabinet system give the parliament more power than does our own constitutional system give the Congress. It is true that under the cabinet form of government the parliament can at any time cause a change of administration by a vote of no confidence. But that very fact exercises an enormous restraint over the parliament and makes party discipline much more strict than with us. In practical operation the individual Senator or Representative in Congress has much more scope to express and make his individual point of view felt, and that scope is limited much more by self-imposed rules of seniority than by any principle of party responsibility.

"It is not too much to say that our form of government works best when a majority in the Congress is sympathetic toward the leadership of the President. As a direct representative of all the people, he symbolizes the hopes and aspirations of a nation; as the successful party candidate for the nation's highest office he is the leader of his party. The President thus carries a mandate not only from the majority of his party but from the majority of the electorate. A President, under our system of government, can escape the responsibility of leadership only by incapacity and lack of personal force. President Wilson was often quoted as saying: 'I am the responsible leader of the party in power.'

"But no President has been able effectively to draw together the divergent forces and conflicting interests represented in the Congress without assuming and asserting vigorously the power of his office. The President has no legal authority to compel the Congress to accept his leadership. But unlike a member of the Congress, he owes no special loyalty to any one state or to any one district; he is elected to represent the nation as a whole. Grover Cleveland stated: 'In the scheme of our national government the Presidency is pre-eminently the people's office.'

"The President therefore is in a position to exert great moral influence upon the Congress to see that the action of the Congress is responsive to the desires of the nation as a whole, and that the national interests are not obscured by local or group interests and are not frustrated by a combination of these interests contrary to the general good.

"If the President should lose touch with the people and with the national needs, the Congress is obviously in a position to refuse to go along; it is difficult, however, for the Congress itself to supplant, rather than merely act as a check upon, the leadership of the Chief Executive. After Lincoln's death a Vice President succeeded Lincoln who could not in the same

measure speak for the country as a whole; and at least partly because of that fact, the Congress tried to assume the role of national leadership. The results, as we know, were disastrous for the whole country. The ignoble treatment of the South during this period still has its effect upon the national economy. North as well as South suffered from the moral bankruptcy of the democratic process."

Some Unsolved Problems

Perhaps the Speaker touched too lightly on the contrast between the parliamentary system, as in Britain, and our system. My own judgment is that our government is very much more immediately dependent on Congress than Britain's government is immediately dependent on Parliament. In both countries the legislative bodies are a special means of popular control which I feel to have the most thoroughgoing importance. But in this country Congress expects, and the people expect it, to do vastly more in the way of policy *initiation* and precise administrative control than is expected of the British Parliament. Parliament, in effect, has a veto power rather than the other way around. The British government more clearly and directly than ours "does that to which a sufficient minority does not sufficiently object." Yet the popular control is very real; both "the government" and Parliament are acutely sensitive to tides of popular opinion.

In these modern times there may be much virtue for this country in a development somewhat more in the parliamentary direction. The late Senator Robinson of Arkansas while majority leader of the Senate once proposed to a group of government technicians that they make a thorough study of our national legislature and indicated a belief that it might be worth considering to make the Congressional function mainly a questioning, influencing, and vetoing function. The Reorganization Act of that time furnishes a good example of Congressional action by means of legislative veto and indicates that such a change could be accomplished without formal Constitutional amendment. This would put our government in a position somewhere between its present status and that of the British government. Congress would retain the right to initiate, but use it less and less frequently. This system might be actually the best of the three possibilities.

A discussion of the relationship between the two branches written from the Congressional viewpoint would not be complete without more detailed presentation of the inadequacies existing in the departments. This discussion, written from the administrative viewpoint, similarly would not be complete without some further mention of Congressional attitudes and practices that offend the administrators' sensibilities. Aside from the tendency for Congress, in legislation, to stipulate standards and procedures more precisely than implied in Speaker Rayburn's philosophy—a tendency which has its justification but which now needs more and more to be questioned—these elements of difficulty relate almost wholly to the functioning of individuals in Congress, not to the functioning of Congress as a whole.

They begin, and perhaps they end, with efforts of individuals to exert special influence and to determine specific actions within the administrative field. Yet it would be utterly wrong not to have some differences in the influence exercised—even in administration—by individual members of Congress. Legislation is not simply a matter of counting noses. Here, also, noises count, too. The Vice President, the Speaker, and the majority leaders need special prerogatives and influence to support their greater responsibilities. To a lesser extent the same is true of committee chairmen. In general, however, the four named officials exercise their influence somewhat more properly and effectively than do committee chairmen. I think that this is attributable to the fact not only that they have greater responsibilities but that they acquire these responsibilities through election rather than through seniority. The seniority method of assigning chairmanships seems to me one of the worst of our governmental customs. If chairmen were freely elected by their Houses, or perhaps by their committees, I am sure they would be more responsible to the committees and to Congress. And they would tend to become *national* politicians rather than to remain spokesmen for their states or sections as so many do now.

But the worst abuses—in the eyes of administrators—are not those of committee chairmen as such but of a few individuals who, whatever their capacity, will try to dictate just as much as they can and will go to almost any length to force their demands for a specific

action in which they are much interested. Single individuals can often determine the precise wording or precise amounts in appropriation bills or other legislation. Some members use this ability as a threat to force a desired action or as a means of applying punishment when the action is not taken. And there are other devices and stratagems available to the same end. So it is that a few individuals force unsuitable persons into government jobs, or make it impossible for a particular employee to be discharged, or prevent the closing of a particular field office, or compel an office to be located at a place other than the one most generally desirable.

We do not want to press this generalization too far. The fact is simply this: in some instances, and sometimes very bitterly and hatefully, individual members of Congress degrade their calling and forsake their proper, high level of policy for particular and selfish purposes. It is only fair, however, to acknowledge that the pull of their constituents on them downward toward a lower level of calculation is terrific, and that most of the time the vast majority resist this pull with great courage and with great consideration for administrators as well as for the general welfare.

Beyond these points of direct concern to administrators there are two important general points that should be of public concern. One of these is the feeling of members of Congress of their individual lack of power. The other is their collective concern about the power of their Houses and of Congress.

A feeling of frustration and weakness is almost universal and generally inevitable in a big organization. The necessity to produce an "organized product," already stressed, means that usually no individual can feel much sense of accomplishment through his participation in the process. Laboring men and women working for the government find their situations not markedly different from the situations of similar workers in industry. For statisticians, accountants, scientists, and other specialists the same is true, but for substantive program workers and executives the sense of individual achievement falls as the size of organization and the complexity of its work increase. This applies particularly to government because of its size, scope, and political character. The theoretical power vested in high officials appears to be much greater from below and from outside

than it seems to be at the place where it is exercised. This extends to the Presidential office itself; any man in that office is much more aware of his lack of power than he is of the possession or exercise of power. And this executive situation is reflected in the Congress. Any member is one of 531, is a member of only one of two different Houses of just one branch of the government. The reconciliation of the views of the members of one House necessarily leaves each individual feeling rather futile most of the time. Reconciliation of the views of the two Houses aggravates the feeling. Reconciliation with "administrative and technical considerations" presented by the departments and with the national-leadership function of the President in a process hemmed in by popular sentiments leaves the individual member little sense of worth or achievement.

From a social standpoint this very condition is desirable. No one should feel very powerful in his individual person and situation. All concerned should contribute to a process of determination rather than to make determinations. Yet the problem for individuals is real and important. It is a widespread problem, familiar in terms of assembly-line factory workers but never much considered in terms of government legislators and executives. There seems to be no remedy except fuller understanding of the process on the part of the public and officials alike and some resulting transference of valuation to the *process*.

The price of the present situation is a premium on individual performance to get attention, and a discount on organizational performance to get agreement on action.

This problem of the individual is, like the second, one of most fundamental importance: a striving for Congressional power that takes the form of both constant and spasmodic conflict with the executive. It is a conflict to be viewed in part as wholly separate from conflicts over policy, although it contributes to the latter. The question of prerogative and power influences many votes in ways unrelated to substantive issues. The net of a situation in which votes are influenced first by considerations of individual attention and power and next by considerations of Congressional prerogative, added to a condition distinguished by sparring for position by the two parties, makes the total process more a contest between forces, often irrelevant to the

policy questions, and less a process of arriving at agreement for action on the merits of the cases.

A number of candid members of Congress have admitted in private to voting in pique over inattention to them as individuals on the part of the President. Cases where votes have been more determined by concern about Congressional prerogatives than by intrinsic policy differences are by no means infrequent. The Senate vote on the League of Nations is a vivid example where personal pique, Senatorial pique, opposition-party considerations, and simple isolationist opposition combined to determine a course of action contrary to the course popularly desired at the time. A similar vote reflecting only isolationist opposition would have been an entirely different matter.

One may feel that the League vote reflected a failure on the part of President Wilson in that he did not take Senator Lodge and one or two other Senators with him to France to negotiate the treaty. But the problem is by no means so simple. Lodge might well have used his participation to arm himself for even more telling attack. Even if participation had mollified him to the extent of winning his support, Senators not selected might have been all the more offended. No group of Senators short of two thirds of the entire body could bind the Senate, they certainly would not agree, and the very thought of sixty-five negotiators for a single country is so utterly absurd anyhow as not to warrant the suggestion.

This situation poses a general governmental problem of most compelling importance. It is a problem that stems from the separation of powers, which handicaps governmental unity and puts high barriers in the way of agreement on courses of action.

In our society the greatest power rests with the people. It is an ultimate power. Because the people have that power they can, when they clearly know what they want, require the government to do anything they choose, and keep the government from doing anything they oppose. The people cannot and should not make most specific decisions. The government provides machinery for making these specific decisions. But the ability of the people always to influence both legislation and administration, and their ultimate power to make specific decisions, are the essentials to the conduct of democratic government.

The continuing importance of Congress in an ever more complex society does not depend upon its becoming more expert in more and more fields. That is both impossible and undesirable. (Department, agency, and bureau heads should be chosen less and less for technical expertness and more and more for generalist qualities. Members of Congress must operate on a still higher level.) Nor can the end of Congressional expertness be achieved by setting up great staffs—small staffs would not suffice—of technicians to serve the Congress. That would establish a serious and wasteful duplication. It would add to existing governmental disunity the doctrinaire and competitive differences of different bodies of technicians. The absence of experts is not a principal governmental difficulty. Congress and its committees can and should have better-paid and somewhat larger staffs, but these staffs should be designed strictly to serve the special Congressional function. Congress also can make much better use of technicians in the departments, as Congressman Clarence Cannon has pointed out in a notable speech. But that is not the paramount need. Members of Congress are not elected as experts or to become experts in technical fields. They can and should be experts in politics.

The fundamental importance of Congress is that it peculiarly partakes of the popular function. Protection of its true importance requires increasingly that Congress treat its power more as an ultimate power and less as a devising and minutely, directly controlling power. Existing disesteem of Congress arises from efforts on the part of Congress to be responsible for things concerning which it cannot really be responsible and from a consequent failure to deal adequately with the development of general policy. The word "development" here is used in considered contrast with "formulation." The power of Congress—as distinguished from its influence—will be greater when it is used less frequently. Its greatest importance is as a *reserved* power.

There is no room to doubt that Congress has, and will continue to have, much vaster and more fundamental powers than the whole executive branch. Its pre-eminent and priceless function is to be the reservoir of penultimate control, convertible into the channel by which the ultimate popular power may be brought to bear in an orderly and prompt fashion.

War Administration

WARTIME NECESSITIES only make normal governmental necessities more vivid and less controversial. In quiet, peaceful times those necessities can and should be tempered more to common popular expectations. During such periods not only should the exercise of governmental authority be less extensive, but it should be slower, should grow out of more discussion, and should be applied with greater restraint and circumspection. Wartime urgency simply magnifies the necessity for swift and powerful public action. Many of the things a government must do to organize the nation for victory may be and are similar to things it does in normal times. But there is this great difference: when the country is at war, everybody understands that the business of the government is to govern.

In a nation at war governmental activity is enormously expanded. The nature of government is not much changed, but its scope is enormously enlarged. What was necessary before, to do big things through big organization, remains necessary; the demand for men capable of organizing and managing big undertakings suddenly becomes acute. The ability of administrators to operate on their proper levels becomes positively imperative. Talent for co-ordinating matters of inherent and far-flung complexity is needed more than ever before. The ability under confused and changing circumstances to discern the public interest coupled with the determination to sustain it—these become priceless as it becomes clear that saving the country is the only sure means of saving anything. The government must govern with a sure hand when its ability to make decisions and to enforce them becomes as essential to us as the air we breathe.

Nor, in a democracy, does government become any less political in wartime. The political climate will change and so will popular expectations. But what the nation can do and what the nation does are

no whit less determined by popular sentiments than they were before. The ability to sense those sentiments and to work in the atmosphere created by them, however, now become supremely important because of the importance and the urgency of winning the war, which is, until victory, the main business of government.

Parallels in Civilian-Military Administration

War does not contribute directly to increased popular understanding of public administration. Yet it almost seems as though it should, for military administration is understood by the public much better than other branches of public administration. It may be helpful, therefore, to discuss public administration in Army terms.

The War Department's wartime job is of such tremendous size and scope as to resemble in some ways the peacetime job of the whole government. Yet its task has definitely departmental limitations. Army supply needs cannot be treated without regard for other aspects of the manpower problem. Army transport, similarly, is just one part of a total transportation problem. Military activity itself must be subject to political activity as in the pre-invasion arrangements in North Africa, the deposition of Mussolini, and negotiations and arrangements with Spain and Turkey, not to mention the intricate task of handling continuous relationships with Britain, Russia, China, Mexico, Brazil, and other Allies.

The public has a general understanding of this complexity. They do not hold General Marshall closely responsible for the acts of a particular colonel. The parents of Private John Doe may be very unhappy about the attitudes and conduct of John's commanding officer or regimental head, but they are not inclined to blame General Marshall, or even to write to him about it. They are even less inclined to blame "the government" and to feel that the colonel, the Army, and the government are one and the same. Citizens may be aware of many instances of poor utilization of the abilities of Army officers and men—that is, of poor placement. Still they do not hold either General Marshall or the War Department or "the government" strictly to account. They know that there must be colonels in the Army, that there are thousands of them, that their abilities and qualities vary widely, and that they cannot be produced automatically to meet pre-

cise specifications; that while there is much discipline in the Army, each officer has an individual area of discretion, and that ideal placement of men according to special qualifications is an intricate and slow business at the very best. Consequently the public judges the Army by general results and judges its officers as parts of a total organization. The public sees Army administration as a system, as a way of utilizing many men and resources, or—as I prefer to phrase it—as a way of getting an organized product.

There are thousands of administrators in the Army working in systematic ways trying to improve the functioning of the organization. Rules and procedures are set up to minimize the bad effects of unsuitable officers and to supply able officers with whatever resources they may lack as individuals.

From the standpoint of administration, civil organization and management are fully comparable with Army organization and management and should be judged in the same way. An Army captain gets a good deal of respect. Yet no civil governmental official dealing with the public will, as a rule, have less rank or less competence. In every governmental department of size there are hundreds of officials in peacetime who should be regarded as having the rank of colonel or higher. In the Department of Agriculture in 1940 there were two or three hundred of a rank equivalent to those of brigadier or major general. It is fortunate that they are not uniformed, that the public does not defer to them in the way the public does to military officers. They are and should be civil officers. But the administrative system in which they function should be appraised and understood more nearly in the way in which our citizenry appraise and understand Army administration.

Unique Features in War Administration

War administration has the handicaps that new or suddenly expanded organizations always have—a difficulty that I have referred to earlier. It is unavoidable. Hundreds of thousands of new persons have to be brought into a strange environment to do things they have not done before. Efficient management of new agencies, comparable to ordinary governmental efficiency, is therefore wholly impossible. What has happened in civilian war administration is of a

piece with what has happened—but is accepted—in American business: namely, that, with huge increases in the volume of work and the necessity of relying on new and untrained personnel, it is to be expected that the laundry will often be late (and sometimes lost); that information clerks will occasionally be slow, or snippy, or uninformed; that, in general, service will not be up to prewar standards.

Nor would it be possible or practicable to minimize these difficulties very much by maintaining in peacetime much larger organizations with the thought that they then could start out in high gear if a war emergency should come. For organizations that are not actually able to function petrify or rot. War agencies do not deal with stable factors, much less with problems that can be readily anticipated. They are obliged to deal with innumerable unpredictable factors, some of which have a way of changing with dazzling speed. Experience and logic demonstrate that only the aggressor can plan well and organize well for war in advance, and that in time events will make such preparations obsolete. Apparently the best preparation the nonaggressor can make is to ensure that there will be this margin of time.

The salient facts regarding war administration, then, are these: (1) its infinitely greater complexity beyond that of the prewar period; (2) its completely governmental or public-interest character; (3) the necessity for huge and quick expansion of organization and personnel, entailing a severe drag on efficiency; (4) the speed with which the situations it must meet change; and (5) its political nature—that is, its dependence on popular thought and sentiment.

The handicaps and obstacles to high efficiency in civilian war administration are many and serious: the difficulties of making greatly expanded or huge new organizations function like older agencies in terms of operating efficiency; the difficulties of getting required new personnel (who for the most part have to be recruited outside of government) to make the great adjustment to a governmental function and to a completely public-interest attitude; the difficulties of organizing and managing enterprises of unprecedented size and complexity; and the difficulties inherent in promptly redirecting the energies of big organizations to new objectives when and as changes occur in the course of the war.

This means in sum that the difficulty in war administration is that war agencies and personnel are not sufficiently governmental. They are not sufficiently bureaucratic because, in the nature of things, they have not had time to develop proper and adequate red tape or to select and sift their personnel so as to bring to the top the men who combine the intellectual power, administrative skill, and political sagacity needed to manage the immense and complex responsibilities entrusted to them.

Another difficulty lies in the fact that, in a democracy, even if ultimate administrative needs could be fully foreseen, the administrative structure could not be set up full-blown at the beginning. By and large, administrative structure can develop only as rapidly as the people and their representatives realize the enormity of what their government needs to safeguard their welfare.

Criticism Often Irrelevant

Some time ago one of the most reputable of Washington's correspondents commented about wartime administration in a way that is all too common. He began by saying:

"Without doubt the largest obstacle to the American war effort is the cumbersome, sluggish bureaucracy here at Washington. It is a disease which afflicts so many after they get into government service. At first they try, then gradually they succumb to the ball and chain of bureaucratic methods and must slow down to the snail's pace at which the machine moves."

After this sweeping indictment came this example:

"An ambassador of one of the United Nations writes himself a patriotic speech and as a courtesy turns it over to one of the government agencies just to be sure he is in line with policy. He is in line all right, but his speech is censored in several irrelevant details, through a purely mechanical application of rules which in this instance makes no sense whatever. The ambassador described the size of the German force which attacked his country in the early part of the war—many, many months ago. It was ancient history. The Germans probably have forgotten what they used in that campaign but they could look it up if they were interested any longer, which is not likely. Nobody but a historian would care. Yet the detail was stricken out."

It happens that this incident, as it is reported, is not in the remotest way an example of the offense charged in the general indictment. This is not a story of delay, red tape, confusion, passing the buck, or organizational complexity. It is simply a story of the decision—probably a wrong decision—of an individual official. Wrong decisions are made in all organizations, governmental and other. In somebody's judgment, nearly every decision is wrong. This particular one might well have been argued on its merits as a decision. For since we have bureaucracy and red tape, it was subject to appeal. But the difficulties of appeal were not cited as the thing to be criticized—only the decision of a single official which somebody else believed to be wrong!

Thereafter the commentator went on to note and applaud what for some peculiar reason he seemed to think was a basic contrast:

"An American, representing American interests, tells me there is only one office in town where he can get a prompt yes or no answer. That is from the organization run by Sec. Ickes. You may not like some of the things Sec. Ickes says, but he can make decisions, which seems to be an increasingly rare thing around here."

There may be a formal contrast here since another man and decisions are involved. But here the making of individual decisions is upheld whereas in the first instance the same action was denounced. Neither instance had any direct relevance to the question of bureaucracy, which was the subject of the column. It related solely and exclusively to the merits of the kinds of decisions different individuals make.

Administration is, of all fields, the one of which Washington correspondents ordinarily know least. It does not have much news interest when dealt with seriously, but, unfortunately, it has a good deal of news interest to a Don Quixote who likes to tilt at the devilish windmills of bureaucracy and red tape.

The correspondent I have quoted is a highly intelligent person. He would be among the first to denounce a criticism of a public policy consisting of names and epithets thrown at the particular individuals who happened to head the agency responsible for the policy. Yet, like many other commentators, he often tends to discuss administration

in terms of epithets. Swearing at the government is a right, and one which has its values. But it is certainly the least useful way for those to employ their energies who are potentially capable of helping the public understand and appreciate the exceedingly intricate and difficult problems of civilian war administration.

Understanding the Difficulties

Complexity is the outstanding factor in the management of our national war effort. Take the function of the Office of War Information. To formulate and effectuate "information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort, and of the war policies, activities and aims of the Government" is a policy to which no one objects. Applying the policy is what is difficult. To do it perfectly would involve knowing a vast deal of what the Army knows, as a total organization, and of what the State Department knows, and the Navy and the Foreign Economic Administration and several other organizations. OWI cannot and does not pretend to know what the staff of all these agencies know. It must, therefore, use caution and check appropriately with these various organizations. Yet no one general in the Army can know all that the Army knows that would have a bearing on the matters on which OWI might want clearance; he simply could not imagine all of the possibilities. But everybody in the Army cannot be consulted; it would mean endless delay and a great diversion of energy needed elsewhere. Therefore the general does a reasonable job of checking and analyzing the questions presented to him and then plays safe by being a little bit extra-cautious. A similar process goes on in other agencies. The Office of War Information then decides what should be released and what not. It is a sensible and a necessary process. Inevitably there are numerous instances of delay and confusion, of stupidity and ignorance, and of excessive caution. But, despite these faults, the nation is helped by the program far more than it is hindered.

In some fields of war management the complexity of the problem involved is indescribable. The decisions on the volume of grapefruit to be canned affects in some measure the number of ships that can

be built, the number of men that should be inducted into the armed service, the supply of fence available for expansion of hog production, the number of dehydration plants that can be built—and countless other things. To bring all these factors into focus, relating all the items to each other and translating them into specific functions and responsibilities on the various levels and the various segments of management, to do it quickly and to make prompt adjustments as and when conditions change—this is the job that the war has brought us. This is what is involved in a war of total resources. It is a job that can be and is being done. Happily it is not a job that must be performed to perfection. However, it must be done better than the Nazis and the Japs manage their corresponding job. Assuredly it will be.

After complexity, the outstanding feature of the task of administering the war is the newness of the job, the necessary newness of the agencies carrying on the job, and the newness of the personnel charged with managing the job. Two or three of the agencies—the War and Navy Departments, for example—were old and well established when the first attack came, but the sudden and enormous growth of both of these departments puts them, in terms of administration, in a situation not much different from that of the agencies wholly new. They have to rely largely on new personnel unacquainted with government, unacquainted with any organization of comparable size, unacquainted with their regulations and procedures, and unacquainted with most of the elements in the military situation.

Reference was made earlier to the American industrialist who said that his plant employing three hundred was far less efficient than his plant employing thousands, owing to the fact that the small plant was new whereas the big one was old. Given a second new plant employing a thousand, of the same age as the smaller plant, it would have been less efficient. Public administration must bow to the same law. Huge new government departments simply cannot be highly efficient. The problem is first to make them as efficient as possible and then steadily to increase their efficiency.

Related to the fact of newness, in explanation of the problem of achieving efficiency in war administration, are the nature and weight of the burden which has to be carried by top executives. Anyone ex-

perienced in organization and administration knows that there is a vast difference between establishing a big organization and assuming the direction of a big organization already successfully functioning. It is not easy to judge the capacity of a new president coming into the headship of a great and going corporation. He may ride on the organization rather than contribute to it, and it may take months and years to ascertain the facts. In or out of government, a good going organization may operate rather effectively for a time with a mediocre head, provided, of course, he does nothing to damage the organization. But to start a big organization in government, or enormously to expand a small one, puts a vastly different and an incapable burden on the top man. In business many new organizations are based on new ideas, and a new idea may be so superior as to confer on the firm advantages that enable it to thrive without superior organization or management. So it is that some men who have not been gifted with a general capacity for creating new organizations have nevertheless been credited with having created successful new organizations. But be that as it may, there was before the war almost no field of material of demonstrated ability to create large governmental organizations of the kind required for war management. Nor could the lack of an adequate supply of such organizing genius have been nullified by a decision to establish numerous small organizations instead of the large ones projected. The job of relating the countless activities of many small organizations is the problem of big organization.

Yet not all of the difficulties in war administration inhere in the fact of complexity, or of huge new organizations or of old organizations greatly expanded. The conversion of older agencies from peacetime to wartime functioning has also entailed certain difficulties. Some older organizations which have not undergone great expansion are functioning now much less efficiently than they did a few years ago. Under successive leaders, or under the same leader grown old or used up, all organizations have their ups and downs, their better and their worse periods. Mediocre leaders become tragic figures when the requirements of leadership grow heavy. Changes of personnel in top positions, even though they do not ensure improvement, are a necessary part of the effort for administrative adequacy. New top

men tend to be like new bureaus: they have policy drive even though at first they show inferior administrative competence. By trying hard they can succeed in time in getting administrative control without making administrative wreckage. They can gain the refinements of administrative competence while giving their organization needed policy stimulation. War does not automatically create men equal to big jobs; our success in war administration lies in the fact that able men can learn how to carry great responsibilities.

Though the critics may continue to talk of the tendency of the new personnel and new organizations to "succumb to bureaucracy and red tape," the problem of mastering the complexity, newness, and size involved in war management is the problem of organizing new personnel into an effective bureaucracy. In part this requires devising for it an adequate amount of the proper kind of red tape. As the personnel is sifted and seasoned and as the organizations establish and improve their procedures, they develop a superior brand of red tape and evolve into a superior bureaucracy. Gradually the American people discover that theirs is a V-lined war administration.

American Adjustment to International Organization

WITH EACH PASSING MONTH since the Secretary of State's return from Moscow in November 1943, it has become increasingly clear that the American people have made up their minds on the central issue of our era: they definitely favor the formation of a "general international organization" and supplementary functional agencies through which the United Nations will co-operate for peace as they now co-operate for war. But evidence is wanting to show that they realize the implications for domestic organization and procedure of that national decision. We take it for granted that we are going to participate—indeed, to lead—in the establishment and maintenance of an effective system of world security and exchange. But have we considered what that participation will require of us by way of new attitudes within our own country and new departures within our own government? It seems to me we have barely begun.

Effective collaboration in intergovernmental organization depends initially upon the ability of various national representatives to reach "agreement for action" through international negotiation and thereafter upon the ready and continuous capacity of each participating government to make its promised contribution to the work of the organization. Missteps are possible at countless points along the way, any one of which may vitiate the undertaking. To light them up may lead people to think that no effort to organize independent nations for common action could possibly succeed. Yet that risk must be run. For unless we fully appreciate the difficulties that have to be surmounted in getting nations to work together effectively, we shall never muster up sufficient determination to "see things through." Only if we know how hard it will be to gain our objective will we make adequate preparation for the attempt.

Pitfalls in International Co-operation

The hazards to international collaboration about which we Americans must be concerned are of two kinds. In the first place we need to take into account the general difficulties that beset diplomatic conferences and negotiations, the necessary preliminaries to all inter-governmental undertakings. Among these are difficulties deriving from defective communication between national delegations and their home governments, from differences in language, from the need to be constantly solicitous of every nation's self-esteem, from the clash of national economic interests, and from the fact that all problems have to be approached through national channels even though that very approach may tend to make them less soluble.

Secondly, there are several hazards inherent in the organization and procedure of our own national government. Our federal structure, the separation of powers, the two-thirds rule in the Senate, the strong sense of prerogative in Congressional committees, the administrative individualism shown by most executive departments and agencies, and the limited integration which the State Department has achieved in its own internal organization—these features of our political system handicap the United States government in co-operating effectively with other nations. It will be useful to examine briefly the pitfalls in each class.

Consider the working situation at any international conference. In the case of world-wide undertakings, there will be spokesmen from forty to perhaps more than fifty separate national states. These men have to act as the embodiment of all the power and dignity and all the aspirations, interests, and preoccupations of their respective nations. Even, therefore, when individually they have the strongest urge to co-operate, agreement will not be easy. All the delegations save one will be in a foreign country and in something less than perfect communication with their home governments. They will have come with instructions varying greatly in character and detail. The various spokesmen will differ considerably in the facility with which they use their own national language and even more so in their mastery of the language of the conference. Each individual must weigh as best he can the forces at work in the assemblage, bearing in mind not only what the representative of Country X said for the record on

Point Y, but also what he divulged privately regarding the willingness of his government to accept a compromise. And all the time every delegation must determine as shrewdly as possible how best to balance the claims of national interest and international welfare.

Note too that the more representatives each nation sends, the harder it is for the conference to arrive at a decision. For differences arise then not only between delegations but within them as well. Delegations with voting powers should be small, under definite leadership and discipline, usually limited to officials, with a staff of advisers and technicians.

The wonder is that positive agreement is ever reached. Even the highest common denominator of national interests and policies is likely to be too low to provide a genuinely sound basis of "agreement for action." Since, however, such agreement defines the very object and purpose of international consultation, the people of every country have a moral obligation to "bend" their own procedures and attitudes toward acceptance and support of the results of the negotiations. The most and best which has any chance of emerging from the process of intergovernmental negotiation is always in danger of being too little and too weak. Consequently if any government accepts a proposal in conference but does so with the intention of "whittling the thing down" later by attaching reservations or qualifications to its ratification, it is practically certain to reduce the agreement to nothingness.

Turning next to the analysis of those difficulties that are peculiarly American, we may note first the consequences likely to result from our failure to make proper allowance for the fact that it is of the nature of federal systems that certain powers and functions are reserved to their component units. A national government in a federal system may on that account find it difficult or impossible to enter into binding international commitments on many subjects. The United States, Canada, Australia, and India (in so far as India is an actual nation) all labor under such handicaps. We have a rather unsatisfactory record in ratifying the conventions worked out by the International Labor Organization for this very reason. After a full decade of membership in the I.L.O. the United States has ratified only five of the twenty-three conventions which have been

proposed during that period, chiefly because under our Constitution most of the subjects with which they deal fall within the jurisdiction of the states.

The checks and balances inhering in the separation of powers within our national government, however, comprise a far more serious obstacle. It should not be necessary to emphasize that a government in which powers are divided is less unified than one in which they are not so divided, but the significance of that fact is often ignored. What it means is that questions are seldom considered solely on their merits; they are also considered on the extraneous basis of the prerogatives and the prestige of the separate branches, particularly the legislative and the executive. The fortunes of the members of Congress and of the President do not rise and fall together. American voters can, and frequently do, use the same ballot to vote for one man for the Presidency and for other men, favoring different policies, for the Senate and the House of Representatives. Even in the case of members of Congress who belong to the same party as the President there is little discipline of the kind needed to provide a basis for governmental unity. If we had a provision that any disagreement between Congress and the President on a test question could be "taken to the country," the influence working toward such unity would be enormously enhanced. But there is no such usage in our system, and the factors productive of self-discipline remain for the most part intangible and weak.

The difficulty is aggravated once more, in the case of agreements embodied in treaties, by the requirement of a two-thirds vote in the Senate. This means that the formation of positive foreign policy is vastly more difficult than positive domestic policy. Given the present distribution of our population, the letter of the Constitution enables one third of the membership of the Senate, representing only a small popular minority, to thwart the will of even a great majority of our people. We need also to be reminded that bicameral legislatures find it harder to make up their minds than unicameral bodies.

These three features—federalism, the separation of powers, and the two-thirds rule—all have a serious bearing upon the work of the State Department in carrying primary responsibility for the President for the conduct of our foreign affairs. But administrative in-

dividualism among executive agencies complicates its task even further. Many questions arising in our international relations are of such a character that they call for interdepartmental consideration, but the tendency of each agency, not excluding the State Department, to insist on exclusive jurisdiction in its field is so strong that they seldom receive the joint attention they deserve. Even where there is adequate joint attention, the process of arriving at a total-government position and securing adherence to that position by all concerned is most inadequate. The result is that the officials who serve as spokesmen for the United States in international negotiations on questions of that type (they will usually be drawn from both State and the other agency or agencies) invariably labor under a great handicap compared with the spokesmen of other nations.

Finally, the United States government is handicapped in the conduct of international affairs by the State Department's incomplete adjustment to its new administrative needs. Its internal organization has been much too loose for effective administration and remains somewhat defective even after the reorganization announced a year ago. Its procedures are in many cases time-consuming to the point of absurdity.

It is not intended to suggest that the State Department merits indiscriminate criticism. Its underpaid Washington staff is probably, man for man, the ablest in the capital. In the past the Department has relied too casually on the knowledge and experience of its personnel, and too little on organized bodies of information, but much improvement has been made in this particular in the last few years. The Department's chief weaknesses are: inadequate internal organization and poor administration; in the field of policy, timidity, a lack of bold imagination on the one hand and an academic remoteness from political reality on the other; a stubborn retention of old notions of foreign policy in narrow terms of international law and formal procedures; a failure to systematize sufficiently its relations with other departments; and a Foreign Service still recruited and developed in the old legal and formal mold. Concerning relations with other departments there are two principal problems—exercising policy controls over foreign operations without unduly handicapping administration, and developing processes by which domestic policy as

formulated in the various departments influences and is influenced by foreign policy. This latter is extremely intricate and difficult business.

Events, not persons, probably should be blamed for present shortcomings. The job confronting the Foreign Office of each of the more important nations has grown suddenly and enormously. The situation has been especially difficult for the State Department because of constitutional and traditional factors peculiar to the United States. More internal progress has been made in recent years in the State Department, in my opinion, than in any other great Foreign Office. The intention here is simply to make plain the general outlines of the situation in which the United States must begin to function internationally in a new way.

Though this discussion offers no exhaustive analysis of our handicaps—I have not even tried to describe the uncertainties engendered by our Congressional committee system—it will at least help the reader realize how many a slip there is for Americans between a popular decision to co-operate internationally and effective action by their government reflecting that decision.

Our Dangerous Unawareness

Why, with public opinion so favorable to international co-operation, have our people given so little thought to the domestic implication of world organization? Perhaps one of the main reasons is to be found in the curious fact that even our most incisive writers have shown far less concern over them than they actually merit. After endeavoring in his *U. S. War Aims*, for example, to outline definitively what should be the future relation between this country, its allies, and its present enemies, Walter Lippmann summarized by saying: "This is the definite question that the makers of policy have to decide. This is what the people have to make up their minds about. The rest is negotiation, legislation and administration." His own study was devoted almost entirely to that fundamental problem of basic relationships. Certainly he would never suggest that "the rest" could be dismissed by mere mention. But certainly also no one reading his provocative study would ever learn thereby to appreciate that in-

ternational organization—whether on his plan or some other—necessarily entails a number of significant national adjustments.

Sumner Welles in *The Time for Decision* and Clarence Streit in his wartime edition of *Union Now* may give a trifle more attention to the question of the organizational adjustments and procedural arrangements required of each member nation to make their plans effective. Yet for the most part they, too, leave essential "details" to take care of themselves. All of these men may, and probably do, assume that first things must be argued first—that the primary need is to develop public understanding and popular conviction for organized co-operation within the community of nations. But this proposition has a corollary: second things must be considered second; they must not be ignored.

Patently the time has come to direct attention to some of the hard material requirements for the building and functioning of the proposed general international organization and its various supplementary agencies. It is acknowledged on all sides that their own structures and procedures should be conceived in terms of the functions they will perform. Is it of any less importance to recognize that a nation pledged to work with them and through them has to relate its own methods of organization and operation to its responsibilities under the agreements creating the agencies? The architecture of intergovernmental politics comprises more than the making of broad artists' sketches for the utilities and shelters humanity needs for its welfare and security in this unsteady world. It also includes stipulation of technical specifications running down to the humblest details of construction, maintenance, and operation. Just as special contributions have been required from the people of the United States for the winning of this war, so special contributions will be required from them for the winning of the peace. Our citizens have come, with quite good grace, to understand why we cannot presently have our usual quota of cars and gas and tires. We now need to understand with equal clarity and to accept with equal grace that international co-operation for peace and plenty will require us to discipline some of our old habits and modify various former practices in our dealings with other countries. Hitherto we have been

rather oblivious of certain things that are essential to success in intergovernmental collaboration. That is a luxury we can no longer afford. The American people felt that they had made up their minds about what Lippmann calls the "definite question" of basic relationships in 1920. It was mainly failure in "negotiation, legislation and administration" that rendered their conclusion futile. We cannot let that occur again.

Every citizen of the United States has an opportunity to exert an influence on American membership in international organizations. If our people are to discharge the responsibility therein implied, they must avoid the error of becoming exclusively concerned—as Wilson was after the last war and as several of our leading architects seem to be now—with general political arrangements. The fact that the general conceptions of 1944 are probably more realistic than those of 1919 might turn out to be almost irrelevant. For no matter whose scheme is chosen, it will come to naught if it dismisses "negotiation, legislation and administration" as matters of minor consequence.

Many observers have remarked on the inexperience of the United States in international dealings and on its long immunity from the necessity of comprehensive organization for the handling of intergovernmental affairs. Some draw the conclusion that we have become incapable of effective participation in international collaboration. Their argument is that our national government has no capacity for handling the complicated details of international business. They prove too much. Their "realism" overreaches itself. We do lack experience. Our government does labor under certain definite handicaps. But the prospect is not hopeless. It will be hard for us to translate our national intentions to co-operate with other peoples into the actualities of practical, day-by-day intergovernmental collaboration, but it will not be impossible if we see what specific things are necessary and do them. Can we change our easy attitudes and awkward usages? If we can, we can make the necessary national adjustments for world co-operation.

But No Reason for Despair

Our aspiration for a world in which all peace-loving nations co-operate for their own security and welfare obviously runs ahead of

prevailing attitudes and traditions not only here but elsewhere. The difficulties that bar the way to the formation of international organizations that actually work are solid and substantial. Yet if we use our wits within the limitations they impose, we can hold their disadvantage to a minimum and may even be able in some instances to employ their strength to gain a helpful leverage.

Take the matter of nationhood and nationalism. Nationalism is clearly a barrier to the creation of anything like an effective world government in the early future. Yet the peoples of the earth want—and need—to handle some of their problems internationally. If their national governments were not available to serve as channels for effectuating that co-operation, how could they proceed at all? Again, though many persons insist that it would be practicable to try to establish a super-state at this juncture in history, who can say that the world commonwealth will not be built sooner and better if, because of these obstacles, humanity is first obliged to experiment with a number of less ambitious organizations?

However bright or dark may be the ultimate prospect for a genuine world government, for the immediate future the task is to organize co-operation between ourselves and other *nations*. Granting all the things that are said about the evils of nationalism, no thinking man expects that the peace settlement after this war is going to involve the early disappearance, as such, of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Republic of China, or any other major country. The immediate questions concerning international co-operation, therefore, are these: What kinds of organizations are the great nations likely to form or support? (Obviously they will create or allow to be importantly effective only those kinds in which they could participate as nations.) On what terms will they participate? In what manner? By what means?

All these essential new arrangements will have to be *intergovernmental* in character. This fact is of tremendous significance. We cannot begin the practice of international collaboration by bringing two billions of people into a town meeting; nay, not even that lesser number identified with but a single interest, such as labor or industry or agriculture. Most of the people of the world are organized in no other way than through governments. There simply is no way to by-

pass nations. It would be unwise to try to by-pass them even if there were, because national values and interests cannot be recognized and integrated excepting through intergovernmental mechanisms. For every person alive, therefore, national citizenship constitutes his one good ticket for membership and participation in international organization.

If all of the functions for which it were desired to create international facilities had to be lodged in a single, comprehensive intergovernmental agency—if, in other words, the various peoples of the United Nations were obliged to put all of their international eggs into one big basket—questions of procedure affecting national participation could not avoid taking on an equal importance in many cases with questions of substance. Happily that is not the prospect that confronts us. The United Nations contemplate the creation of a number of intergovernmental organizations. It should therefore be possible for member governments to consider their working relations with any one particular organization as of something less than the most vital significance. When separate agencies are created for different functions, nations will usually be willing to use a specific method of voting in certain fields and on some questions even though they might with good reason be quite unwilling to use it in other fields and for all questions. By the same token they will also be willing to share costs differently in different cases.

Thus even though as a people we are somewhat lacking in international experience and though our decision to co-operate with other nations for world security and prosperity must be expressed through the rather inflexible forms of intergovernmental collaboration, the problem of accommodating ourselves to international modes of action is not posed for us in its hardest aspect. With a chance of compensating ourselves in the agreement on Agency Y for overgenerous concessions made in negotiating the terms of the charter for Agency X, our diplomatic officials should be able to proceed with reasonable confidence and dispatch in working out with representatives of the other United Nations agreements covering each and all of the world's chief problem areas calling for international attention.

The United States is a Great Power, in fact, one of the Super Powers. Yet it also prides itself, and justifiably so, on its concern

for the rights and dignities of little countries. Americans cherish an ideal of world order in which not only they themselves but small nations too will be able to find safe and satisfying places. Reliance on a number of intergovernmental agencies instead of one all-comprehending organization will make it easier rather than harder for us to realize that aspiration. Our people can contemplate increasing American participation in international administration without anxiety because the number and variety of organizations and procedures employed will mean fewer instances in which actions are determined by a few big powers and more in which they will be decided by truly representative deliberation and voting. It will induce more substantial collaboration all the way round. There will be encouragement not only for the forming of common views at the policy level but also for co-operation in the handling of day-to-day business at the working level—the kind of collaboration *in operations* that Sir Arthur Salter stressed so vividly in his history of *Allied Shipping Control in World War I*.

What it all adds up to is that this generation of Americans has something better than a bare fighting chance to help build a free world. Consequently we shall be doubly remiss if by weak or wavering support we make it impossible for our executive and legislative leaders to negotiate with foreign nations and to support international organizations and undertakings in a manner fully befitting our wealth and power and truly reflecting our ideals of liberty and fraternity. They in turn will be remiss if they fail to show that teamwork which is so indispensable to really effective government.

Defective Processes of Decision

An efficient government is one that succeeds readily in making its actions reflect the intentions of its citizens. In the field of international negotiation and legislation this is something the United States government often finds it difficult to do. Constitutionally, responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations is vested in the President. As a practical matter, most of his responsibility must be exercised by the Department of State. But the rest of the government is not organized behind the Department in such a way as to guarantee its effectiveness in the management of our international business.

The explanation for this regrettable fact lies largely in the several peculiar features of the American political system that have been analyzed in the preceding pages. Their combined effect is such that no other nation in the world, certainly none of comparable importance, has governmental machinery so hardly adjustable to the international responsibilities it will have to carry during the coming generation as does the United States.

In any organized undertaking processes of decision are of the essence, and, as Chester I. Barnard points out so well in his book *The Functions of the Executive*, these processes consist largely in techniques for narrowing the range of choice. Without appropriate techniques for first limiting and then reducing the number of alternatives, no action could ever be taken because no decision would ever be reached. This holds true equally for courts, for legislatures, for administrative departments, for chief executives, and for a government as a whole. It has powerful application in business; indeed, our constant and ungrudging recognition of it there accounts in no small measure for our phenomenal industrial accomplishments. Yet we show a curious impracticality with regard to the point when it comes to the top level in government, sometimes largely ignoring the need for narrowing the field of choice, occasionally almost denying it.

Some of the methods for reducing choices and expediting decisions in our political system are so familiar that they are not seen in that light at all. Take the manner of electing our President. No candidate for that office from 1796 to 1944 would have received a popular majority had there been a completely unrestricted field, yet how many citizens realize that it is *only* when the choice is limited by the device of party nominations to a few principal contenders, and very preferably to two, that *any* candidate can win a majority? Incidentally it is germane to observe also that elections in which the voters are offered but two choices are far more likely to produce effective administrations than those in which the choices number three or four. John Quincy Adams was handicapped throughout his Presidency because the range of choice in the campaign of 1824 included, besides Jackson and himself, Clay and Crawford. Lincoln's efforts to avert the Civil War in 1861 were the more certainly destined

to fail because of the four-way division in the campaign of 1860 between himself, Douglas, Breckenridge, and Bell. The election of 1912, with its three-way split between Wilson, Taft, and Theodore Roosevelt, generated so much tension and friction that even after thirty years the nation retains its disinclination for another campaign on that model.

The procedure by which choice can be limited sufficiently to make it possible to arrive at agreement for action is often very intricate and must be carefully developed. Congress, for example, is an institutional device for narrowing the range of choice with regard to policy. All of the elaborate Congressional rules and procedures have been devised to serve that one aim. They are, to be sure, abused and perverted at times, but it would be impossible to legislate without them. Of all the statutes in the code, probably none would have received a majority in a popular referendum if it had been submitted to the people in all its alternative forms.

The difficulty of decision is roughly in proportion to the number of persons who must reach agreement. Difficulties grow almost in geometric ratio with increases in the number and the independence of the officials or bodies involved. The co-ordinator's job is invariably tougher than that of the administrator; interdepartmental affairs are never as easy to handle as intradepartmental undertakings; international matters are always harder to manage than intranational activities. Here we have the explanation of why the conduct of foreign relations is more difficult for democratic governments than for autocratic regimes and more difficult for the United States than for other free republics; the number of officials or bodies having the right to have a say in the business is almost at a maximum.

Consider again the problem of reaching definite "agreement for action" at an international conference. By and large, representatives of other countries are able to act with assurance that what they say will be confirmed by their governments. Now and then, admittedly, they have to cable home for a new instruction or for power to make a certain concession. But generally they are in a position to say without much delay: "This arrangement will be satisfactory to my government" or "Subject to this change, the arrangement suggested will be satisfactory to my government." On the other hand, they

watch with amazement the hesitation and squirming of United States representatives, handicapped as our spokesmen are by want of an equal ability to speak conclusively for the American government. For who *can* speak with any final assurance about what the United States will or will not do? The head of an American conference delegation may readily discover what is satisfactory to his Cabinet chief and to the President, but to find what would also be acceptable to other interested executive agencies and to two thirds of the Senate—or to 49 Senators and to 218 members of the House—is slow, complicated and uncertain business. Again, to learn what will be “satisfactory to the President” cannot fail to be especially difficult every fourth year, and to find out what will satisfy Congress is bound to be especially conjectural every second year. An American delegation to an international conference is, in short, in such a situation as Congress itself would be in if its own enactments were binding only if approved by a majority of our forty-eight state legislatures.

Changing Our Ways

Organized international collaboration faces so many pitfalls just because it is international that no nation, least of all a leading one, can afford to place others in its path through neglect of defects in its own political or administrative processes. The people of every country and the government of each nation have the right and the need to influence the process of international decision. That process should moreover be accompanied by exploration, debate, agitation, and petition. But no one people and no one nation can or should *determine* the process or its conclusion. We accept the results of domestic elections in which we participate whether our party wins or loses. We must develop an equal willingness to accept the results of international negotiations in which our government participates even though our proposals are only partially accepted.

Acceptance does not involve moral, individual, or national stultification any more in the one case than in the other. Acceptance can go along with continued agitation for reversal or change. But there must be acceptance of a process for arriving at decisions. Internationally as well as nationally there can be provision for checks on power, and for the reserve right of veto. But these provisions

have to be devised most carefully and exercised with caution. For in the end a nation will have to choose between the general plan agreed upon and the alternative of no agreement and therefore no international action. This does not mean that the United States need give up the least bit of its sovereignty or surrender the right of decision. It simply needs to understand the nature of its part in any decision as less than a determining part. Understanding this, there will be only one decision that it can make with utter freedom and complete precision: Will it participate in the organized handling of world business or will it go on paying the price of an unorganized world? In either case there will be decisions to be made; in neither will they be exclusively ours to make. But in one instance, we can participate in the decisions and influence them; in the other, the Hitlers will make the decisions for us.

Every knowledgeable citizen knows that we have only partially developed the civic attitudes and governmental usages essential to full-scale American co-operation in international efforts to promote security and welfare. Yet though we learn slowly and painfully, we do learn. Surely there are fewer people today than ever before—whether citizens, legislators, or administrators—who do not realize the risks, both for America and for the world, that lie in indecision and ineptitude. Of all the potential tragedies of politics in our age, the greatest would be for this mighty and friendly nation to botch mankind's present opportunity to achieve world organization, and we know it. We are, therefore, not nearly so casual or indifferent with regard to handicaps inhering in the structure or procedure of our own government as we were a quarter-century ago.

The real test of whether we are going to capitalize on the opportunity that is coming with victory in World War II lies in what we do to improve American governmental usages and facilities for international co-operation. Federalism and the separation of powers are fundamental in our system of government; they will not soon be changed either legally or structurally. We can, however, make our federalism more co-operative and less competitive than it has been in the past. And we can keep separation of Congress and Executive from degenerating into opposition, if we are determined to have it so.

The President and Congress can and must work together more closely on questions of foreign policy and international organization than they do at present. What more the President can do is especially difficult to see. Foreign affairs are not nonpolitical; they are thoroughly political, and for this reason it is hard to believe that they can consistently be handled on a nonpartisan basis. To inform opposition-party members of Congress fully about pending issues is to equip any who may be so inclined to make effective attack on what is being done. A few at least will be so inclined often enough to make the transaction of international business on a basis of nonpartisan consultation with Congress most difficult. There is no simple formula for a Presidential method. Each situation, and Congressional relations in general, must be given most careful and constant attention.

Congress for its part must give fresh thought to the nation's new need to be equipped for international decision and action. Failure in this would do more than anything else has done to damage the esteem and ultimate function of the Congress. Ideally, the Congress would recognize the special Constitutional responsibility of the President with respect to foreign policy, and the practical necessity for concentrating the power of decision, by permitting the President to name Foreign Affairs committees, subject only to party representation on the usual basis. Making these appointments an honor at the bestowal of the President might provide sufficient disciplinary unity. This could be done without Constitutional change, but it is most unlikely that Congress would agree to the proposal. Ideally, too, with appropriate safeguards the Congress should authorize the Foreign Affairs Committees or, preferably, executive subcommittees, to make commitments on behalf of Congress on specific matters requiring Congressional approval. Practically, perhaps as much as could be hoped for in the next few years would be some simpler reforms clothing the two committees with somewhat enlarged powers, providing that the two committees be elected by special party caucuses to make them especially responsible to the whole Congress, and employment regularly in the handling of international business of the procedure technically described as the legislative veto. This procedure, once advocated by the late Senator Robinson for general

use by the Congress, has been adopted on occasion for the transaction of domestic business. Under this procedure the Senate and House would in appropriate measures indicate generally the positions that they thought the nation should take on pending issues; specific actions then would be reported to Congress, and failure of Congress to veto any entire action within a stated period of time would constitute legislative concurrence.

It would, in my opinion, be most desirable if the two-thirds rule were abolished, but failure to do so need not prove fatal in every case. With chastened views and tempers among the members of the Senate and an appreciation of the strength of the popular desire for international co-operation to prevent another war, it is quite possible that the charters and covenants for the general international organization and the pending functional organizations will receive the two-thirds majorities required for treaties in those cases where even under present practice the treaty procedure would seem to be indicated.

The cure for jurisdictional cleavage among executive agencies having an interest in foreign relations (which includes practically all of them) is easy to prescribe but hard to apply. It is at once the clearer assignment of functions to each agency and the devising of better machinery and procedures for inter-agency consideration of problems involving the responsibilities of several departments. Establishment of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy represents the most promising development in this field during the past year. It is only a beginning, however. And it should be understood that jurisdictional cleavage is only one aspect of the problem of organizing total-government policy in the foreign field. In public discussions much has been made of shortcomings of the State Department, while not enough attention has been paid to the insularity and other limitations of the other departments as contributors to adequate foreign policy. Their responsibilities and outlooks are overwhelmingly intranational. The pressures on them are almost exclusively internal pressures. In consequence they are inclined to be excessively nationalistic and narrow when dealing with international matters. There is therefore a considerable gap between the State Department and other departments, and State Department policy

often is left too little modified by realistic internal considerations. In other instances the State Department is elbowed out of its proper role by an aggressive Cabinet member who attempts to project his own attitude in a single field into governmental foreign policy in that field.

Leadership in the development of foreign policy, even in specialized fields, must be exercised by the State Department. The development of a total foreign policy sufficiently influencing total internal policy and sufficiently reflective of relevant internal policy can be a principal duty only of the State Department.

Complete national adjustment to international organization, therefore, calls finally for rather extensive changes relating to the State Department itself. The personnel and facilities which it had in 1939 will never again be adequate to the nation's needs. Funds must be provided so that the Department will be able to secure new staff and additional equipment to handle its increasing responsibilities both here and abroad. The Department must discover how to integrate its own organization and expedite its internal procedures. It must help its employees to widen the horizons of their interests, and deepen their understanding of the nation they serve and of the times in which we live. This is especially true in the case of the Foreign Service. The range of its interests, its capacity, and its concern should be as wide as that of the government itself. It will be if it lives up to its name, for it is, officially, the Foreign Service of the United States. The Department of State should never need to be reminded that it administers that Service as a trust from the whole government.

The great new administrative necessity in the conduct of our foreign relations is the effective organization of the resources of the United States government behind the Department of State. The effective organization and administration of the State Department itself is, however, a plain prerequisite to the satisfaction of that need.


The Choice before Us

The most important single fact for us to understand today is this: In our generation the only arrangements that are possible for world peace and world order and for collaboration between the nations

of the earth are the arrangements that are now being developed in the process of international negotiation. These arrangements are not going to be perfectly satisfactory, either to the President, to the Secretary of State, to the Senate, to the House, or to the general public. But we shall have to take them as they come out of that process or take nothing.

Every citizen can, and should, have his own vision of the kind of international order he thinks desirable, and work for its adoption. Members of Congress and executive officials need the influence, stimulation, and restraint that come from serious popular discussion and agitation. But citizens and officials alike should avoid, as they would the plague, any tendency to become dogmatic, doctrinaire, or unyielding in their positions. For perhaps the greatest danger facing the world right now is that the people of the United States will become divided into firm and opposing schools of thought on the question of the way in which this nation should co-operate in international organization. If very many Americans take the position that they are for the purpose of what is planned, but flatly against the method proposed for its accomplishment—that will be the same as deciding to do nothing. Our practical alternatives in the international field are always going to be limited. We shall have to choose between acceptance and adjustment of a proposed method or downright rejection of it. If we accept, we can look forward with good hope to the erection of a stable and thriving world order. We can go on sharing responsibility for peace and progress in the same practical way we have been sharing responsibility for winning the war. And, in due course, we can help to make those arrangements better and more effective. But if we decide the other way, we forfeit the right to expect any of these things.






A NOTE ON THE TYPE

The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins, the man responsible for so much that is good in contemporary book design and typography. Caledonia belongs to the family of printing types called "modern face" by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. It has all the hard-working feet-on-the-ground qualities of the Scotch Modern face plus the liveliness and grace that is integral in every Dwiggins "product" whether it be a simple catalogue cover or an almost human puppet.

The typography is by Stefan Salter and the book was composed, printed, and bound by H. Wolff, New York.



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